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There is a common perception that the very idea of a science of ethics is a hopeless 
chimera—that the doors of ethical truth are eternally locked to the investigative 
methods of science. In this dissertation, I defend a metanormative view which I 
believe could provide the key to a future science of ethics. According to this view, 
which I call “Robust Metanormative Naturalism,” there are mind-independent, 
irreducibly normative facts and properties, which are distinct from all descriptive 
facts and properties and which sometimes secure the truth of our normative 
judgements. But these irreducibly normative facts and properties are nonetheless 
perfectly continuous with science: knowledge of them can be acquired through a 
combination of observation and inference to the best explanation, and they are thus 
of the same kind as other irreducible posits of natural science, like subatomic 
particles and forces of nature. 
In defence of this view, I develop an argument for the existence of mind-
independent normative truths which is essentially a refined version of Pascal’s 
Wager. I argue that we have Pascalian reasons, given to us not by our contingent 
desires, but by the normative content of certain epistemically possible worlds, to 
engage in the project of normative deliberation—which is the project of seeking 
determinate answers to normative questions—and that this implies the existence of 
mind-independent normative truths. I then argue that the truthmakers for these 
truths are facts and properties which are irreducibly normative, rather than 
descriptive, but which are also involved in correct causal explanations for non-
normative, empirical facts, and that fundamental normative truths can therefore be 
known on a genuinely empirical basis. In particular, I make the case that we cannot 
adequately explain why conscious beings universally respond in certain ways to 
certain of their conscious experiences (such as by wanting to avoid agony) without 
positing that these experiences have normative properties. And finally I suggest that, 
if we combine this (non-reductionist) metanormative view with a reductionist view 
of personal identity and the self, we can potentially arrive at a robust from of ethical 
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Robust Metanormative Naturalism represents a synthesis of two separate 
views which are often regarded as in conflict. The first of these two views is Robust 
Metanormative Realism, similar to that defended by David Enoch. Enoch (2007) 
describes Robust Metanormative Realism as “the view, somewhat roughly, that 
there are response-independent, non-natural, irreducibly normative truths, perfectly 
universal and objective ones, that when successful in our normative inquiries we 
discover rather than create or construct” (21). The second view is Epistemic 
Naturalism. This is the view that all knowledge and truth, including normative 
knowledge and truth, if not itself strictly scientific in character, is at least continuous 
with the kind of knowledge and truth delivered by the natural sciences, and thus 
that there are no sui generis domains of knowledge and truth autonomous from 
science. Robust Metanormative Naturalism, therefore, is the view that there are 
response-independent, irreducibly normative truths that we have to discover, rather 
than create or construct, and which are continuous with, rather than autonomous 
from, the truths of natural science. 
This view can be reduced down to three central commitments which I will 
defend in turn over the course of this dissertation. It is first of all committed to the 
existence of categorical reasons: reasons, whether for action or belief, which do not 
depend for their binding normative force on the aims or desires of agents. If we have 
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normative reasons to do or believe things because they are the most efficient means 
to the fulfilment of our ends, I believe this implies that we also have normative 
reasons to take the means to our ends which are not themselves dependent on these 
ends and which are therefore categorical in nature. Second of all, this view is 
importantly committed to the causal standing and efficacy of normative facts and 
properties: normative properties, just like descriptive or non-normative properties, 
sometimes cause us to behave in certain ways and to form certain beliefs, and they 
consequently make a difference in the real world through their influence on our 
actions and beliefs. The third commitment is to the empirical accessibility of 
fundamental normative truths. Fundamental normative truths are “normative truths 
that obtain independently of which objects have which descriptive [or non-
normative] properties” (Streumer 2017, 34). And I think we can acquire knowledge 
of such truths, not just a priori through a process of rational reflection and 
deliberation, but empirically and naturalistically on the basis of inference to the best 
explanation. 
I will argue that normative facts and properties are involved in the best 
explanations for certain aspects of the natural world, such as the actions and beliefs 
of human beings. My view is therefore closely related to the so-called “Cornell 
Realism” advocated by the likes of Nicholas Sturgeon and David Brink.1 But I am 
                                                            
1. It is also somewhat similar to Ralph Wedgwood’s (2007) brand of 
metanormative realism, which likewise holds “that normative facts and properties 
are causally efficacious, and play an essential role in causal explanations of certain 
contingent facts” (6). Wedgwood describes his view both as a form of Platonism (3) 
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not claiming that normative facts and properties directly earn their place in our 
ontology by virtue of their explanatory role, but rather that it is legitimate (and 
indeed necessary) to appeal to these facts and properties in explaining certain 
aspects of the world because we already have independent, a priori grounds for 
believing in their existence and causal efficacy. In particular, I maintain that 
normative facts and properties are deliberatively indispensable—we are justified in 
believing in these facts and properties because of the role they play in deliberation—
and explanatorily indispensable. The latter is also the main respect in which my view 
differs from Enoch’s non-naturalistic Robust Realism. By combining deliberative 
indispensability with explanatory indispensability in this way, I think Robust 
Metanormative Naturalism is able to avoid the problems associated with both these 
alternative views. It does not create a mystery about how creatures like us, in the 
kind of world we live in, can acquire normative knowledge and respond to 
normative reasons in the first place; nor does it suffer from the “Problem of 
Explanatory Narrowness” (Leiter 2007, 206), meaning that normative properties are 
too neatly tailored to only one sort of explanandum for us to think that they are real 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
and as a form of non-reductive naturalism (6): Platonism because it is based on the 
doctrine that “the intentional is normative” (3) (by which he means “that there is no 
way of explaining the nature of the various sorts of mental states that have 
intentional or representational content (such as beliefs, judgements, desires, 
decisions, and so on), without using normative terms” (2)) and non-reductive 
naturalism because it holds that, “even if normative facts are not identical to natural 
facts, at least all contingent normative facts are realized in natural facts” (6). My view 
is in no way based on the doctrine that the intentional is normative, however. And 
Wedgwood endorses an intuitionist account of normative knowledge (10), rather 
than the kind of best explanations account that I favour. 
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properties on explanatory grounds alone (211). Instead, it seeks to vindicate the 
human pursuit of normative knowledge and truth by coherently unifying the 
deliberative and explanatory perspectives.2 
In the rest of this introduction, I will say more about what I mean by 
“normativity” and why my view involves a commitment to categorical reasons 
(Section 1.1). I will also explain what I mean by “realism” in the metanormative 
context, distinguishing between what I believe are the two main forms of 
metanormative realism in the process (Section 1.2). Then I will explain what I mean 
by “naturalism,” in particular stressing the distinction between the Epistemic 
Naturalism which I accept and the different, Metaphysical Naturalism which I do not 
(Section 1.3). And finally I will provide a brief chapter by chapter outline of my 
entire argument (Section 1.4). 
 
1.1. What is normativity? 
Normativity, as I conceptualize it, is a kind of force that applies specifically to 
the decisions and responses of conscious agents. Street (2016b) observes that, in 
                                                            
2. The deliberative and explanatory perspectives can also be called the 
practical standpoint (Street 2016c, 293) and the theoretical standpoint (294) respectively. 
Sharon Street argues that metanormative realism “brings with it a severe and 
irreconcilable tension between the practical and the theoretical points of view on 
ourselves—between our understanding of our normative judgments as true and our 
understanding of them as things with scientifically discoverable causal origins.” I 
agree that this is indeed a problem for non-naturalistic forms of metanormative 
realism, but I hope to show that Robust Metanormative Naturalism is able to 
harmonize the practical and theoretical standpoints without forcing us to the 
conclusion “that things are valuable ultimately because we take them to be” (295), 
which I do not regard as fully coherent. 
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certain circumstances, such as when a car suddenly swerves towards us on the 
highway, or when we see a child in pain, “we have a conscious experience of certain 
features of the world (the swerving car, the child’s pain) as what we can only 
describe as calling for, counting in favour of, demanding, or requiring certain responses 
on our part (evasive action, a helping response, and so on)” (126). From experiences 
like these, we acquire certain distinctive concepts, such as the concept of a normative 
reason—the concept of one thing’s counting in favour of or calling for another—in the 
same way that we acquire other concepts, such as redness or the scent of roses, from 
other conscious experiences (127). Normative concepts are irreducibly normative in 
the sense that they cannot be defined or explained without invoking other normative 
concepts, just as the intrinsic characters of certain experiences cannot be captured or 
described except by using these normative concepts (126). We are subject to 
normative force to the extent that certain features of the world call for, count in 
favour of, demand or require certain responses on our part, and thus to the extent 
that the world exemplifies these irreducibly normative concepts (as certain of our 
conscious experiences seem to suggest). 
There at least two kinds of normativity, which are referred to by different 
names in the recent literature. Jonas Olson (2011) distinguishes between transcendent 
norms, which “apply to agents categorically; their reason-giving force transcends 
particular aims, activities, or roles,” and immanent norms, which, “by contrast, are 
those whose reason-giving force depends on agents’ engagement in certain goal-
oriented or rule-governed activities or their occupation of certain roles, such as 
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institutional or professional roles” (64). Brian Leiter (2015) believes that “what we 
call normativity is simply an artefact of the psychological properties of certain 
biological organisms, i.e., what they feel or believe or desire (or are disposed to feel, 
believe, or desire)” (66). But he draws a distinction between what we call normativity 
and “real normativity”; the latter consists of “standards of what one ought to do or 
believe that are not dependent for their binding force on the attitudes, feelings, or 
beliefs of persons” (68). Tristram McPherson (2011) distinguishes between “formal 
normativity” and “robust normativity”: the game of chess is normative in the formal 
sense “simply in virtue of its being possible to play an incorrect chess move,” 
whereas reasons (unlike chess) have a kind of distinctive authority that makes them 
robustly normative (232-233). And Derek Parfit (2011a) makes a similar distinction 
between the reason-involving conception of normativity, on which “normativity 
involves reasons or apparent reasons,” and the rule-involving conception, on which 
“normativity involves requirements, or rules, that distinguish between what is 
correct or incorrect, or what is allowed and disallowed” (144). 
When I talk about normativity, I am talking about “real” normativity (which 
we can also call “transcendent,” “robust,” or “reason-involving” normativity), as 
opposed to what I will call “psychological” normativity (which encompasses so-
called “immanent,” “formal” and “rule-involving” normativity). Real normativity 
involves reasons of a kind that exemplify irreducibly normative concepts: concepts 
linked to the conscious experience of certain features of the world calling for or 
counting in favour of certain responses on our part. These kinds of reasons cannot be 
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simply reduced to relations between our aims or desires and the efficient means 
towards their satisfaction. I submit, therefore, that all specifically normative reasons 
are either categorical reasons themselves, or ultimately stem from categorical 
reasons, in the sense that these normative reasons would not exist if not for certain 
categorical reasons. Real normativity is the kind of normativity that involves 
categorical reasons.3 
My focus is on real normativity because it is this kind of normativity that 
raises substantive metaphysical and epistemological questions. It is quite obvious 
both that there is such a thing as psychological normativity, and that we can observe 
this kind of normativity in a perfectly naturalistic manner: societies have norms, 
rules and standards which they uphold; individuals have normative judgments and 
principles which they accept and endorse. And agents clearly have reasons for action 
and belief in the sense that they have motives for these actions and beliefs, and in the 
sense that there are various factors which explain these actions and beliefs. But 
genuine normative force is not the same thing as motivating force or explanatory 
power. When we talk about normative reasons, we are talking about reasons that 
                                                            
3. I am not making a phenomenological argument for the existence of 
categorical reasons here. Street reminds us that just because 
 
we possess a certain concept [such as the concept of a normative reason], which 
we’ve come to understand in virtue of being the subject of a certain type of conscious 
experience, of course does not commit us to the view that there exists, “out there” in 
the world, some robustly mind-independent thing that “corresponds to” or is 
“tracked by” the concept in question. (2016, 127) 
 
But if there is such a thing as real normativity, there must be something that 
corresponds to or is tracked by our irreducibly normative concepts. 
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actually call for or count in favour of certain responses on our part,4 rather than just 
explaining them in a purely descriptive manner. There is a legitimate question about 
whether or not there really are any such reasons; and if such reasons do exist, there 
is also a legitimate question about how and under what circumstances we acquire 
knowledge of these kinds of reasons. It is these sorts of questions to which Robust 
Metanormative Naturalism is intended to provide answers. 
 
1.2. Robust Metanormative Realism 
I understand metanormative realism simply as the view that there are such 
things as normative force and categorical reasons: that certain features of the world 
really do call for or count in favour of certain responses on our part (and thus that 
our conscious experiences to this effect are not always illusory). Yet some who 
certainly accept the existence of normative force and categorical reasons do not 
actually refer to themselves as realists. Parfit believes that “reasons for acting all 
derive their force from the facts that give us reasons to have certain desires and 
aims” (2011a, 47), rather than from the desires and aims themselves (or from the fact 
that we have these desires or aims), but he calls his view “Non-Realist Cognitivism” 
(2017, 56), arguing that normative truths, while perfectly objective, “have no positive 
ontological implications” (2011b, 479). John Skorupski (2010) endorses a similar view 
he calls “cognitive irrealism” (439), according to which normative truths are 
                                                            
4. We might also say that they give us warrant or justification for these 
responses. 
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fundamentally about “reason relations” (i.e. relations that hold between normative 
reasons and what they are reasons for), and according to which these reason 
relations are entities that are both “irreal and objective—not mind-dependent” (420). 
And T. M. Scanlon (2014) denies that the ontological commitments of normative 
truths have anything to do with what the world contains (24), even though he 
believes that many normative truths are objective in the fullest sense (94).5 
To accommodate views of this kind, we need to distinguish between Robust 
Realism and what I will refer to as minimalism. The difference between the two, in 
short, is that Robust Realism applies the correspondence theory of truth to the 
normative domain, whereas minimalism applies the minimalist or deflationist 
theory. Under the correspondence theory, “[t]ruth is a matter of the intentional 
object of an actual or possible belief, actual or possible statement, and so on, 
corresponding to some real object” (Armstrong 2004, 16). The Robust Realist, 
therefore, construes normative truths as corresponding to real objects “out there” in 
the world, the real objects in question being normative facts and properties that are 
ontologically distinct from normative concepts and propositions (and which are the 
things that make normative propositions true). The minimalist, on the other hand, 
                                                            
5. Scanlon actually says that “many truths about reasons for action are both 
judgement-independent and choice-independent.” A subject-matter is judgement-
independent “if it is possible for us (at least individually) to be mistaken in our 
judgements about that subject,” and choice-independent if “the standards for assessing 
such judgments do not depend on what we, collectively, have done, chosen, or 
adopted, and would not be different had we done, chosen, or adopted something 
else” (93-94). However, he denies any assurance that normative questions always 
have determinate answers, on the grounds that “the domain of practical reasons is 
not a unified subject matter like set theory” (104). 
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holds that no more substantive conditions for the truth of a normative proposition 
can be given other than the content of the proposition itself. For the minimalist, “to 
claim that it is ‘true’ that genocide is wrong is just to claim that genocide is wrong” 
(Wedgwood 2007, 39); and it is a normative fact that genocide is wrong only in the 
sense that the proposition that genocide is wrong is true.6 David Copp (2017) points 
out that there are (at least) two senses of “fact”: the “worldly” sense, in which “facts 
are the truth makers of propositions; they explain the truth values of propositions; 
perhaps they are states of affairs” and the “propositional” sense, “according to which 
a fact is simply a true proposition” (34). The Robust Realist believes in normative 
facts in the former, “worldly” sense; the minimalist believes in normative facts only 
in the latter, “propositional” sense. 
The views of Parfit, Skorupski and Scanlon are all versions of normative 
minimalism as I have described it. I reject these views in favour of Robust Realism 
because I think that normative truths do carry positive ontological implications. My 
main reason for thinking this is that normative facts and properties (and relations) 
genuinely seem to possess some kind of causal efficacy and standing, whereas for a 
minimalist like Skorupski, “[r]eason relations are irreal,” precisely because “they 
have no causal standing” (2010, 439). I think we sometimes respond in certain ways 
to features of the world which count in favour of our responding in those ways 
                                                            
6. Of course there may be more to the truth of this proposition in the sense of 
further reasons why genocide is wrong (such as that it causes massive suffering and 
death). But the point is that there is nothing to the truth of the proposition that 
genocide is wrong beyond what there is to genocide’s being wrong (according to the 
minimalist). 
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because these features of the world count in favour of responding in those ways, such 
that if those features of the world did not count in favour of those particular 
responses, we would not actually respond in those ways. If we see a child in pain, 
and we have a conscious experience of the child’s pain as calling for a helping 
response on our part, and the child’s pain really does call for such a helping 
response, and we then proceed to make this response by actually helping the child, I 
believe this indicates that the normative fact that the child’s pain counts in favour of 
helping the child is one of things that causes us to make this response. Unlike Robust 
Realism, minimalism basically amounts to an implausible epiphenomenalism about 
the normative.7 Ronald Dworkin (1996), one of the early proponents of minimalism, 
held that “morality and the other evaluative [i.e. normative] domains make no 
causal claims” (120). But I concur with Leiter in replying that “that is plainly false: 
the moral explanations literature from the 1980s onwards—recall Brink, Railton, 
Sayre-McCord, Sturgeon and others—is replete with examples of the role of causal 
claims in ordinary normative discourse (e.g., ‘of course he betrayed them, he’s an 
evil person’)” (69). 
 
                                                            
7. Enoch’s version of Robust Realism is not committed to the causal efficacy of 
normative facts (Enoch 2013, 7). But if normative facts and properties are causally 
efficacious, as I believe, this still entails a form of Robust Realism, because it means 
that these facts and properties make a difference “out there” in the real world 
through their effects on our responses. 
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1.3. Epistemic Naturalism 
I believe that the role of causal claims in ordinary normative discourse, and 
the consequent ontological implications of (mind-independent) normative truths, 
strongly supports the synthesis of Robust Realism with naturalism. If normative 
properties make a difference in the natural world through their influence on us and 
our responses to them, and yet these normative properties are not themselves 
natural properties, this would seem to make them into supernatural properties.8 And 
the constraints of parsimony very much count against accepting a commitment to 
the existence of robust supernatural properties. 
Naturalism is sometimes defined as the view that there is no genuine 
knowledge outside of empirical science (BonJour 1998, 69), or that questions about 
what there is and what we know are reliably answered (only) by the methods of 
science (Leiter 2015, 64). It would indeed be fortunate if we could use scientific 
methods to find answers to normative questions, because these are unquestionably 
the most powerful and reliable methods we have for expanding our knowledge. 
Normative questions are among the most important questions we can ask—they are 
questions, after all, precisely about, or directly relevant to, what is important, or 
what matters—so we should, if at all possible, seek to find a way of leveraging our 
most effective methods of inquiry for the sake of answering these questions. Yet 
                                                            
8. Paul Draper (2007) defines the supernatural as that which is not part of 
nature but which can nonetheless affect nature (277). If normative properties have 
causal standing but are not natural, it follows that they must be supernatural on this 
definition. 
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unfortunately it is dubious that whatever normative knowledge we actually do 
possess is in any way the product of scientific methods. Deliberation is currently the 
method we use to arrive at normative conclusions. And deliberation is not the same 
thing as scientific experiment, especially in the moral case. We came to know that 
water is H2O as a result of controlled observation and experiment, but these same 
methods have not availed us of the knowledge that it is morally wrong to torture 
people for our own amusement. 
I will not define normative naturalism as the thesis that normative knowledge 
is necessarily a form of scientific knowledge (although I hope it can eventually aspire 
to this status). Instead, I will define it as the thesis that fundamental normative 
knowledge can be accessed by empirical means: that fundamental normative 
propositions can, in principle, have empirical evidence for and against them. As 
Parfit says, the normative naturalist is someone who believes that “[n]ormative 
truths … are like other truths about the natural world which might be empirically 
discovered, in the sense that some partly observable things or events might give us 
evidence for or against our belief in these truths” (2017, 55). I will define normative 
non-naturalism, in contrast, as the thesis that fundamental or pure normative 
knowledge is never accessible empirically, because the normative domain is 
completely autonomous from science. Scanlon writes that “[m]ost of the claims we 
commonly think of as normative are not pure normative claims, but mixed normative 
claims. They involve pure normative claims but also make or presuppose claims 
about natural facts” (2014, 37). The non-naturalist holds that there are pure 
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normative truths which do not presuppose any natural facts and which can only be 
known to be true a priori. 
As a non-naturalist, Parfit denies that fundamental normative truths are ever 
accessible empirically. In his words, “[t]here could not be any empirical evidence for 
or against the belief that we have reasons to want to avoid future pain, or the belief 
that torturing people for our own amusement would be wrong” (2017, 58). The 
naturalist does not need to deny that these intuitively plausible beliefs can be known 
to be true (or at least reasonably believed) in the absence of empirical evidence. What 
I maintain is that, even if we do not need to rely on empirical evidence to know (or 
reasonably believe) certain normative truths, these same truths can still also be 
known on a genuinely empirical basis. Just because there are some synthetic a priori 
normative truths does not entail that the normative domain is completely 
autonomous from science. I think we learn from Quine (1976) that there is no hard 
and fast boundary between an a priori accessible domain such as pure mathematics 
and a branch of empirical science such as physics, because “the contrasts that people 
are prone to draw between pure mathematics such as arithmetic, on the one hand, 
and physics, on the other, can be drawn just as well between theoretical physics and 
experimental physics” (75). For Quine, the boundaries between domains are 
essentially artificial, and “[w]hen we abstract from these boundaries, we see all of 
science—physics, biology, economics, mathematics, logic, and the rest—as a single 
sprawling system, loosely connected in some portions but disconnected nowhere” 
(76). What ties these domains together is that they all have some kind of link to 
20 
observation: we can observe how mathematical and logical principles work in the 
real world (for instance, as they are used in science). The non-naturalist may insist 
that the normative domain has no link to observation whatsoever; but if we really do 
have the capacity to respond to normative reasons, the normative domain gets its 
link to observation through its link to our observable responses, and this remains the 
case even if certain normative truths can also be known a priori. 
This Epistemic Naturalism, according to which there is no knowledge that is 
autonomous from science, is importantly distinct from a stronger Metaphysical 
Naturalism. Metaphysical Naturalism implies that there are no irreducibly 
normative facts and properties: to the extent that there are any normative facts,9 
these facts reduce to natural facts in the sense that these facts can also be stated using 
entirely non-normative, naturalistic concepts. If this kind of naturalism is true, then, 
as Parfit says, “the fact that some act is right might be the same fact as the fact that 
this act minimizes suffering, or is an act of which most people would approve” 
(2017, 57). I will classify the thesis that normative facts (such as the fact that some act 
is right) are the same facts as facts that are statable using entirely non-normative 
concepts (such as the fact that this act minimizes suffering, or is an act of which most 
people would approve) as normative reductionism. Reductionism is not the same 
thing as naturalism. On the one hand, reductionism is clearly compatible with 
supernaturalism: if normative facts can also be stated using entirely non-normative 
                                                            
9. The Metaphysical Naturalist might hold that there are simply no normative 
facts. 
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concepts, the fact that some act is right could be the same fact as a supernatural fact, 
like the fact that this act accords with the will of God.10 And on the other hand, it 
may be possible to acquire (fundamental) normative knowledge a posteriori even 
though normative facts are irreducibly normative (they cannot be stated without 
using irreducibly normative concepts). 
 
1.4. Outline of this dissertation 
Robust Metanormative Naturalism is precisely the view that there are 
irreducibly normative facts which can be known on an empirical basis. I will begin 
my defence of this view by providing a defence of metanormative realism more 
broadly in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 will assess Enoch’s Argument from the 
Deliberative Indispensability of Irreducibly Normative truths. I argue that Enoch 
does show that, in at least one important sense, deliberation is committed to the 
existence of mind-independent normative truths. But he fails to show that 
deliberation is itself justified in a way that entails the existence of these mind-
independent normative truths. Chapter 3 will supplement Enoch’s argument with a 
further argument drawn from Parfit which I call “Parfit’s Wager.” I think that 
Parfit’s Wager is able to show that deliberation is justified in a way that entails the 
existence of mind-independent normative truths. In Chapter 4, I will make the case 
against normative minimalism that normative truths have positive ontological 
                                                            
10. Not to imply that there are such supernatural facts, of course. 
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implications on account of the causal standing that normative facts and properties 
appear to possess. This will complete my defence of Robust Metanormative Realism. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I will consider what I believe to be the main arguments 
against normative non-naturalism and normative naturalism respectively. Chapter 5 
will consider the Argument from Queerness against the existence of non-natural 
normative facts and properties. I argue that whatever force this argument has 
essentially reduces to the (not inconsiderable) force of parsimony and Occam’s 
Razor. Chapter 6 responds to Enoch’s and Parfit’s arguments against normative 
naturalism, focusing in particular on Parfit’s Triviality Objection, according to which 
certain fundamental normative claims would be rendered implausibly trivial if 
normative properties were also natural properties. I argue that, at best, this 
argument only applies to normative reductionism, not the kind of Epistemic 
Normative Naturalism which I advocate, and in any case, it fails to take into account 
properly the fact that, if certain natural facts (such as the fact that some act would 
maximize happiness) are identical to certain normative facts (such as the fact that 
some act is right), these natural facts would themselves be normative facts (albeit 
unobviously) by virtue of their identity with these normative facts. 
In Chapters 7 and 8, I will explicitly defend (non-reductive) Epistemic 
Normative Naturalism. If normative properties make a difference in the real world, 
these properties should also be able to explain certain observable circumstances. As I 
stated in Section 1.1, normativity is a force that applies to our agential responses, so 
unless normativity is merely epiphenomenal, it must have the power to affect our 
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responses, and thus have the power to explain some of our response as well. Since 
normative facts and properties can influence our responses, it seems reasonable to 
infer that normative facts can be known on the basis that these facts are the best 
explanations for certain of our responses. This Normative Explanations Argument, I 
believe, is the central argument for normative naturalism. And it is this argument 
that I will defend in Chapter 7. In particular, I will argue that the best explanation for 
the empirical fact that all conscious beings have a desire to avoid agony is the 
normative fact that we always have a (normative) reason to want to avoid agony. 
Finally, in Chapter 8, I will argue against normative reductionism that normative 
properties are irreducibly normative. Normative properties are necessarily co-
extensive with non-normative properties (there is no possible world in which it is 
not wrong to torture people for our own amusement, for instance), but I think this 
indicates, not that normative properties are identical to non-normative properties (in 
the sense that these normative properties can also be stated using entirely non-
normative concepts), but that normative properties consist in certain patterns in non-
normative properties, patterns which are themselves irreducibly normative. 
The most plausible alternative to Robust Metanormative Naturalism, I 
believe, is a complete normative scepticism. And so, in the following chapter, I will 





2. Deliberative Indispensability 
 
Normative scepticism is the view that there is no such thing as normative 
knowledge: that no positive normative judgement is ever known to be true.11 This 
view is often motivated on the grounds that a belief in normative knowledge and 
truth saddles one with unacceptable commitments, whether metaphysical, 
epistemological, or both. Unlike the metanormative realist, the sceptic has no need 
“to explain how there can be facts that in themselves, that is, irrespectively of the 
desires, aims, roles, or activities of human beings and other agents, require, or count 
in favour of, certain forms of behaviour” (Olson 2011, 66). The realist might be obliged 
to posit a mysterious, inexplicable faculty of normative intuition in order to account 
for normative knowledge. Or he might have to make an ontological commitment to 
metaphysically “queer” normative entities (such as irreducibly normative favouring 
relations) in order to explain the normativity of normative truths. And even if the 
realist does not have to take on any inherently unacceptable commitments, a view 
which has to make room for normative knowledge and truth may just be less 
parsimonious than a view which manages to leave them out.12 
                                                            
11. That is, a judgement which says that something has some normative 
property (not just that it lacks some normative property). 
 
12. An error theory about all normative judgements (which states that all 
normative judgements are systematically false because there are no normative 
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In this chapter, we will look at one argument against normative scepticism 
and for metanormative realism: Enoch’s Argument from Deliberative 
Indispensability, according to which we are justified in believing in mind-
independent normative truths because such truths are indispensable to the 
(indispensable) project of deciding what it makes most sense to believe and to do. 
Enoch (2013) argues that “objective, irreducibly normative facts are indispensable … 
for deliberation, and that this indispensability suffices to justify belief in their 
existence” (9). For reasons I will explain, I don’t think this argument ultimately 
succeeds, at least in the way that Enoch formulates it. But I think an important truth 
can be extracted from it which will help us to construct what I believe to be a 
successful argument for realism: the argument I call “Parfit’s Wager” which I will 
defend in the next chapter. 
Some argue that we don’t actually need a direct argument against normative 
scepticism, because, for foundational reasons, a complete normative scepticism is 
completely untenable. Copp (1995) suggests that there might be no argument for 
metanormative realism which does not beg the question against scepticism, because 
any argument must involve an appeal to some norms, even if only those calling for 
coherence and consistency in argument. But, in Copp’s view, 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
properties) has recently been defended by Bart Streumer (2017). Streumer’s 
arguments for this view touch heavily on issues relating to the supervenience of 
normative properties on natural properties and the reducibility of the former to the 
latter, so I will not address them until Chapter 8 when I discuss normative 
reductionism. 
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this gives us no reason to accept normative skepticism. On the contrary, it 
suggests that an attempt to defeat normative skepticism would be an instance 
of the sort of enterprise Otto Neurath warned philosophers against when he 
urged us to remember that a sailor cannot rebuild her entire boat all at once 
while at sea. (46) 
 
In what follows, I will reply to the suggestion that normative scepticism is self-
defeating on a foundational level, arguing that even the most thoroughgoing 
normative scepticism can be motivated in such a way as to make it a serious option 
for the metanormative theorist (Section 2.1). The realist, therefore, does need a direct 
argument for realism. In Section 2.2, I will present the Deliberative Indispensability 
Argument in a way that makes it neutral between normative minimalism and 
Robust Realism.13 In Section 2.3, I will argue that there is a form of deliberation, 
normative deliberation, which is committed to the existence of at least some 
normative truths. And in Section 2.4, I will consider and reject a relativistic model of 
normative deliberation, arguing that the normative domain cannot be relativistic all 
the way down, and thus that normative deliberation is also committed to the 
existence of mind-independent normative truths. Finally, in Section 2.5, I will examine 
Enoch’s account of the rationality (or intrinsic indispensability) of normative 
deliberation, concluding that Enoch fails to show that we have any normative reason 
to engage in this form of deliberation, and thus that he ultimately fails to show that 
we are justified in accepting the commitment to (mind-independent) normative 
                                                            
13. I will postpone my treatment of this issue (minimalism vs. Robust 
Realism) until Chapter 4. 
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truths that normative deliberation carries with it. We are therefore in need of a 
further argument for metanormative realism. 
 
2.1. Is normative scepticism self-defeating? 
Copp argues that a complete normative scepticism cannot (or should not) be 
taken seriously at all: although not strictly self-refuting, normative scepticism is self-
defeating and therefore, in his words, “not seriously on the agenda,” (48). Normative 
scepticism implies that we are not justified in believing that anything has any 
normative property or status, and since being epistemically justified is itself a 
normative status (justification, epistemic or otherwise, being a paradigmatically 
normative notion), if normative scepticism is true, it follows that we are not justified 
in believing that it is true, or that it is epistemically justified to any extent 
whatsoever. Copp takes this to indicate that “the skeptic is in an untenable position 
… she cannot consistently accept that her scepticism has any justification” (47). 
Skorupski (2010), likewise, holds that: “[r]eason relations are the essence of thought, 
in that thought itself just is responsiveness to them. To deny that there are truths 
about reason relations is to deny the objectivity of thought itself” (457).14 If the 
sceptic is committed to denying the objectivity of thought itself, it is difficult to see 
how her own position could be objective either. And if we already know that a 
                                                            
14. It is not quite accurate to suggest that the sceptic denies that there are 
truths about reasons relations: if there are no reason relations, the truth that there are 
no reason relations would itself be a truth about reason relations. But of course, if 
there are no normative truths, then there are no truths implying the existence of 
normative reason relations. 
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position cannot possibly be objective even before considering arguments in its 
favour, it seems reasonable enough to infer that, as Copp says, it is not seriously on 
the agenda. 
Epistemic justification involves normative reasons for belief: considerations 
that count in favour of holding a certain belief in a way that “enhances, to an 
appropriate degree, the chances that the belief is true” (BonJour 1998, 1). In so far as 
the normative sceptic denies the existence of normative reasons, Copp is clearly right 
that the she cannot consistently accept that her scepticism has any justification.15 But 
this does not necessarily mean that there cannot be evidence for the truth of 
normative scepticism16; it does not put the sceptic “in the unfortunate position of 
subscribing to a theory according to which it is impossible to claim truly that there is 
evidence that the theory is true” (Olson 2014, 163). And even if a position is 
completely unjustifiable from an epistemic point of view, it might still be 
successfully motivated on the pragmatic grounds that it is simply “more efficacious 
                                                            
15. If normative scepticism is false, it actually could have some epistemic 
justification: false beliefs, after all, are often taken to be capable of having at least 
some justification. But if normative scepticism is true, this still implies that it could 
not have any justification. 
 
16. Eliezer Yudkowsky (2007a) tells us that evidence “is an event entangled, 
by links of cause and effect, with whatever you want to know about. If the target of 
your inquiry is your shoelaces, for example, then the light entering your pupils is 
evidence entangled with your shoelaces.” Evidence, in at least one important sense, 
is a purely causal notion rather than a normative one, and thus it is not self-defeating 
for the normative sceptic to appeal to evidence in support of her position. 
29 
than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of 
experience” (Quine 1980, 44).17 
As a normative sceptic, Olson (2014) rejects the idea that normative scepticism 
is self-defeating by drawing a distinction between “arguments to the effect that p, or 
evidential support for p, and epistemic reasons to believe that p” (160). The 
normative sceptic is not offering arguments to the effect that there are normative 
reasons to believe in normative scepticism (and thus to believe that there are no 
normative reasons); she is offering arguments to the effect that normative scepticism 
is true (157). For this purpose, the sceptic can appeal to the (non-normative) notion 
of indicator evidence, according to which “q is evidence that p just in case q reliably 
indicates that p” (162). She can use this notion, in conjunction with a principle of 
parsimony like Occam’s Razor, to argue that scepticism is more parsimonious than 
realism, and that this indicates that scepticism is the more likely to be true without 
implying that there are normative epistemic reasons to believe either of these views. 
Olson acknowledges that “appeals to Occam’s Razor and considerations of 
theoretical simplicity seem to be appeals to norms” (2011, 67-68), and that this 
threatens to entail self-defeat for a sceptic who has to rely on these kinds of appeals 
                                                            
17. Though Quine is talking not about scepticism but about adopting 
alternative explanatory schemas. The relevant point is that we may have no strictly 
epistemic reasons to assign more credibility to “the myth of physical objects” than to 
the gods of Homer, but we may nonetheless have pragmatic reasons to do so 
because the former is a superior tool for predicting future experience in light of past 
experience (44). A theory of human beings and their behaviour of which normative 
scepticism is an integral part may likewise, in principle, be a more efficacious 
predictive tool than a theory which includes a commitment to normative facts and 
properties. 
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to argue against realism. Olson’s response is to maintain that Occam’s Razor is an 
immanent rather than a transcendent norm, and that it therefore gives us only a non-
categorical reason to prefer scepticism to realism (68). In other words, Occam’s Razor 
gives us a reason for scepticism about (real) normativity and normative reasons, not 
in a way that inadvertently implies the existence of such reasons, but only in the 
sense that, all else being equal, simpler theories are generally more conducive to the 
realization of our goals, including the epistemic goal of having (mostly) true beliefs. 
And we are surely more likely to have (mostly) true beliefs by believing one theory T 
over a distinct theory T* if, all else being equal, T is theoretically simpler than T*. 
Normative scepticism is not committed to the existence of categorical reasons, so it is 
in at least one important respect a simpler theory than metanormative realism. I 
think this clearly indicates that normative scepticism can neither be outright rejected 
as self-refuting, nor “safely ignored” as merely self-defeating (Copp 1995, 48), and 
that the realist therefore needs a direct argument for realism. 
 
2.2. The argument 
For the sake of providing such an argument—that is capable of blunting the 
edge of Occam’s Razor—I will slightly modify Enoch’s Argument from Deliberative 
Indispensability so that it is not an argument for Robust Realism as Enoch defines it 
(that is, as involving irreducibly normative truths that have Platonic ontological 
implications), but simply an argument for mind-independent normative truths (that 
may or may not have ontological implications of some kind). Deliberation being the 
31 
process of deciding what it makes most sense to believe and to do, the essence of this 
argument (as I will present it) is that deliberation necessarily involves a commitment 
to mind-independent normative truths, and that deliberation is justified, so a 
commitment to mind-independent normative truths is also justified. 
The main argument against metanormative realism, I believe, is the argument 
that normative facts and properties are not needed to explain any aspect of the 
world as we are able to observe it, and that the best explanation for why this is the 
case is that normative facts and properties do not really exist. This argument first 
sets up an explanatory indispensability criterion for ontological commitment, under 
which belief in entities of a certain kind is justified in so far as these entities are 
involved in our best explanations, and then simply maintains that normative facts 
and properties fail to meet this criterion.18 The explanatory indispensability criterion 
may be perfectly valid as a positive basis for believing in certain kinds of entities 
(such as the posits of natural science). But it is open to the realist to argue that there 
is another criterion under which a commitment to normative facts and properties is 
in fact vindicated, namely, the criterion of deliberative indispensability. As a criterion 
for ontological commitment, deliberative indispensability states that belief in a 
certain kind of entity is justified if that entity is necessary for deliberation. This is the 
basis for Enoch’s defence of (Robust) metanormative realism. In his words, 
                                                            
18. Perhaps it is better to use the term “reliable” in this context, rather than a 
normative term like “justified.” The idea is that we are more likely to have (mostly) 
true beliefs if we only allow ourselves to believe in the kinds of entities which are 
needed for our best explanations, and that this excludes a belief in normative facts 
and properties. 
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“normative truths, though not explanatorily indispensable, are nevertheless 
deliberatively indispensable … and this kind of indispensability is just as respectable 
as the more familiar explanatory kind” (50).19 Indispensability arguments are used to 
support ontological commitments in science and mathematics, and if such 
arguments work in these cases, this naturally raises the possibility that an 
indispensability argument might work in the normative case as well. 
The above outline frames the issue in explicitly ontological terms, as Enoch 
does (because he is arguing for Robust Realism), but if deliberative indispensability 
is a valid criterion for ontological commitment, commitment to certain kinds of 
entities, it should also be a valid criterion for commitment to certain kinds of truths. If 
we are justified in believing in certain entities, we are justified in believing in certain 
truths (namely, the truths that involve those entities). Yet the reverse does not 
automatically follow: we might be justified in believing in certain kinds of truths, but 
not justified in making any positive ontological commitments as a result of those 
truths (and Occam’s Razor may well count against doing so). For the present 
purposes, we can therefore take the indispensability criterion as a basis for justified 
                                                            
19. I have omitted the “irreducibly” that precedes “normative truths” in 
Enoch’s text, because as I am using the Deliberative Indispensability Argument, it is 
not an argument for irreducibly normative truths (just mind-independent normative 
truths). Streumer (2017) recognizes that this argument “may show that normative 
properties are indispensable to deliberation. But it does not show that if normative 
properties were identical to descriptive properties, this would undermine our reason 
to engage in deliberation” (23). 
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belief in (mind-independent) normative truths, while remaining neutral about the 
exact ontological implications of these truths.20 
What does it mean to say that specifically mind-independent normative truths 
are indispensable to deliberation, or that deliberation involves a commitment to 
mind-independent normative truths? The basic idea is that the non-existence of such 
truths would completely undermine our reason to engage in deliberation. If what we 
are essentially doing when we deliberate is trying to find determinate answers to 
normative questions, then, if there were no (mind-independent) normative truths for 
us to discover, deliberation would always inevitably fail, and thus, on Enoch’s terms, 
we would have no reason (or at least, not sufficient reason) to engage in deliberation 
at all. Therefore, if we do have sufficient reason to engage in deliberation, (mind-
independent) normative truths must exist: because deliberation is fundamentally 
impossible without them, either such truths don’t exist and we don’t have sufficient 
reason to engage in deliberation, or we do have such reason and normative truths do 
therefore exist. 
With this in mind, we can see a simple way of presenting the Deliberative 
Indispensability Argument for metanormative realism: 
                                                            
20. In one sense, if a commitment to normative truths is justified, then a 
commitment to the existence of such truths is justified. So it seems that, even if we try 
to deny that normative truths have ontological implications of some kind, we are 
still making an ontological claim. But Parfit and Skorupski both maintain that we 
have to distinguish between two senses of “exist”: an ontological and a non-
ontological sense, and that truths (normative or otherwise) only “exist” in the non-
ontological sense. We will return to this issue in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3). 
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(1) If there were no (mind-independent) normative truths, we would not have 
sufficient reason to engage in deliberation. 
(2) We do have sufficient reason to engage in deliberation. 
(3) Therefore, there are (mind-independent) normative truths.21 
 
This formulation captures the notion of deliberative indispensability (premise (1)), 
but it puts the point in terms of the dependence of the reason (or justification) we 
have for deliberation on a certain kind of truths, (mind-independent) normative 
truths, rather than in terms of any explicitly ontological commitments that 
deliberation is supposed to license. This may seem to be a problem: isn’t deliberative 
indispensability modelled on explanatory indispensability in the philosophy of 
science and mathematics? As an argument for Robust Realism, the Deliberative 
Indispensability Argument does rely on an analogy with explanatory ontological 
commitments, such as the commitment to electrons (54-55). But as an argument just 
for realism, it will not lose plausibility points by leaving open more ontological 
questions rather than fewer. 
 
2.3. Deliberation and (mind-independent) normative truths 
Having established that we can state the Deliberative Indispensability 
Argument in adequately non-ontological terms,22 let’s take the premises of the 
                                                            
21. This argument can also be stated in terms of deliberation being warranted 
or justified. 
 
22. I am not ruling out the possibility that a commitment to normative truths 
either goes hand in hand with an ontological commitment or is a fully ontological 
commitment in its own right. I just mean that the argument, as I have presented it, 
leaves the ontological question as open as possible while still capturing all that is 
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argument one at a time. Start with premise (1): why do there need to be (mind-
independent) normative truths for us to have sufficient reason to engage in 
deliberation? In defence of the idea that deliberation is committed to (mind-
independent normative truths, Enoch appeals to the phenomenology of deliberation. 
He describes deliberation as “an attempt to eliminate arbitrariness by discovering 
(normative) reasons,” which is “impossible in a believed absence of such reasons to 
be discovered," and because deliberation “feels like trying to make the right choice,” 
and the phenomenology of deliberation is therefore similar “to that of trying to find 
an answer to a straightforwardly factual question” (72-74).23 It is no doubt true that 
we often do ask ourselves questions about what we ought or have reason to do with 
the aim of finding the right answer, on the assumption that such an answer already 
exists independently of us. Normative questions are clearly a part of deliberation, 
and normative truths are obviously indispensable for success in answering questions 
of this kind. But does that indicate that deliberation as a whole involves a necessary 
commitment to specifically mind-independent normative truths? Perhaps only some of 
the questions we ask ourselves in deliberation call for determinate normative 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
needed in the deliberative indispensability criterion (by linking deliberation and our 
reason to engage in it with (mind-independent) normative truths). 
 
23. In the “worldly” sense of “fact,” a factual question is one which demands 
some kind of ontological answer. In the “propositional” sense, a factual question is 
simply one that demands a true answer (perhaps under a non-realist theory of 
truth). I take a “straightforwardly factual question,” in this context, to mean a 
question that demands a determinate answer: one that we have to discover, rather 
than create. 
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answers. If so, the unavailability of such answers might not make deliberation into a 
completely futile endeavour. 
Olson points out that “the question one is trying to answer in deliberation is 
often what one most wants (to do), or most desires (to do)” (2014, 173). If 
deliberation does not necessarily involve asking oneself normative questions like 
what one ought to do, or what it makes most sense for one to do (what it makes most 
sense to do being what there is most normative reason to do), then it does not 
necessarily involve a commitment to (mind-independent) normative truths. If it is 
plain enough that we often ask ourselves what we ought to do (and that in asking 
this question, we are aiming at a determinate answer), it is surely equally plain that 
we often ask ourselves what we most want (to do), and that we are aiming at equally 
determinate answers when we do so. If asking ourselves what we most want (to do) 
counts as genuine deliberation, it would seem that we can deliberate successfully in 
the complete absence of any normative truths, mind-independent or otherwise: all 
we need are psychological truths about our desires and empirical truths about how 
to realize them effectively. This would seem to refute premise (1) of the Deliberative 
Indispensability Argument: we can deliberate successfully without (mind-
independent) normative truths, because deliberative questions are often not 
normative questions at all, and consequently, the non-existence of normative truths 
would not necessarily undermine whatever reason we have to engage in 
deliberation in the first place. 
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But suppose that there are no (mind-independent) normative truths, and 
hence that we can only deliberate successfully by asking ourselves what we most 
want (to do), rather than what we ought to do (or what it makes most sense for us to 
do in the sense that involves normative reasons). In this scenario, deliberation would 
still be akin to answering straightforwardly factual questions, and we would often 
find determinate answers to the questions we ask ourselves in deliberation. Would 
this refute premise (1)? Just because deliberation (of a kind) can succeed without 
(mind-independent) normative truths does not mean that we would still have 
sufficient reason to engage in deliberation in the absence of such truths. If there are 
no (mind-independent) normative truths, we might have no reason at all to ask 
ourselves what we most want (to do). We certainly do not have normative reason to 
ask ourselves what we most want (to do) if there are no normative truths. Olson 
would say that we have reason to deliberate (in the absence of normative truths) in 
the sense that we have non-normative, “hypothetical” reasons to do so, and that 
“hypothetical reasons claims are true only if they reduce to empirical claims about 
agents’ desires and (actual or believed) efficient means of bringing about the 
satisfaction of these desires” (153). In this sense, we clearly do have sufficient reason 
to ask ourselves what we most want (to do), simply as an efficient means of bringing 
about the satisfaction of our desires (the claim to this effect being a hypothetical 
reason claim that the normative sceptic can accept consistently with his view). 
In defence of premise (1), we could deny that there are any (non-normative) 
“hypothetical” reasons of the kind Olson appeals to (and thus that, if we have any 
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reason to engage in deliberation, the “reason” in question must be normative), or we 
could deny that simply asking ourselves what we most want (to do) constitutes 
genuine deliberation. The first option is not promising: as Olson points out, the term 
“’[r]eason’ is notoriously ambiguous and there is clearly a sense of the term that fits 
the proposed understanding of hypothetical reasons” (154).24 We cannot answer the 
sceptic’s objections just by insisting that an ambiguous term like “reason” only has 
one usage.25 Enoch himself would probably take the second option: he distinguishes 
between the two different activities of trying to make up our minds and trying to 
make the decision it makes most sense to make (2013, 77). It is only the latter 
(according to Enoch) that involves a commitment to (mind-independent) normative 
truths, and it is this activity, the activity of deciding what it makes most sense to do, 
that he understands by “deliberation” (77-78). Olson, on the other hand, seems to 
take deliberation to be the former activity, the activity of trying to make up our 
minds. Enoch and Olson disagree on whether or not deliberation is necessarily 
committed to (mind-independent) normative truths, it would appear, largely 
because they understand “deliberation” differently. 
                                                            
24. In support of this claim, Olson gives as an example the fact “that we might 
say there was reason for Hitler to invade Britain during the Second World War,” 
meaning “only that Hitler had some desire (e.g., a desire to win the war) that would 
likely have been satisfied, had he invaded Britain” (154). This does not establish that 
hypothetical reasons claims are never normative, but I think it does show that there 
is a non-normative “hypothetical” use of the ambiguous term “reason.” We will 
return to this example in the next chapter (Section 3.5). 
 
25. The relevant usage of “reason” (for the purposes of the realist) being the 
one that means “a fact or consideration that counts in favour of something” (154). 
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“Deliberation,” like “reason,” is an ambiguous term; we should not insist that 
the only correct usage is the one that involves a necessary commitment to normative 
truths. In the same way that reasons can be either normative or non-normative, there 
are clearly normative and non-normative forms of deliberation. And just as the non-
normative form of deliberation (the activity of trying to make up our minds or of 
trying to decide what we most want) presumably involves a necessary commitment 
to non-normative reasons (hypothetical reasons, in Olson’s terminology), the 
normative form of deliberation (the activity of trying to decide what we ought to do 
or what it makes most sense for us to do) involves a necessary commitment to 
normative reasons,26 and hence to normative truths. This is the kind of deliberation 
(let’s call it “normative deliberation”) that the Deliberative Indispensability 
Argument must (of course) appeal to. And if there are no normative truths, we 
clearly have no normative reason to engage in normative deliberation.27 But could 
we still have sufficient normative reason to engage in normative deliberation if there 
were no mind-independent normative truths? 
                                                            
26. Olson responds to Enoch in part by denying that the decisions we make 
through non-normative, purely desire-based deliberation are arbitrary: “[i]t might 
ultimately be arbitrary what desires I in fact have, but given that I do have those 
desires there need be nothing arbitrary about my choice” (174). This non-
arbitrariness seems to suggest that non-normative deliberation is committed to non-
normative, hypothetical reasons in the same way that normative deliberation is 
committed to normative, categorical reasons. 
 
27. Though we might still have some hypothetical reason to engage in 
normative deliberation, since doing so would probably serve some of our desires. 
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The evidence of what it feels like to engage in (normative) deliberation cannot 
be used to confirm the existence of mind-independent normative truths (the 
phenomenology of deliberation is hardly a reliable guide for that—it could easily 
feel like we are discovering mind-independent normative truths in deliberation even 
though we are doing no such thing),28 but that does not mean that it cannot be used 
to confirm the commitments of (normative) deliberation, whether or not there is 
anything in reality that corresponds to these commitments. Introspective evidence 
probably can tell us (though not infallibly) what we are fundamentally committed to 
when we ask ourselves what it makes most sense to do. If (normative) deliberation 
genuinely feels like an attempt to discover, rather than create, determinate answers to 
normative questions, just as scientific inquiry feels like trying to discover (not create) 
determinate answers to scientific questions, then we have good evidence that it 
genuinely has this goal (the goal of finding determinate answers to normative 
questions), and thus that, in the absence of such answers in the form of mind-
independent normative truths, deliberation of the normative kind is inevitably 
doomed to fail. 
                                                            
28. At the end of his discussion of the Deliberative Indispensability 
Argument, Olson concludes that it “establishes at most that error theorists are 
committed to holding that a certain kind of deliberation [what we are calling 
“normative deliberation”] … is illusory” (2014, 177). Premise (1) of our formulation 
of the argument does not imply that (normative) deliberation is not illusory; that is 
the job of premise (2) (which we will address in Section 2.5). So the phenomenology 
of (normative) deliberation can still be good evidence for the truth of premise (1) 
(though probably not for the truth of premise (2)). 
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Normative deliberation clearly does involve trying to arrive at an 
independent answer—independent, that is, of the particular deliberating agent. 
When we deliberate in a normative manner, we are looking for answers to our 
questions and not trying to invent those answers; we would probably not even 
bother trying to answer normative questions at all if we thought we could just make 
the answers up.29 If we are intentionally making up the answers, we are most likely 
just trying to make up our minds, and hence not really asking ourselves what we 
ought to do or what it makes most sense (for us) to do. Not to imply that if we are 
trying to make up our minds, we are therefore intentionally making up answers: 
when we ask ourselves what we most want, we are looking for a determinate answer 
to this question. And if there is an element of independence involved in asking 
ourselves what we most want, there is surely a similar element involved when we 
ask ourselves what it makes most sense to do.30 
                                                            
29. Taking Enoch’s example, if I am not looking for a determinate answer, I 
might ask myself whether to join a law firm or apply to graduate school in 
philosophy, but I would not ask myself whether I ought to join a law firm or apply to 
graduate school in philosophy (or which of these things it makes most sense for me to 
do) (2013, 72). If I said that I was asking the second question, but also said that the 
answer to this question was my decision to make, this would tend to indicate that I 
am really asking the first question and have simply confused the two. If we accept 
that we can ask both questions, and that these questions are indeed distinct, we 
should also accept that normative deliberation strives at independent answers 
(independent at least of the particular deliberating agent). 
 
30. There is a sense in which facts about our desires are mind-dependent: if 
there were no minds, there would be no facts about our desires. But facts about our 
desires are facts about things inside our skulls, and what is going on inside our 
skulls is just as much a matter of fact as what is going on in the universe outside our 
skulls. 
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Yet just because there is an element of independence involved does not mean 
that normative deliberation requires normative truths that are genuinely mind-
independent. It could be that, while the phenomenology of (normative) deliberation 
clearly indicates that it seeks answers that are not created by the individual 
deliberating agent, these answers do not have to be independent of a normative 
framework that is entirely created by us. As a deliberator, the answers I am looking 
for may not be answers that I am creating, but they could nonetheless be answers 
that have already been created by others before me (my society, say). I might not be 
at all aware of this, however, and since the framework I am consulting may be almost 
completely independent of me as an individual agent, I will have the distinct 
impression of trying to answer a straightforwardly factual question. This seems to 
suggest that we can account for the phenomenology of (normative) deliberation 
without introducing a commitment to normative truths that are ultimately 
independent of a (mind-dependent) framework created by us.31 
 
2.4. A relativistic model of (normative) deliberation 
Deliberation might have more than one “level”: on the first level, we decide 
what we most want, on the second level, we create a normative framework in order 
                                                            
31. Against this, one could argue that the phenomenology of deliberation 
would simply not be the same in a relativistic scenario; we would ask ourselves 
“what does such-and-such a framework tell us to do?” rather than “what does it 
make most sense to do?” But this assumes that we would be conscious of the fact 
that we are consulting a (mind-dependent) framework if indeed that is what we are 
doing in normative deliberation. 
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to help us achieve what we want, and on the third level, we decide what it makes 
most sense for us to do relative to the framework we have created. The first and 
third levels are equivalent to the non-normative and normative forms of deliberation 
(respectively), both of which feel like trying to find answers to factual questions. The 
second, on this model of deliberation, is an intermediate, “bridge” form that 
generates normative deliberation out of non-normative deliberation. It is not akin to 
finding answers to factual questions, but the phenomenological evidence is not 
strong enough to show that deliberation has to aim at mind-independent answers all 
the way down. The metanormative realist and the sceptic should both accept that 
there are two forms of deliberation (non-normative and normative) which feel like 
they require mind-independent answers, but if there is a third form of deliberation 
bridging the gap between non-normative and normative deliberation, and on which 
normative deliberation actually depends, then in fact only the first, non-normative 
form of deliberation (asking ourselves what we most want) aims or needs to aim at 
fully mind-independent answers. In this scenario, the best theory of truth for 
normative truths would seem to be a coherence theory,32 in which case, 
metanormative realism (Robust or otherwise) would be false. 
                                                            
32. Quine (1979) would agree. In his view, “[s]cience, thanks to its link with 
observation, retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth; but a coherence 
theory of truth is evidently the lot of ethics” (477). The coherence theory “involves 
the rejection of realism about truth,” and hence the rejection of “the principle of 
bivalence (according to which every proposition is either true or false) and the 
principle of transcendence (which says that a proposition may be true even though it 
cannot be known to be true)” (Young 2018). Applied to normative truths, the 
coherence theory involves rejecting the mind-independence of such truths. 
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How would deliberation work under this model? Olson presents us with an 
instructive analogy: 
consider (regulative) rules of football. It is in a sense arbitrary what these 
rules are, but it is not arbitrary for referees to make decisions based on them. 
For example, it is in a sense arbitrary that goalkeepers are not allowed to pick 
up the ball by hand when it has been played by a team-mate … But given that 
this is now a rule it is not arbitrary for referees to award a free kick to the 
opponent team when this happens. (2014, 174) 
 
The rules of football are a framework we create, presumably after a process of non-
normative deliberation (asking ourselves what we most want). This enables referees 
to ask themselves what decisions they ought to make (or what decisions it makes 
most sense for them to make) and come up with non-arbitrary answers that are 
independent of them as individuals, but not genuinely mind-independent, by 
consulting the relevant framework. This model of deliberation preserves the 
commitment normative deliberation clearly has to normative truth, thus accounting 
for the phenomenology of deliberation. It also has the advantage of unifying 
deliberation by linking the normative form with the non-normative form (via the 
creation of normative frameworks) and explaining how the former is actually 
derived from the latter. And it does this without having to endorse a commitment to 
categorical reasons and mind-independent normative truths. 
But if normative deliberation (as opposed to non-normative deliberation) is 
completely relativistic in nature, can it really arrive at the non-arbitrary normative 
answers it appears to seek? If it is not arbitrary for a football referee to award a free 
kick in a particular situation, and this is so because of the current rules of football, 
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then it must be non-arbitrary for him to base his decision on the current rules of 
football (rather than, say, the old rules of football or even the rules of rugby). He 
must, therefore, have sufficient reason to use that particular framework rather than 
another—and surely he does have sufficient reason to base his decision only on the 
current rules of football. If the reason he has is entirely non-normative, then his use 
of that framework will be normatively arbitrary, in which case the decision he 
arrives at on the basis of that framework will also be normatively arbitrary. If this is 
how deliberation works, then normative deliberation cannot arrive at answers that 
are normatively non-arbitrary. On the other hand, if he has sufficient normative 
reason to base his decision on the current rules of football, then his decision will not 
be normatively arbitrary, but this non-arbitrariness would rely on a normative truth 
that is not relative to the framework on which he is basing his decision: the 
normative truth that he has sufficient normative reason to base his decision on the 
current rules of football (rather than on some alternative set of rules). Could this 
normative truth be relative to some other framework? There might be higher-level 
normative frameworks which decide between lower-level frameworks (like the 
current rules of football). And if one has sufficient normative reason to base a 
decision on a certain lower-level framework, this normative truth could be relative 
to a higher-level framework. But then one would need sufficient normative reason to 
use that particular higher-level framework, thereby presupposing another normative 
truth that is not relative to the higher-level framework. No matter how many levels 
of frameworks one goes through, at each level, there will always be a need for a 
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normative truth that is not relative to the framework at that level, unless, that is, 
one’s first-order decision is to be normatively arbitrary. 
If normative frameworks are things that we create, there cannot be infinitely 
many of them, so either there are some normative truths that are not relative to 
frameworks we create, or normative deliberation cannot arrive at normatively non-
arbitrary answers. In other words, if one has normative reason to make a particular 
decision because it conforms to a certain framework, one must also have normative 
reason to follow that framework, and if one has such reason because following that 
framework itself conforms to some higher-order framework, then one must have 
normative reason to follow that framework, or else one’s decision is going to be 
normatively arbitrary. And since we cannot create an infinite series of frameworks, 
not all normative reasons can come from frameworks that we create. If all normative 
truths and normative reasons are mind-dependent, therefore, all our decisions are 
normatively arbitrary, because the frameworks on which we base these decisions are 
themselves normatively arbitrary. That does not mean that our decisions would be 
arbitrary in some non-normative sense, such as the sense in which a decision is not 
arbitrary if there is sufficient hypothetical reason for it; the normative domain could 
be relativistic all the way down without rendering all of our decisions completely 
arbitrary. But we are asking whether or not normative deliberation is a viable project 
in the absence of mind-independent normative truths, and since the absence of such 
truths would render our decisions normatively arbitrary, and the normative form of 
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deliberation clearly aims at normatively non-arbitrary answers, it certainly seems that 
the answer must be no. 
One might argue that premise (1) of the Deliberative Indispensability 
Argument is still false, because we do have sufficient non-normative reason to engage 
in normative deliberation even if it cannot achieve its aim of discovering mind-
independent normative truths. Olson insists that the normative error theory does not 
discredit normative ethics because “[t]he human predicament is such that we need to 
‘find principles of equity and ways of making and keeping agreements without 
which we cannot hold together’,” and “[o]ur means of achieving this is to engage in 
first-order normative theorizing” (198). This could well be true, but if we understand 
premise (1) as the claim that we would not have sufficient normative reason to 
engage in normative deliberation if there were no mind-independent normative 
truths, then it is not touched by the possibility that we might have sufficient non-
normative reason to engage in this project even if there were no such truths. This, 
therefore, is how premise (1) must be understood: we could not have sufficient 
normative reason to engage in normative deliberation unless there are mind-
independent normative truths. If the normative domain was relativistic all the way 
down, all normative truths would be relative to frameworks that are normatively 
arbitrary, and normative deliberation would not be able to arrive at normatively 
non-arbitrary answers. Though we might still have non-normative reason to seek out 
such answers, we would not have any normative reason to do so. 
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2.5. Do we have sufficient reason to engage in normative deliberation? 
 In so far as premise (1) states that we would not have normative reason to 
engage in normative deliberation without mind-independent normative truths, it is 
indeed true. Now for premise (2) of the Deliberative Indispensability Argument. In 
Olson’s sense, we clearly have sufficient non-normative (hypothetical) reason to 
engage in non-normative deliberation (asking ourselves what we most want). But to 
generate the conclusion that there are mind-independent normative truths, we must 
have sufficient normative reason to engage in normative deliberation. 
What we need is an account of the rationality of normative deliberation, and 
such an account is what Enoch attempts to supply. According to Enoch, there are 
some projects we engage in which are what he calls “intrinsically indispensable.” A 
project is intrinsically indispensable if it is “rationally non-optional” in the sense that 
disengaging from this project is not a rationally acceptable option (2013, 70). One of 
these projects is the reasoning project—the project of using reason, in the form of 
logic and rules of inference, to expand our knowledge; another is “the project of 
trying to find out what is going on in the world outside our minds” (64). These are 
both projects which, in Enoch’s view, we cannot rationally opt out of; and if we 
cannot rationally opt out of a project, we must have sufficient reason to engage in it. 
But these are not the only intrinsically indispensable (rationally non-optional) 
projects: the explanatory project, which is the project we are engaged in when we try 
to understand the world through science, is in this same sense intrinsically 
indispensable, as is, most importantly for the metanormative realist, the deliberative 
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project (more specifically, the project of normative deliberation: trying to decide 
what it makes most sense to believe and to do). 
In defence of the idea that the reasoning, explanatory and deliberative 
projects are rationally non-optional, Enoch makes an appeal to human nature, 
claiming that “[w]e are reasoning creatures” (64), that “[w]e are explaining, 
understanding creatures” (60), and that “we are essentially deliberative creatures” 
(70). Our nature may be such that we cannot disengage from these projects, not in the 
long term at least, but, as Enoch acknowledges, it is not clear that this suffices to 
make these projects rationally non-optional (62). In fact, if we simply cannot 
disengage from these projects because of our nature, this could indicate that they are 
not rationally non-optional at all, because for that very reason, they are not rational 
(although they are therefore not irrational either). Richard Joyce (2001) maintains 
that “rationality must be something we can fall short of … If we are bound to follow 
a principle [or a project, in this case] as a matter of psychological fact [or because of 
our nature], then we cannot be considered rational to do so” (57). If Joyce is right, 
then if we cannot but engage in these kinds of projects, it is not rational for us to do 
so, and it could not be irrational for us to opt out of doing so, and thus these projects 
are not actually intrinsically indispensable in Enoch’s sense. 
Enoch insists that even if we can opt out of these projects, it just seems prima 
facie irrational for us to do so; he takes the explanatory project to be a project from 
which “even if we can, it seems we should not so disengage” (2013, 60). He also calls 
this project “one of tremendous importance for us” and speaks of rationally non-
50 
optional projects as being “valuable” (60-61). Enoch himself does not make this clear, 
but I suggest that the rational non-optionality of a project (on Enoch’s account) is the 
result of two conditions: 1) the project is of very high value or importance for us (in 
some sense), and 2) the project has the high value or importance for us that it has 
because of some inescapable part of our nature. If a project is of enough value or 
importance for us, and this value or importance is generated, in large part, by our 
human nature, such that we cannot somehow escape the high value or importance 
this project has for us (except perhaps by completely changing our nature), then we 
are inescapably irrational if we nonetheless try to opt out of this project. This is 
arguably what it means for a project to be rationally non-optional (and hence 
intrinsically indispensable). 
But what makes a project especially valuable or important for us?33 Again, 
Enoch doesn’t specify, but I think we can safely assume that a project is of value or 
importance for us to the extent that engaging in this project helps us to realize our 
values.34 This allows us to say that, if the realization of our values depends to a great 
enough extent on our engaging in a particular project, and we are prevented from 
                                                            
33. Enoch calls the explanatory project “one of tremendous importance for us” 
(my emphasis), not just “tremendously important.” I don’t think the kind of 
importance required for rational non-optionality has to be absolute or intrinsic 
importance: relative importance should be enough. 
 
34. I will remain neutral on what exactly a value is here (whether they are 
things we desire to desire after some process of idealization, for instance, or whether 
they are things we ought or have reason to desire): what matters for the argument is 
that a project is valuable to us to the extent that it helps us realize our values, 
whatever “our values” might be. 
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escaping this dependency by our nature, then this project is rationally non-optional, 
so long, that is, as it would be irrational for us to opt out of a project that we heavily 
depend on, because of our nature, for the realization of our values. And there clearly 
is at least one sense in which it would indeed be irrational for us to opt out of such a 
project: in the “hypothetical” sense of “reason,” we have every reason not to opt out 
of a project that is crucial to the satisfaction of our desires, and the satisfaction of our 
desires is bound to be heavily linked to the realization of our values. Therefore, if the 
realization of our values depends on our engaging in a certain project, and our 
nature prevents us from escaping this dependence (because we cannot change our 
values, for instance), then we are inescapably irrational, at least in the non-
normative, hypothetical sense, if we try to opt out of this project. 
It is probably true that our nature determines us to have certain values rather 
than others, and that we depend on certain projects (like the reasoning, explanatory 
and deliberative projects) to help us realize our values. And as such, it is also 
probably true that we are irrational in the hypothetical sense if we try to opt out of 
these projects, and thus that these projects are intrinsically indispensable in at least 
one important sense. But if we only have non-normative reason to engage in 
intrinsically indispensable projects, then even if the deliberative project is 
intrinsically indispensable, this will not entail the existence of mind-independent 
normative truths. As we have already observed, we might have sufficient non-
normative reason to engage in normative deliberation in the absence of any 
normative truths at all (mind-independent or otherwise). If normative scepticism is 
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true, we would still have at least some hypothetical reason to engage in first-order 
normative inquiry. And if normative deliberation really is a rationally non-optional 
project in the sense that it is indispensable to the realization of our values, then we 
surely would have sufficient hypothetical reason to engage in this project in the 
absence of (mind-independent) normative truths. If normative deliberation is 
rationally non-optional for the reasons Enoch suggests, its being rationally non-
optional does not in fact justify the conclusion that there are mind-independent 
normative truths. 
But since we do have sufficient hypothetical reason to engage in normative 
deliberation, premise (2)—that we have sufficient reason to engage in deliberation—
is still true, and as we have established, premise (1) is also true: normative 
deliberation does involve a commitment to mind-independent normative truths. So 
why doesn’t the conclusion—that there are mind-independent normative truths—
follow? As we have formulated the Deliberative Indispensability Argument, the 
move from premises (1) and (2) to the conclusion rests on an equivocation: premise 
(1) uses the normative sense of “reason” whereas premise (2) uses the non-
normative, “hypothetical” sense, and this is why the conclusion doesn’t follow. For 
premise (1) to be true, it has to mean that we would not have sufficient normative 
reason to engage in (normative) deliberation without mind-independent normative 
truths. And for all Enoch establishes, premise (2) is only true in the sense that we 
have sufficient non-normative reason to engage in (normative) deliberation. So 
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premise (2) does not trigger the antecedent of premise (1), and the conclusion 
therefore does not follow. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
We must conclude that, as it stands, Enoch’s Argument from Deliberative 
Indispensability fails. The normative sceptic can accept both that normative 
deliberation involves a commitment to mind-independent normative truths and that 
normative deliberation is intrinsically indispensable, because the combination of 
these ideas does not have to imply that a commitment to mind-independent 
normative truths is justified. The sceptic can reply that deliberation, normative or 
otherwise, is only rationally non-optional in the sense that we have sufficient 
hypothetical reason to engage in it. And if (normative) deliberation can be rationally 
non-optional without implying the existence of mind-independent normative truths, 
then even in the absence of such truths, we would still have sufficient reason to 
engage in normative deliberation. If metanormative realism is to be vindicated on 
broadly deliberative grounds, therefore, we are going to need a different account of 





3. Parfit’s Wager 
 
Is there a sound argument for the conclusion that we not only have sufficient 
non-normative reason to engage in normative deliberation, but sufficient normative 
reason as well? If there is, we could defend premise (2) of the Deliberative 
Indispensability Argument in a way that does entail the existence of (mind-
independent) normative truths, without relying on an equivocation between the 
normative and non-normative senses of “reason.” I believe there is such an 
argument. 
In a particular passage from On What Matters: Volume Two (a passage that, as 
far as I am aware, has yet to receive adequate attention in the literature), Parfit uses 
what is essentially a refined version of Pascal’s Wager, which I will call Parfit’s 
Wager, to argue for the existence of irreducibly normative truths. I think this 
argument shows that we can use the specifically normative form of deliberation to 
arrive at the conclusion that there are some normative reasons and truths, and thus, 
consequently, the conclusion that the normative form of deliberation is 
(epistemically) justified. If we can use normative deliberation itself to arrive at the 
conclusion that normative deliberation is justified, I believe this shows that we do 
have, not only sufficient non-normative or “hypothetical” reason, but sufficient 
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normative reason to engage in this form of deliberation.35 And when combined with 
premise (1) of the Deliberative Indispensability Argument, this entails the conclusion 
that there are mind-independent normative truths. 
The gist of this argument is that, since normative reasons are epistemically 
possible—we do not know with anything approaching certainty that there are no 
such reasons—if we believe in normative reasons, we might be believing what we 
ought to be believe, and we are in fact more likely to be believing what we ought to 
believe, and less likely either to be believing what we ought not to believe, or to be 
failing to believe what we ought to believe, compared to not believing in normative 
reasons (whether we actually believe that normative reasons don’t exist, or simply 
suspend judgment on the matter). For this very reason, we must have at least some 
normative reason to believe in normative reasons, and this reason that we have 
straightforwardly implies the existence of normative reasons. We can also add that, 
since this meta-reason to believe in normative reasons in no way derives from our 
aims or desires (Parfit’s Wager does not itself rest on an appeal to our aims or 
desires), this reason must be a categorical reason, and thus that at least some of our 
reasons, contrary to any form of normative scepticism or non-realism, are normative 
and categorical in nature.36 
                                                            
35. In the same way that we can use non-normative deliberation to arrive at the 
conclusion that we have sufficient non-normative reason to engage in non-normative 
deliberation. 
 
36. To be clear, two separate claims are being made here: first, that Parfit’s 
Wager establishes the existence of at least some normative reasons (the normative 
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Guy Kahane (2017) has recently made a similar Pascalian argument against 
“nihilism,” by which he means “both the view that nothing has final value, and that 
there are no reasons to want, do or feel anything” (331). In Section 3.1, I will explain 
why this argument doesn’t quite succeed as an argument against normative (or 
evaluative) scepticism, and suggest why Parfit’s Wager can succeed where 
“Kahane’s Wager” fails. In Section 3.2, I will prepare the ground for the argument by 
stressing the analogy between normative deliberation and the form of reasoning 
known as inference to the best explanation (IBE), in terms of the need they both seem 
to have to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps from an epistemic point of 
view. Then, in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, I will present the Parfit’s Wager argument for the 
existence of normative reasons and truths, in the process supplying and defending 
an additional premise (a principle which I call “Normative Superdominance”) that I 
believe the argument needs in order for the conclusion to follow. In Section 3.5, I will 
make the argument that, given what normative reasons are, and given the way in 
which the existence of these kinds of reasons can be established using Parfit’s Wager, 
at least some of these reasons must be categorical. And finally I will explain, in 
Section 3.6, how the kind of Pascalian reasoning involved in Parfit’s Wager actually 
vindicates the Deliberative Indispensability Argument and establishes the existence 
of mind-independent normative truths. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
reason we have to believe in normative reasons itself being one such reason); and 
second, that, given the way in which Parfit’s Wager establishes the existence of 
normative reasons, at least some of these reasons must be categorical. 
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3.1. Kahane’s Wager 
Kahane argues that we have powerful pragmatic reasons to believe that 
normative or evaluative nihilism is false, and that, in contrast, some things really do 
matter (347). He explains that this is because, 
If nothing matters, this [the fact that nothing matters37] doesn’t matter either. 
But if nothing matters, and we believe that, then—although it won’t matter 
whether anything would still matter to us—it’s likely that far fewer things 
would matter to us. If nothing matters then this result of belief in nihilism of 
course also won’t matter. But it would matter, and matter greatly, if we falsely 
believe in nihilism and stop, in this way, to care about the things that do 
matter. (347-348) 
 
If some things really matter, and yet we believe that nothing matters, this would 
clearly be a bad thing: we would stop caring about things, such as suffering, which 
(in this scenario) really matter, and which we therefore very much ought to care 
about. However, if we instead believe that some things matter, and yet nihilism is in 
fact true and nothing really matters at all, no negative consequences will follow, 
precisely because nothing matters. Moreover, if some things do matter, then, so long 
as our evaluative beliefs are roughly on track (we are not “deeply mistaken in 
thinking that suffering is bad, justice is good, and so forth” (337)), believing that 
nihilism is false and that some things matter will have good consequences, because it 
will lead us to care about many things that (in this scenario) we actually ought to 
care about. And if nihilism is in fact true and nothing really matters, if we believe 
(albeit correctly) that nihilism is true and that nothing matters, there will be nothing 
                                                            
37. Or correctly believing that nothing matters (for that matter). 
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good about this because, once again, nothing at all would matter. This seems to 
suggest that we ought to believe, or try to believe, that nihilism is false and that 
some things really do matter, because of the potential gains involved in doing so and 
the potential risks involved in not doing so, combined with the complete lack of 
potential gains involved in the belief in nihilism and the lack of potential risks 
involved in the belief that some things (really) matter. 
I think Kahane is broadly on the right track, but his argument relies on an 
assumption about our normative or evaluative psychology which I just don’t think 
we need to make in order to construct a successful wager argument against nihilism 
or normative/evaluative scepticism. Kahane’s Wager is based on a principle he calls 
“Belief Loss,” according to which “[c]oming to believe in nihilism will result in our 
coming to lose our substantive evaluative beliefs” (331). He argues that Belief Loss 
seems just a truism about the way our psychology works, the kind of effect 
we routinely observe when someone becomes an atheist, or comes to believe 
that there is no such thing as phlogiston, or when you reveal to them that the 
elaborate anecdote you have been telling was a practical joke. (338) 
 
But if nihilism is true, we would still care about all kinds of things: a scenario in 
which nothing really matters and yet we care about all kinds of things, such as 
suffering, is exactly the scenario that obtains right now if nihilism is in fact true. Is it 
really plausible that, in such a scenario, we would stop caring about the things we 
actually care about if we came to believe (correctly) that nihilism is true? If we came 
to believe that nothing matters in any sense whatsoever, then perhaps we really 
would stop caring about anything at all. Yet it seems quite possible to hold, like 
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Street, that “[n]othing matters, ultimately, independently of the attitudes of beings 
who take things to matter” (that nothing has “final value,” as Kahane puts it), but 
that nonetheless, “plenty of things matter” (2016b, 121).38 And I doubt that holding 
such a position, correctly or incorrectly as the case may be, prevents one from caring 
about such things as justice and human suffering.39 
Kahane insists that our subjective concerns co-vary closely with our 
evaluative beliefs, and consequently that “once we conclude that all of our 
evaluative beliefs are false, we should also largely lose the corresponding subjective 
concerns and motivations” (339-340). That may well be true, but it is far less clear 
that coming to believe in nihilism in Kahane’s specific sense—the sense according to 
which nothing has final value—will lead us to reject all our substantive evaluative 
beliefs as false: “to no longer hold that suffering is bad, virtue good, freedom 
desirable, etc” (340). We might be able to believe that suffering is bad without 
believing that it is ultimately bad, or that it is bad completely independently of us 
                                                            
38. Or even, as Street says, that “plenty of things ‘really’ matter, if we allow, 
as I think we should, that existing independently of a subject’s point of view of the 
world is not the only way of being ‘real’” (121). What Kahane seems to mean when 
he talks about things mattering, however, is precisely the “robustly attitude-
independent sense” of “(really) matters” that Street rejects. 
 
39. As a Robust Metanormative Naturalist, I of course do believe that some 
things matter in the robustly attitude-independent sense. Yet because of the rather 
abstruse metaphysics involved in the question of whether anything matters in this 
sense (see my own discussion of reductionism in Chapter 8, for instance), I don’t 
think that believing (incorrectly) that nothing matters in this sense prevents one from 
caring about things which really do matter (in this sense). 
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and our attitudes, or the like.40 We will then be able to continue caring about 
suffering even if we come to believe that nihilism (in Kahane’s sense) is true. Unlike 
Kahane’s Wager, Parfit’s Wager is a purely conceptual argument, and it is thus not 
answerable to the contingencies of our normative or evaluative psychology. I 
therefore believe this argument can succeed where Kahane’s Wager fails. 
 
3.2. Normative deliberation, IBE and bootstrapping 
If we can really use normative deliberation to justify normative deliberation 
in the way that I am suggesting, normative deliberation must be able to pull itself up 
by its own bootstraps from an epistemic point of view. This need not be a problem: 
crucial to the Deliberative Indispensability Argument is an analogy between 
normative deliberation and the form of reasoning known as inference to the best 
explanation (IBE), and it would appear that IBE has just as much of a need to pull 
itself up by its own bootstraps as normative deliberation (at least in so far as IBE and 
normative deliberation are to count as reliable or epistemically justified to any 
extent).41 
                                                            
40. We saw in the previous chapter (Section 2.4) that there are no normative 
truths without mind-independent normative truths. But evaluative language clearly 
admits of an expressivist usage that doesn’t commit us to the existence of (mind-
independent) normative truths. We will still be able to use utterances like, “suffering 
is bad” and “suffering matters” to express our subjective concern with ameliorating 
suffering if nihilism in fact turns out to be true. 
 
41. One might regard this analogy between normative deliberation and IBE as 
a version of the so-called “companions in guilt (or innocence)” strategy for 
defending metanormative realism: both the justificatory and the explanatory forms 
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It is instructive how Olson (2014), as a normative sceptic, actually responds to 
Enoch. He rejects the Deliberative Indispensability Argument, not for the same 
reasons that we have rejected it, but on the grounds that the only indispensability 
arguments that work 
are precisely those that are truth-tracking, i.e. those that tend to render us 
having true beliefs. Employing IBE has rendered us having true beliefs about 
such things as protons and planets, and about mundane matters such as 
whether it has rained recently. This is because the world is explanation-
friendly. (176) 
 
By contrast, the world is not (normative) deliberation friendly, according to Olson, 
because there are no (mind-independent) normative truths. This response naturally 
takes IBE, but not normative deliberation, to be truth-tracking or epistemically 
justified (or reliable). But what if Enoch were to ask Olson how he knows that IBE is 
truth-tracking or epistemically justified? Judging by the above passage, he would 
presumably answer that IBE has led to us having true beliefs in the past, or that the 
world seems to be explanation-friendly. But to get from these observations to the 
conclusion that IBE is truth-tracking or epistemically justified, he will have to 
employ IBE, in which case he is leveraging IBE in its own defence. Olson suggests 
that the explanation-friendliness of the world is the best explanation for the success of 
IBE, but of course IBE can only be truth-tracking if the world is indeed explanation-
friendly; if we were not justified in (or had no evidence for) taking the world to be 
explanation friendly in the first place, we would not be justified in taking IBE to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
of rational inquiry arguably suffer from the same Original Sin of ultimately having 
to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps (epistemically speaking). 
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truth-tracking. And we need to rely on IBE to support or license the conclusion that 
the world is explanation-friendly. So in terms of the justification, rationale or 
evidence for IBE, there appears to be an intractable element of epistemic circularity. 
This does not mean that we are not justified in accepting IBE; Enoch’s point, 
however, is that normative deliberation is no less problematic in terms of its ultimate 
rationale or justification than IBE, and thus that we are no less justified in taking the 
deliberative indispensability criterion to be a sound basis for commitment to certain 
kinds of truths than the explanatory indispensability criterion.42 Since explanatory 
indispensability is fundamentally no better off than deliberative indispensability, the 
analogy between the two stands, and IBE cannot be used to refute the commitments 
of normative deliberation. 
The exact same thing can be said about a principle of parsimony like Occam’s 
Razor. As Yudkowsky (2007b) explains: 
If two hypotheses fit the same observations equally well, why believe the 
simpler one is more likely to be true? You could argue that Occam's Razor has 
worked in the past, and is therefore likely to continue to work in the 
future. But this, itself, appeals to a prediction from Occam's Razor … Indeed, 
                                                            
42. Under some models of knowledge, the kind of bootstrapping I am 
claiming is involved in IBE would not come out as justified, and so the kind of 
bootstrapping involved in normative deliberation would not come out as justified 
either. But if coherentism is the correct theory of epistemic justification, this kind of 
bootstrapping sometimes will be justified, and IBE and normative deliberation are 
both prime candidates for justified cases of bootstrapping. If, on other hand, some 
form of foundationalism is true, then there will be some foundational, self-evident 
truths, and if there are some self-evident non-normative truths, there will probably 
be some self-evident normative truths as well. In any case, there is good reason to 
believe that normative deliberation is just as basic as IBE, whether IBE can bootstrap 
itself or is simply self-evident in terms of its justification. 
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it seems that there is no way to justify Occam’s Razor except by appealing to 
Occam’s Razor. 
 
A scenario in which Occam’s Razor will continue to work in the future because it has 
worked in the past is indeed a simpler one than a scenario in which Occam’s Razor 
has worked in the past and then suddenly, for some reason or other, stops being as 
effective in the future,43 and thus, by Occam’s Razor, the former scenario is more 
likely to obtain than the latter. Furthermore, Occam’s Razor has worked in the past 
(presumably) because it has led to us having true beliefs in the past: using Occam’s 
Razor has often led us to select those hypotheses which actually are (most likely to 
be) correct. But how do we know that the hypotheses we have selected on the basis 
of Occam’s Razor are actually the correct ones (or the ones that are most likely to be 
correct)? It would seem that there is no way to confirm the truth of these hypotheses 
in a way that is independent of the original appeal to Occam’s Razor. 
It is reasonably clear that the sceptic who, like Olson, relies on IBE and 
Occam’s Razor to argue against metanormative realism needs these things to pull 
themselves up by the bootstraps from an epistemic point of view. It is therefore open 
to the realist to argue that normative deliberation (and indeed the entire normative 
domain) can bootstrap itself in an equally legitimate way. The normative sceptic, 
however, can give an informative account of how this bootstrapping is supposed to 
work in the case of IBE: he can tell us how the way the world is explains how certain 
                                                            
43. Yudkowsky points out that the hypothesis: “’Occam's Razor works up to 
October 8th, 2027 and then stops working thereafter’ is more complex, but it fits the 
observed evidence equally well.” 
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commitments of ours are likely to track the truth, and by using IBE to support IBE, 
he can tell us how and why IBE actually works. Normative deliberation and a 
justified belief in (mind-independent) normative truths probably need to pull 
themselves up by their own bootstraps as well. IBE and normative deliberation both 
appear to be what Enoch calls “basic belief-forming methods” (2013, 58), i.e. 
methods of forming justified beliefs which nonetheless do not admit of further 
epistemic justification by virtue of anything more fundamental than themselves. So 
unless the realist can give an informative account of the kind of bootstrapping 
involved in normative deliberation, he cannot claim that normative deliberation is 
epistemically on par with IBE. The realist should be able to show that deliberation 
can pull itself up by the bootstraps in a way that is epistemically just as respectable 
as IBE. 
This is where our second argument for metanormative realism—Parfit’s 
Wager—comes in. For Blaise Pascal, we ought rationally to believe in the Christian 
God, although His existence is plainly uncertain, because wagering that God exists is 
the best bet in prudential terms (Hájek 2018). In a similar vein, Parfit’s Wager 
purports to show that we ought rationally to believe in the existence of normative 
reasons and truths, because wagering as much is the best bet in normative terms. But 
fortunately for us, Parfit’s Wager does not suffer from the same defects as Pascal’s 
original Wager. It is not vulnerable to a “What about the other Gods?” objection, 
showing that the prudential value of believing in the Christian God is cancelled out 
when we consider, say, the possibility of a God that doesn’t want us to believe in 
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Him, and will vindictively punish us if we dare to do so. Nor does it require us to 
actively try to believe something that we might just find it too difficult to believe. 
Instead, it simply contends that we will come to understand, as a conceptual matter, 
that we have a categorical reason to believe in normative reasons (and a normative 
reason to believe in categorical reasons) when we reflect properly on the possibility 
that there could be such reasons and what this possibility means for us and for what 
(if anything) we ought rationally to believe.44 
At first glance, this argument might strike the reader as viciously circular, in 
spite of the analogy with IBE and its need to pull itself up by the bootstraps 
(epistemically speaking). How can we wager for the existence of normative reasons 
because it is the best bet in normative terms unless we already know that normative 
reasons actually exist? The answer is that when we make the Wager, we are 
comparing epistemically possible worlds in terms of the normative reasons (or lack 
thereof) in those worlds, without assuming, at that stage, that the actual world 
contains any normative reasons itself. For all we know at this stage, we might be in 
the neutral world (in normative terms), by which I mean a world in which there are 
no normative reasons and in which, therefore, everything is normatively neutral, in 
the sense that nothing has any normative property or status (positive or negative). 
What we are doing (or ought to be doing) is giving ourselves the best chance of 
                                                            
44. The categorical reason we have to believe in normative reasons is an 
epistemic reason (a reason for a belief), but the normative reasons we have 
categorical (epistemic) reason to believe in might be other kinds of reasons (such as 
practical reasons), and they might be non-categorical as well as categorical reasons. 
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being in a good world in normative terms, that is, a world in which normative 
reasons do exist and in which we respond appropriately to those normative reasons 
(in that world). In so doing, we are not already assuming, in a question-begging 
manner, that we are not in fact in the neutral world. The existence of normative 
reasons (in the actual world) is a conclusion we can then go on to draw on the basis 
of the Wager. 
 
3.3. The argument 
Without further ado, therefore, here is the passage from Parfit (2011b) 
containing what I refer to as Parfit’s Wager: 
If we believe that there are some irreducibly normative truths, we might be 
believing what we ought to believe. If there are such truths, one of these 
truths would be that we ought to believe that there are such truths. If instead 
we believe that there are no such truths, we could not be believing what we 
ought to believe. If there were no such truths, there would be nothing that we 
ought to believe. Since 
(D) it might be true that we ought to believe that there are some 
irreducibly normative truths, 
and 
(E) it could not be true that we ought not to have this belief, 
we can conclude that 
(F) we have unopposed reasons or apparent reasons to believe that 
there are such truths, 
so that 
(G) this is what, without claiming certainty, we ought rationally to 
believe.45 (619) 
                                                            
45. Parfit also makes the claim that “we could not have reasons to believe that 
there are no irreducibly normative truths, since the fact that we had such reasons 
would itself have to be one such truth,” and the claim that, “if we ought to have 
some belief about this question [whether or not there are irreducibly normative 
truths], this [that there are such truths] is what we ought to believe” (618-619). I 
reject the first of these two claims. As Streumer (2017) points out, “there can be 
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And if we ought rationally to believe (even if we have no right to be certain) that 
there are some irreducibly normative truths, I think we can conclude that normative 
reasons and truths (probably) do exist: the unopposed or apparent reasons we have 
to believe in irreducibly normative truths would themselves be some such reasons, 
and the truth that we have such reasons would itself be one such truth. 
I don’t think the above passage establishes the existence of irreducibly 
normative reasons and truths, however. If we speak just in terms of normative 
reasons and normative truths, and leave it open whether or not these reasons and 
truths are metaphysically reducible, presumably to naturalistic or empirical truths, 
we will get the conclusion that we ought rationally to believe (without claiming 
certainty) that there are some normative reasons and normative truths. Of course, it 
may be quite impossible to reduce normative reasons and normative truths to 
anything more fundamental than themselves, and Parfit certainly has other 
arguments for the thesis that such reasons and truths must be irreducible.46 But as 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
reasons to believe a theory [such as the normative error theory] that is in fact false 
but we do not know is false” (155). If we do not know that there are any (irreducibly) 
normative truths, there can be reasons to believe that there are no such truths, even if 
this would mean that there actually are such truths. Yet I think the second claim is 
clearly true: if there are no normative truths, it could not be the case that we ought to 
believe that there are no such truths (because this would itself have to be one such 
truth), but if there are such truths, it certainly could be the case that we ought to 
believe that there are such truths. 
 
46. Such as the “Triviality Objection” against normative naturalism, to which 
he devotes a whole chapter (2011b, 328-356). We will discuss the Triviality Objection 
in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4). And I will defend non-reductive normative naturalism 
over the course of Chapters 7 and 8. 
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with the Deliberative Indispensability Argument in the previous chapter, we will set 
this issue aside for now and leave it completely open whether normative reasons 
and truths are irreducible or not. 
 
3.4. The Normative Matrix and Normative Superdominance 




There are some normative 
reasons and truths 
There are no normative 
reasons and truths 
Believe that there are 
some normative reasons 
and truths 
Believe what we ought to 
believe 
Normatively neutral 
Believe that there are no 
normative reasons and 
truths 




Fail to believe what we 
ought to believe 
Normatively neutral 
 
According to this matrix (let’s call it “the Normative Matrix”), if there are no 
normative reasons and truths, there is nothing that we ought to believe (or ought not 
to believe), and therefore, whatever we believe (or don’t believe) in such a scenario is 
normatively neutral: it neither has any normative property or status (positive or 
negative) itself, or involves the possession of any normative property or status by 
anything whatsoever. In a scenario such as this, it doesn’t matter normatively what 
we believe (or don’t believe). If, on the other hand, normative reasons and truths 
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actually do exist, then, if we also believe that there are some such reasons and truths, 
we will be believing what we ought to believe. Yet if, in this same scenario, we 
instead believe that there are no such reasons and truths, we will be believing what 
we ought not to believe: if we ought to believe that there are some such reasons and 
truths, it follows that we ought not to believe that there are no such reasons and 
truths. And what if we simply suspend judgment altogether, believing neither that 
there are nor that there aren’t any such reasons and truths? If there are no normative 
reasons and truths, it won’t matter normatively whether or not we suspend 
judgment on this question. But if there are some such reasons and truths, then 
although we might avoid believing what we ought not to believe by suspending 
judgment, we will also be failing to believe what we ought to believe, because, in 
such a scenario, we ought to believe that there are some such reasons and truths. 
One thing this matrix assumes is that, in the scenario in which normative 
reasons and truths exist, it is also the case that we ought to believe that there are 
such reasons and truths (as Parfit says, “[i]f there are such truths, one of these truths 
would be that we ought to believe that there are such truths” (619)). But are we 
really entitled to assume this? Couldn’t it instead be the case that, even though there 
are such things as normative reasons and truths, we have no reason at all to believe 
in them?47 Suppose that there are normative reasons and truths. In this scenario, 
there will be some things that we have normative reasons to believe. And if we ever 
                                                            
47. After all, some things can obviously exist without us necessarily having 
any reason to believe in them. 
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have reasons to believe that we have reasons to believe any of the things that we in fact 
have reasons to believe, we will also (thereby) have reasons to believe that there are 
normative reasons and truths; we will then be able to infer the existence of 
normative reasons and truths straightforwardly from the fact that we have these 
reasons. And if (in this same scenario) we ever had any countervailing reasons to 
believe that there are no such reasons and truths, these very reasons that we have 
would themselves indicate that normative reasons and truths actually exist. 
If there are any normative reasons and truths, therefore, it follows that we 
ought to believe that there are such reasons and truths—unless, that is, we never 
have any reasons whatsoever to believe that we have any reasons to believe any of 
things that we nonetheless do have reasons to believe. And while this is a logically 
possible combination, it is not exactly a plausible one.48 If there are some normative 
reasons and truths, there are surely some things that we have normative reasons to 
believe, and although there will no doubt be cases in which we have reasons to 
believe something without knowing that we have these reasons, in all probability, 
there will also be cases in which we do know that we have reasons to believe what 
                                                            
48. Especially when we consider that, just because there are some normative 
reasons and truths does not mean that non-naturalism has to be true about them, 
such that there might have to be a particular epistemological problem about our 
access to a metaphysically sui generis domain of normative truths that doesn’t arise 
for other areas of knowledge. I will defend a naturalistic account of normative 
knowledge in Chapter 7. 
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we actually have reasons to believe.49 If I have reasons to believe that I have a hand, I 
probably also have reasons to believe that I have reasons to believe that I have a hand 
(because I also have reasons to believe that I have eyes that work correctly, for 
instance). And if we ever know that we have normative reasons to believe 
something, we are thereby in a position to know that there are some normative 
reasons, simply by inference from the fact that we have these reasons. It does seem 
to be the case, therefore, that if there are some normative reasons and truths, this is 
we ought to believe.50 This means that, in accordance with the Normative Matrix, if 
we ought to believe that there are some normative reasons and truths, and we 
instead believe that there are no such reasons and truths, we will be believing what 
we ought not to believe; and if we suspend judgement on the matter, we might 
avoid believing what we ought not to believe, but we will still be failing to believe 
what we ought to believe. 
So taking all these possible outcomes into account, what can we say follows 
from the Normative Matrix? Does it really show that we ought rationally to believe 
                                                            
49. The complete normative sceptic, of course, will not accept that there are 
such cases. But such a sceptic would probably not also be a metanormative realist, 
and it hardly seems tenable to be both a sceptic and a realist about normativity at the 
same time. 
 
50. We should qualify this by saying that we ought not to hold this belief with 
certainty, to allow for the possibility that, even though normative reasons exists and 
we sometimes have normative reasons for belief, there are absolutely no cases in 
which we know that we have such reasons. According to claim Parfit’s (G), “this is 
what, without claiming certainty, we ought rationally to believe” [my emphasis] (619). 
The conclusion that Parfit’s Wager delivers is precisely that there are normative 
reasons, and that we ought to believe as much—but without certainty. 
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that there are some normative reasons and truths? It may establish a version of 
Parfit’s claim (F): that there are apparent reasons to believe in normative reasons and 
truths, but this will not necessarily entail or support the conclusion that we ought 
rationally to believe in such reasons and truths (even if we avoid claiming 
certainty).51 For this to follow, we need there to be actual reasons to believe that there 
are some such reasons and truths. And I don’t think the Normative Matrix on its 
own is enough to entail that we ought rationally to believe that there really are some 
normative reasons and truths. 
To get to this conclusion from the Normative Matrix, we need one more 
premise that Parfit himself does not supply. This premise is a principle I call 
“Normative Superdominance.” The Normative Superdominance principle states 
that: 
If a particular decision or response (such as a forming a certain belief) 
normatively superdominates all its available alternatives, then we have at least 
some normative reason to make that decision or to respond in that way (for 
instance, by forming the relevant belief). 
 
                                                            
51. Talk of rationality as I am engaging in it here (and as Parfit does in the 
original passage) is interchangeable with talk of reasons. This is largely a matter of 
stipulation: there is a sense of “rationality” which does not inherently involve 
normative reasons, meaning instead something like “reason,” which itself refers to 
the mental abilities that lead us to have true beliefs. Even if there are no normative 
reasons and truths, these mental abilities of ours would still exist, and thus reason or 
rationality, in that sense, would still exist in the absence of normative reasons. But 
this is obviously not the relevant sense to use in this context. As Parfit says, “the 
more important questions are not about rationality, but about reasons” (454). When 
we are asking whether or not we ought rationally to believe in normative reasons 
and truths, therefore, we are asking whether or not we have (normative) reasons to 
believe in such reasons and truths. 
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A decision or response “normatively superdominates” all its available alternatives if 
and only if 
1) the normatively best possible outcome associated with this decision or 
response is normatively better than any of the possible outcomes associated 
with its alternatives,  
2) the normatively worst (or least normatively good) possible outcome 
associated with this decision or response is normatively equal to or better than 
the normatively best possible outcome associated with any of its alternatives. 
 
and 
3) the normatively worst possible outcome associated with each one of its 
alternatives is normatively worse than the normatively worst possible outcome 
associated with this decision or response. 
 
In other words, the particular decision or response in question not only has to 
provide us with the only chance we have of getting the normatively best possible 
outcome; there also has to be no way that we could get a normatively better outcome 
(better, that is, than we would actually get if we responded in that way) by 
responding in some alternative way instead (because the possible outcomes 
associated with any of the alternatives are none of them normatively better than any 
of the possible outcomes associated with this decision or response). And not only 
that, but this decision or response has to provide us with the only guarantee that we 
will avoid the normatively worst possible outcome: all of the alternatives must 
involve some chance of getting an outcome which is normatively worse than any of 
the outcomes we would get if we made the decision or response in question. If all 
three of these conditions obtain, it seems to be a conceptual truth that we have at 
least some normative reason to make that decision or to respond in that way, and 
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thus that it is not the case that we have absolutely no normative reason whatsoever 
to respond in that way.52 
When I speak of a possible outcome being normatively better or worse than 
another possible outcome, I am defining a “normatively good” outcome as one in 
which we respond appropriately to normative reasons (for instance, in which we 
believe what we have normative reasons to believe, or do what we have normative 
reasons to do) and a “normatively bad” outcome as one in which we fail to respond 
appropriately to normative reasons (in which we fail to believe what we have 
normative reasons to believe, or in which we fail to do what we have normative 
reasons to do). I also define a “normatively neutral” outcome as one which is neither 
normatively good nor normatively bad (in these senses). An outcome where we 
neither respond nor fail to respond appropriately to normative reasons, because 
normative reasons do not exist and thus there are no normative reasons for us to 
respond or fail to respond to, is in this sense a normatively neutral outcome. Given 
these definitions, we can say that a normatively good outcome is, of course, 
normatively better than a normatively bad outcome. I also think we can say that a 
normatively good outcome is normatively better than a normatively neutral one: if 
                                                            
52. In support of this idea, we can observe that it is clearly a conceptual truth 
that, if we ought to make a certain decision or respond in a certain way, then we 
have decisive reason to make that decision or to respond in that way. This seems to 
suggest that, if we are more likely to be responding as we ought to respond, and less 
likely to be responding as we ought not to respond, by responding in a certain way 
(or by making a certain decision), compared to any other decision or response (or 
lack thereof) we could possibly make, and we know this, then we have, perhaps not 
decisive reason, but at least some reason to make that decision or to respond in that 
way. 
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one outcome is good (in some way) and another outcome is not good (in that same 
way), then, even if the latter outcome is not bad (in that way), it is reasonable to infer 
that the former outcome is better (in that way) than the latter outcome. And for the 
same reason, a normatively bad outcome is also normatively worse than a 
normatively neutral outcome (even though the normatively neutral outcome isn’t 
normatively good). 
With these conceptual resources in hand, we can clearly see by looking at the 
Normative Matrix that believing in normative reasons and truths normatively 
superdominates all its available alternatives. The normatively worst (or least 
normatively good) possible outcome involved in having this belief (the normatively 
neutral outcome) is as normatively good as the normatively best possible outcome 
involved in either having the contrary belief or in suspending judgement (the 
normatively neutral outcome in both cases). Believing in normative reasons and 
truths is the only response that has the normatively best possible outcome (believing 
what we ought to believe) associated with it; and the normatively worst possible 
outcome associated with either of the other two responses (believing what we ought 
not to believe or failing to believe what we ought to believe) is worse than the worst 
possible outcome associated with believing in such reasons and truths (mere 
normative neutrality). Since believing in such reasons and truths normatively 
superdominates both of its only possible alternatives, by the Normative 
Superdominance principle, we have at least some normative reason to believe in 
such reasons and truths. And if we have even some normative reason to believe in 
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such reasons and truths (no matter how tiny or weak this reason may be), it follows 
that such reasons and truths must therefore exist: the reason that we have to believe 
in such reasons and truths would itself be one such reason, and the truth that we 
have this reason would itself be one such truth. And if this is the case, we can indeed 
conclude that we ought rationally to believe that there are some normative reasons 
and truths. 
That being said, the Normative Matrix does have as its precondition the 
potentially controversial assumption that normative reasons and truths are possible. 
If such reasons and truths are not in fact possible, it would make no sense to ask 
whether or not to believe in such reasons and truths, or whether or not one had 
reason to have this belief, and there would be no normatively good or bad possible 
outcomes involved either in having or not having this belief, so there would be no 
way of generating the Matrix in the first place. This point can also be expressed in 
terms of probability: if you assign probability 0 to the existence of normative truths 
and normative reasons—as a complete normative sceptic might—then Parfit’s Wager 
will not give you a reason to change your mind and become a metanormative realist. 
One of the premises of the argument is claim (D): that it might be true that we ought 
to believe that there are some (irreducibly) normative truths (619). And the sceptic 
could well reject this premise, arguing that because there are no normative reasons 
and truths, we can effectively rule out from the start the possibility that we might be 
believing what we ought to believe by believing in such reasons and truths. 
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At this stage, the realist should not simply point out that normative reasons 
and truths are logically possible: the sceptic does not have to maintain that the 
negation of any normative proposition either is or reduces to a truth of logic. What 
the realist needs is for it to be epistemically possible that some normative propositions 
are true—for it to be the case that, when coming to Parfit’s Wager, we can reasonably 
be uncertain or undecided about whether or not there really are any specifically 
normative reasons and whether or not we have any reason to believe in them. As far 
as the sceptic is concerned, the upshot of this is that, if he already has a strong 
argument against the existence of (mind-independent) normative truths, Parfit’s 
Wager will not provide an answer to this argument, because this argument will be 
enough to establish that such truths are epistemically impossible. If some version of 
the Argument from Queerness, for instance, is sound as an argument against all 
normativity, then we would be able to know on the basis of this argument that there 
are no (mind-independent) normative truths, and Parfit’s Wager would do nothing 
to change this state of affairs.53 As far as the realist is concerned, however, the upshot 
is that the onus is very much on the sceptic to provide a knock-down argument 
against realism, on the basis of which we can know that there are no (mind-
independent) normative truths, because if there is no such argument, then (mind-
independent) normative truths will be epistemically possible, and claim (D) will 
                                                            
53. Olson, who accepts a version of the Argument from Queerness, would 
maintain that we do (or at least can) know that there are no (mind-independent) 
normative truths, because such truths would imply the existence of irreducibly 
normative favouring relations, and irreducibly normative favouring relations are 
queer. I will address this argument in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4). 
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therefore be true, thus generating the Normative Matrix and with it (via the 
eminently plausible Normative Superdominance principle) the conclusion that there 
really are some normative reasons and truths.54 Even if Parfit’s Wager does not itself 
qualify as a knock-down argument against normative scepticism, it does succeed in 
very much shifting the burden of proof onto the sceptic, who must show that he 
knows (with something approaching certainty) that there is no such thing as (mind-
independent) normative truth. It is still a significant result that, if normativity is even 
possible, it (probably) does actually exist. 
In our context, remember, we are suggesting that normative deliberation can 
pull itself up by its own bootstraps in a way that is epistemically on par with the 
way that inference to the best explanation can pull itself up by its own bootstraps. Of 
course, IBE must pull itself up by the bootstraps in an explanatory way: a way that 
pivots on the notion of an explanation.55 Normative deliberation, on the other hand, 
must pull itself up by the bootstraps not in an explanatory way, but in a normative 
way: a way that pivots on the notion of what we ought rationally or have 
(normative) reason to believe. Using Parfit’s Wager, we have deliberated our way to 
the conclusion that we ought rationally to believe in the existence of normative 
                                                            
54. Plus the conclusion that (some of) these normative reasons and truths 
must be mind-independent, taking into account the truth of premise (1) of the 
Deliberative Indispensability Argument (which we established in the previous 
chapter). 
 
55. Yudkowsky offers such an explanation for why Occam’s Razor works in 
practice when he points out that “we live in a simple world, a low-entropy universe 
in which there are short explanations to be found” (2007b). This is surely the same 
basic reason why IBE works in practice as well. 
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reasons and truths. This suggests that normative deliberation can pull itself up by 
the bootstraps in an epistemically respectable way. Of course, this argument does 
not prove the existence of normative reasons and truths by means of IBE. But then it 
would appear that the felicity of IBE cannot be proven by means of normative 
deliberation. All-things-considered, therefore, deliberation and IBE do seem to be on 
par from an epistemic point of view, taking each basic belief-forming method on its 
own terms (as it makes most sense to do). The normative sceptic who attempts to 
refute the commitments of deliberation by appealing to IBE would be akin to a 
sceptic of IBE who attempts to refute this basic belief-forming method by appealing 
to normative deliberation. In both cases, this is the wrong approach. Both basic 
belief-forming methods have some need to bootstrap themselves and both seem 
equally capable of doing so. As a result, the commitments of normative deliberation 
are just as respectable as the commitments of IBE. 
 
3.5. From normative reasons to categorical reasons 
In Chapter 1 (Section 1.1), I stated that normative reasons depend on 
categorical reasons. I will now explain why the existence of normative reasons 
implies the existence of categorical reasons. And if I am correct that Parfit’s Wager 
establishes the existence of normative reasons, this means that it also establishes the 
existence of categorical reasons. Categorical reasons are the kind of normative 
reasons which apply to agents independently of their involvement in certain rule-
governed or goal-orientated activities. As Olson (2011) elaborates: 
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To say that there are categorical reasons for some agent, A, to behave in some 
way, φ, is to say that there is reason for A to φ irrespective of whether A’s φ-
ing would promote satisfaction or realization of some of A’s desires or aims, 
or promote the fulfilment of some role A occupies, or comply with the rules of 
some activity A is engaged in. (64) 
 
Such reasons need not be just reasons to behave in some way; we might have 
categorical reasons to respond in other ways, such as by forming certain beliefs, so 
long as the reasons we have to respond in those ways apply to us irrespective of 
psychological or social phenomena such as our desires, ends, or roles.56 
Some theorists believe that there are normative reasons but no categorical 
reasons: that all our normative reasons, whether for action or belief, are dependent 
in some way on our aims or desires. I don’t think this Internalism about reasons,57 as it 
is often called, represents a coherent position. As Scanlon (2014) points out, “the 
claim that a person has [normative] reason to do what will promote the satisfaction 
of his or her desires is itself a normative claim. Indeed, it is an ‘objective’ normative 
claim, since it does not itself depend on what people desire, or on what aims they 
have” (16-17). As we saw in the previous chapter (Section 2.3), Olson argues that we 
                                                            
56. Categorical reasons are also sometimes called external reasons. Street 
defines external reasons as “reasons for agents to do things even in cases where there 
is no sound deliberative route from their own subjective motivational set to the 
conclusion that it is a reason” (2016b, 132). I think this is merely a terminological 
difference: categorical or external reasons are those reasons that apply to us 
independently of our own or anyone else’s motivations. 
 
57. Internalists about reasons are those who “agree that there are reasons in 
the standard normative sense, but deny that there are any normative reasons of a 
certain sort—namely ones that exist independently of whether there is a sound 
deliberative route to the conclusion that they exist from the subjective motivational 
set of the agent whose normative reasons are in question” (131). 
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only have hypothetical reasons for action and belief, and that these hypothetical 
reasons are in no way normative: they are not “properly understood in terms of the 
counting-in-favour-of relation,” as he puts it.58 In other words, we may have reasons 
to respond in certain ways, in the purely psychological sense that responding in 
these ways is likely to satisfy our desires, but facts about our desires and the likely 
means to their satisfaction do not actually call for or count in favour of any responses 
on our part. Claims that say that certain features of the word call for or count in 
favour of certain responses do not “reduce to empirical claims about agents’ desires 
and (actual or believed) efficient means of bringing about the satisfaction of these 
desires,” and are therefore, in Olson’s view, systematically false. For instance, it 
might be true to say “that there was reason for Hitler to invade Britain during World 
War II,” but if so, this “means nothing more than that Hitler wanted to win the war 
and had he invaded Britain he would have been more likely to do so” (2011, 78). It 
does not mean that Hitler’s invading Britain was called for or counted in favour of in 
any respect whatsoever; and if it did mean this, the claim that Hitler had this reason 
would be false, just like, for Olson, any normative claim implying the existence of 
categorical reasons. 
This suggests that a sceptic about categorical reasons should also be a sceptic 
about all normative reasons. Olson tells us that the sceptic about categorical reasons 
                                                            
58. That is, the concept of a hypothetical reason is not related to or acquired 
from the conscious experience of certain features of the world calling for or counting 
in favour of certain responses on our part, but simply from the observation that 
agents act in order to achieve certain ends. 
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“cannot hold that there is a transcendent norm to the effect that agents take (what 
they believe to be) the means to their ends, for that would mean that the error 
theorist is committed to their being categorical reasons after all” (77).59 If Hitler did 
have a normative (hypothetical) reason to invade Britain, this implies that he would 
have had a categorical reason to take the means to his ends: if he didn’t have a 
normative reason to take the means to his ends, a reason which did not itself depend 
on the ends or desires he happened to have, he wouldn’t have had a normative 
reason to do the specific thing (invading Britain) that would have been conducive to 
the satisfaction of his actual desire (winning the war). And since Olson believes that 
there are no categorical reasons, he concludes that Hitler had no normative reason to 
invade Britain—and that no one ever has any normative reasons at all, for that 
matter. 
I think this example shows that, if there are any normative reasons at all, there 
must be at least one transcendent norm in virtue of which we have these reasons, 
and which applies to us completely independently of our aims or desires. Even if 
there is only one transcendent norm, according to which we ought to take the most 
efficient means towards our ends, we would still have a categorical reason to comply 
with this norm and thus to take the most efficient means towards our ends. The 
Internalist might attempt to escape this problem by making an appeal to meta-
                                                            
59. Olson makes this observation in the context of defending moral error 
theory: the view that moral claims are or entail claims about categorical reasons, but 
there are no categorical reasons in reality and consequently all moral claims are false 
(62). If Parfit’s Wager really does establish the existence of categorical reasons, it 
significantly undermines the case for moral error theory in the process. 
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desires. If we have a meta-desire to satisfy our first-order desires as thoroughly as 
possible, for instance, this meta-desire might give us a reason to take the means to 
our ends that is normative and yet hypothetical, rather than categorical. But I think 
Olson could easily respond to this by saying that this simply pushes the problem 
back one step: if a meta-desire to take the most efficient means towards one’s ends 
gives one a normative reason to do just that, it still follows that there must be a 
transcendent norm to the effect that agents take the most efficient means to towards 
the fulfilment of their (meta-)desires, a norm which inescapably implies the existence 
of categorical reasons. 
But even if the Internalist can somehow accommodate normative reasons 
without categorical reasons (by appealing to meta-desires or otherwise), I think that 
Parfit’s Wager still establishes the existence of categorical reasons in its own right. By 
Parfit’s Wager, the reason we have to believe in normative reasons and truths does 
not come from any relation this belief stands in to our desires, but from the 
conceptual truth that believing in such reasons and truths normatively 
superdominates not believing in such reasons and truths. In other words, it follows 
from the epistemic possibility of normative reasons plus the Normative 
Superdominance principle that we not only have a normative reason to believe in 
normative reasons and truths, but that this normative reason is also a categorical 
reason. The only way of escaping this conclusion, I believe, is by denying one (or 
both) of these premises. And I don’t think someone who denies either of these 
premises could consistently hold that there are any normative reasons at all. 
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3.6. The Deliberative Indispensability Argument revisited 
We are now in a position to see how the Deliberative Indispensability 
Argument, supplemented by the kind of Pascalian reasoning involved in Parfit’s 
Wager, establishes the existence of mind-independent normative truths. The correct 
formulation of this argument states that: 
(1*) If there were no mind-independent normative truths, we would not have 
sufficient normative reason to engage in normative deliberation. 
(2*) We do have sufficient normative reason to engage in normative 
deliberation. 
(3*) Therefore, there are mind-independent normative truths. 
 
Premise (2*) is of course the crucial premise of this argument. And to illustrate 
further why this premise is true, we can use the following matrix: 
 
 
There are some normative 
reasons and truths 
There are no normative 
reasons and truths 
Sometimes engage in 
normative deliberation 
Normatively good Normatively neutral 
Never engage in 
normative deliberation 
Normatively bad Normatively neutral 
 
In the scenario in which there are no normative reasons and truths, there is of course 
no normative difference between engaging and not engaging in normative 
deliberation: there are no normative truths for us to discover, so it does not matter 
normatively whether or not we try to discover such truths. But suppose there really 
are some normative reasons and truths. If there are some normative reasons and 
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truths, a scenario in which we respond appropriately to those normative reasons and 
truths (for instance, by doing what we ought to do) will in normative terms be 
better, all else being equal, than a scenario in which we do not respond 
appropriately to those normative reasons and truths (such as by not doing what we 
ought to do). And if, in such a scenario, we engage in some degree of normative 
deliberation, at least some of the time, we are surely more likely to discover what the 
normative truths are, and thus more likely to respond in a normatively appropriate 
manner to those truths, than if we never engage in any normative deliberation 
whatsoever. We can therefore say that, if there are some normative reasons and 
truths, one of these truths would be that we ought to engage in (some degree of) 
normative deliberation. 
As such, if there are some normative reasons and truths, and we do 
sometimes engage in normative deliberation, we are doing what we ought to do in 
that particular scenario, and are thus in the normatively good case, all else being 
equal. If we never engage in normative deliberation in that same scenario, we are 
failing to do what we ought to do, and are thus in the normatively bad case (all else 
being equal). And if there are no normative reasons and truths, it doesn’t matter 
normatively whether or not we ever engage in normative deliberation. Therefore, 
when it comes to deciding whether or not to engage in normative deliberation to any 
extent whatsoever, we can say that, if we choose to engage in normative deliberation 
at least some of the time, we will find ourselves either in the normatively good case 
or the normatively neutral case. If we instead choose never to engage in normative 
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deliberation, we will get either the normatively neutral case or the normatively bad 
case. Normatively speaking, the combination of possibilities that includes the 
normatively good case and the normatively neutral case clearly trumps the 
combination of possibilities that includes the normatively neutral case and the 
normatively bad case. It certainly seems normatively better not to run the risk of 
getting the normatively bad case, especially when, by doing so, we will at best get 
the normatively neutral case, and to allow for the possibility of getting the 
normatively good case (when at worst, all we will get is the normatively neutral 
case). And thus it follows that, normatively speaking, the decision to engage in some 
degree of normative deliberation trumps the decision never to engage in any 
normative deliberation at all. To say the least, therefore, we do seem to have some 
normative reason to engage in normative deliberation. 
So long as normative reasons and truths are epistemically possible, we can 
clearly see that the decision to engage in some degree of normative deliberation (at 
least some of the time) normatively superdominates the decision never to engage in 
any normative deliberation whatsoever. If the Normative Superdominance principle 
holds, it follows that we have at least some normative reason to engage in normative 
deliberation. We must, therefore, be in the scenario in which there are such things as 
normative reasons and truths. And from this it follows that we not only have some 
reason, but sufficient reason to engage in normative deliberation (because we ought 
to engage in normative deliberation if there really are some normative reasons and 
truths). This entails that premise (2*) of the Deliberative Indispensability Argument 
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is true, and when combined with the truth of premise (1*), gives us the conclusion 
that there are mind-independent normative truths. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
If IBE and Occam’s Razor can be relied upon at all as means of acquiring 
knowledge, the kind of epistemic bootstrapping involved in them must not be 
completely fallacious; and this is the very same kind of bootstrapping that (I have 
argued) is also involved in Parfit’s Wager and the Deliberative Indispensability 
Argument. Another way to put this point is to say that behind (the use of) IBE and 
Occam’s Razor is the assumption that the universe is a (relatively) simple place: a 
place in which simple explanations of phenomena are more likely to be correct than 
more complicated ones. This assumption may be highly plausible. But then so, I 
believe, is the Normative Superdominance principle I have appealed to in defence of 
the existence of normative reasons and truths: if the possible outcomes involved in a 
certain decision or response are so much normatively better on balance than those 
involved in every possible alternative, it seems equally reasonable to assume that we 
have at least some normative reason to make that decision or to respond in that way. 
We have seen from our discussion of premise (1) of the Deliberative 
Indispensability Argument in the previous chapter that normative deliberation is 
committed to mind-independent normative truths, in the sense that it aims at 
discovering normatively non-arbitrary answers to normative questions, and that 
there would be no such answers to be had without mind-independent normative 
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truths. As such, although there may still be some (even sufficient) non-normative 
reason to engage in normative deliberation in the complete absence of such truths, 
there would not be any normative reason to do so. What Parfit’s Wager shows is that 
there is sufficient normative reason to engage in normative deliberation. And if we 
have sufficient normative reason to engage in normative deliberation, and we can 
use normative deliberation to arrive at the conclusion that there are some things we 
ought rationally to believe, normative deliberation must sometimes be able to 
achieve its aim of discovering normatively non-arbitrary answers to normative 
questions. There must, therefore, be mind-independent normative truths, and 
normative scepticism must be false. Having finally got what we came for over the 
course of the last two chapters, in the next chapter, we will consider the ontological 




4. Ontological Implications 
 
There probably are at least some (mind-independent) normative truths: that 
we have normative reason to believe in such truths is (probably) one of them. And 
since, therefore, a realist metanormative theory is called for, we need to ask how 
these (mind-independent) normative truths, in McPherson’s phrase (2011), “fit 
within our best general account of the world” (223). To do this, we first need to ask 
what kind of ontological implications these truths possess, and thus whether or not 
we should opt for a more or less robust version of realism. 
As we observed in Chapter 1, some theorists, such as Parfit (2011b), think that 
normative truths “have no positive ontological implications” (479). Parfit explains 
that normative properties “need not exist either as natural properties in the spatio-
temporal world, or in some non-spatio-temporal part of reality” (486). Others, such 
as Enoch (2013), think that they do have ontological implications, and that 
metanormative realists should not disavow the robust ontological commitments of 
their view (7). The minimalist view (that normative truths do not have ontological 
implications or commitments) seems more parsimonious than the fully robust view, 
but this may not be the case if the Robust Realist can give an adequate naturalistic 
account of the ontological implications or commitments that normative truths are 
supposed to possess. If normative naturalism is not in fact plausible, however, then 
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minimalism will have the advantage of being more parsimonious than Robust 
Realism. So there is something of a burden on the Robust Realist (who is not a 
naturalist) to explain what exactly is wrong with normative minimalism. The burden 
on the minimalist (assuming that the Robust Realist cannot meet his burden) is to 
refute normative naturalism and establish the autonomy of the normative domain; it 
is the essence of the minimalist view (or “quietist realism,” as McPherson calls it 
(2011, 224)) that “[n]ormative truths … constitute a distinct realm and need no 
natural or special metaphysical reality in order to have the significance we 
commonly grant them” (Scanlon 2014, 52).60 
In chapters 6 and 7, we will find out if normative naturalism can hold up to 
scrutiny. In this chapter, I will argue—against minimalism and for Robust Realism—
that normative truths do have ontological implications, on the grounds that 
normative facts and properties seem to possess some kind of causal efficacy and 
standing: our beliefs and actions are often counterfactually sensitive to differences in 
the normative facts, and to differences in the instantiation of normative properties. 
Some normative facts may be fundamental and necessary, but most of the normative 
facts that actually obtain at any given time are contingent, and if these contingent 
                                                            
60. Judging by this remark, Scanlon seems to agree with Parfit that normative 
truths do not have ontological implications, whether natural or “metaphysical” 
(perhaps meaning supernatural or at least non-spatio-temporal), but he in fact denies 
that his view is “minimalist,” because it “aims to give normative … statements 
exactly the content and ‘thickness’ that they require when taken literally: no more 
and certainly no less” (28). In our sense of “minimalism,” however, the minimalist 
view is not minimalist about the significance (or content) of normative truths, but 
only about the ontology of such truths. So I will continue to classify Scanlon as a 
minimalist. 
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normative facts were different, certain non-normative facts (such as facts about our 
beliefs and actions and their consequences) would be also different as a result. This 
indicates that normative facts and properties have an influence on the real world—
they are not epiphenomenal—and thus that there are “worldly” normative facts, as 
the Robust Realist believes, in addition to the “propositional” normative facts in 
which the minimalist believes.61 
I will begin, in Section 4.1, by providing some motivation for the minimalist 
view that fundamental normative truths do not need “truthmakers” because they are 
exclusively a priori. In Section 4.2, I will draw upon an analogy with modal and 
mathematical truths, combined with D. M. Armstrong’s account of the truthmakers 
for these truths, to argue that, even if fundamental normative truths are a priori, this 
in itself would not exempt them from a general need for truthmakers. Then, in 
Section 4.3, I will endorse Parfit’s (and Skorupski’s) observation that there are two 
senses of the term “exist,” an ontological and a non-ontological sense, arguing that 
what demarcates the two senses is that the former implies some kind of causal 
standing whereas the latter implies the complete absence of causal standing, and 
that the central issue between the minimalist and the Robust Realist is therefore 
whether or not normative properties have some kind of causal standing. In Section 
4.4, I will consider and reject Enoch’s argument that minimalism is incompatible 
with the existence of mind-independent normative truths because it is just a 
                                                            
61. See Chapter 1 (Section 1.2) for the distinction between the “worldly” and 
“propositional” senses of “fact.” 
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notational variant of fictionalism. And in Section 4.5, I will make the argument that 
normative properties do have some kind of causal standing by virtue of our 
sensitivity to them. Finally, in Section 4.6, I will reject the potential counterargument 
that normative properties do not actually have any causal standing because they 
supervene on natural properties, and thus it is these natural properties which 
actually do the causal heavy lifting in cases where we seem to be sensitive to 
differences in the normative properties. I conclude that normative minimalism 
amounts to a form of epiphenomenalism which is no more plausible than 
epiphenomenalism about conscious experience. 
 
4.1. Normative truths and the correspondence theory of truth 
What does it mean to say that normative truths lack positive ontological 
implications, as opposed to, say, the truths of the natural sciences, which obviously 
do have ontological implications? One way of explaining this is to appeal to the 
correspondence theory of truth. Under the correspondence theory, truths have 
“truthmakers” which explain why they are true, a “truthmaker” for a truth being 
“an entity in the real world, a thing distinct from the truth itself, with which the 
truth, as a whole, is correlated” (Dodd 1999, 147). If a proposition is true under the 
correspondence theory of truth, this implies that some entity exists in the real world, 
distinct from the truth itself, which makes the truth true, and which is therefore an 
ontological implication of that truth. 
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In the worldly sense of “fact,” a truthmaker is a fact, and as Skorupski (2010) 
points out “of course facts can make a normative proposition true. What makes it true 
that you are acting wrongly is the fact that you are causing suffering, and doing so 
because of the pleasure it gives you” (434). Is the fact that you are causing suffering 
because of the pleasure it gives you an entity that exists in the real world, distinct 
from the normative truth that you are acting wrongly, and therefore one of the 
truthmakers for a normative truth in the sense intended by the correspondence 
theory? This fact is probably distinct from the normative truth that you are acting 
wrongly.62 But there is a rather trivial way in which plenty of normative truths have 
ontological truthmakers: if you are acting wrongly because you are causing suffering 
just for pleasure, then of course this implies that you exist, and that the suffering you 
are causing exists, and these are both (in some sense) entities,63 distinct from any 
truth, which exist in the real world (and which make certain truths, including 
normative truths, true). This is not something that is at issue between the normative 
minimalist and the Robust Realist; the minimalist is aware that entities of certain 
kinds (such as, for instance, moral agents and their actions) often make normative 
                                                            
62. Though if some form of reductive normative naturalism is true, the 
normative fact that you are acting wrongly may be the same fact as the natural fact 
that you are causing suffering just for pleasure, or (more likely) the same fact as 
some disjunctive natural fact of which causing suffering just for pleasure is one of 
the disjuncts. 
 
63. Or “existents,” if “entities” is too ontologically loaded a term. 
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truths true.64 What the minimalist should be taken to deny is that fundamental 
normative truths have truthmakers, in the sense of “real” entities that explain why 
these truths are true. It is not a fundamental normative truth that you are acting 
wrongly because you are causing suffering just for pleasure, because this normative 
truth depends on a non-normative truth (that you are causing suffering just for 
pleasure). That it is wrong to cause suffering just for pleasure, however, probably is 
a fundamental normative truth. For the minimalist, this truth, along with other 
fundamental normative truths, has no positive ontological implications because it 
neither has nor needs a truthmaker. 
One can see why certain truths might need truthmakers, whereas other truths 
might not. Quine (1979) believed that science has some title to a correspondence 
theory of truth because of its link to observation, whereas ethics does not, because, in 
Quine’s view, it lacks this same link (477). If normative truths are not discovered 
through empirical observation and experiment in the way that scientific truths are,65 
this could indicate that scientific truths have truthmakers whereas (fundamental) 
normative truths do not. Minimalists like Parfit and Skorupski accept an a priori 
                                                            
64. Skorupski, after all, is a minimalist, or a “cognitive irrealist,” as he puts it 
(439). 
 
65. This issue touches heavily on the debate between normative naturalism 
and normative non-naturalism, so I will not attempt to resolve it in this chapter. In 
Chapter 7, I will defend an empirical account of normative knowledge according to 
which the normative domain does have a link to observation. 
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model of normative knowledge,66 and a priori truths are more plausibly construed as 
lacking ontological implications than empirical truths. Empirical truths, after all, are 
clearly about entities that exist in the real world, so it is perfectly natural that real 
entities should serve as truthmakers for these truths. It is less obvious, however, that 
a priori truths are about real entities at all.67 And if they are not about real entities, 
their truth is not held hostage to the existence of such entities.68 If (fundamental) 
normative truths are a priori, therefore, this could explain why they might lack 
positive ontological implications. The correspondence theory of truth does not seem 
quite as apt for a priori truths as it does for empirical truths. 
 
                                                            
66. We will also look at Parfit’s and Skorupski’s accounts of normative 
knowledge in Chapter 7. 
 
67. One could of course argue that abstract objects are no less real then 
concrete objects just because knowledge of them is a priori, but I think that concrete 
objects are still more obviously real than abstract objects, and that empirical truths 
about concrete objects are therefore more obviously in need of truthmakers (even if 
both empirical and a priori truths in fact need truthmakers). As Armstrong (2010) 
says, the spatio-temporal world “seems obviously to exist. Other suggested beings 
seem much more hypothetical” (1). 
 
68. By way of analogy, Parfit (2017) claims that mathematicians need not fear 
that all mathematical propositions might be false because numbers don’t exist in 
some Platonic realm, since mathematical truths are a priori and therefore (according 
to the minimalist) lacking in ontological implications (62). 
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4.2. Normative truths and modal truths 
However, if Armstrong’s (2004) “Truthmaker Maximalism” is correct, then all 
truths, including a priori truths, have ontological truthmakers (5).69 Armstrong 
argues that necessary, a priori truths such as <7 + 5 = 12>, have truthmakers just like 
contingent, empirical truths such as the truth that I have five fingers on my right 
hand (99). If mathematical truths need truthmakers in spite of being a priori, then 
even if (fundamental) normative truths are also a priori, this will not automatically 
exempt them from a general need for truthmakers. And if modal truths—truths about 
what is possible and what is necessary—uniformly possess truthmakers, this could 
indicate that normative truths have truthmakers as well. Parfit suggests a similarity 
between normative and modal truths in terms of their (non-)metaphysical status. 
According to Parfit, “[t]here are … many events and other things that are merely 
possible” but “[t]hese merely possible things are not observable features of the 
spatio-temporal world,” and “[w]hen we claim that there are some things we could 
have done, these claims do not commit us to the existence of strange entities as parts 
of reality” (2011b, 487). In other words, modal truths have no positive ontological 
implications. 
                                                            
69. Armstrong admits that he does not have a direct argument for Truthmaker 
Maximalism, but his “hope is that philosophers of realist inclinations will be 
immediately attracted to the idea that a truth, any truth, should depend for its truth 
on something ‘outside’ it, in virtue of which it is true” (7). But if he can show that 
there are some a priori truths which do have truthmakers, this will undermine the 
reason for thinking that fundamental normative truths do not have ontological 
implications just because they are a priori (if indeed they are a priori). 
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Yet Armstrong has a strong argument for the conclusion that modal truths do 
have truthmakers: take a proposition p—if p is contingent (i.e. not a necessary truth), 
then p entails <it is possible that not-p> which is a modal truth. Now say that p has a 
real entity T as its truthmaker; if T is the truthmaker for p, then, since T explains why 
p is true, p is true in virtue of T, so, if T exists, then, necessarily, p is true. But if p is 
true, since p is contingent, then, necessarily, <it is possible that not-p> is also true. 
Therefore, if T exists, then, necessarily, <it is possible that not-p> is true, and this 
makes T itself the truthmaker for this modal proposition. The truthmaker for the 
modal proposition <it is possible that not-p> is the same as the truthmaker (T) for the 
contingent, non-modal proposition p (2004, 84).70 The modal proposition <it is 
possible that not-p> entails that T (a real entity) exists, and therefore this and other 
modal propositions do have ontological implications in spite of being necessary and 
a priori (if p is contingent, then <it is possible that not-p> is a necessary, a priori truth). 
Does the fact that modal truths like <it is possible that not-p> have 
truthmakers give us enough reason to believe that fundamental normative truths 
also have truthmakers? It does give us reason not to believe that fundamental 
normative truths don’t have truthmakers just because they are a priori (if they are a 
priori). But it does not appear to give us any reason to think that normative truths 
have their own truthmakers in addition to the truthmakers that already exist for non-
normative truths. Armstrong claims that he has “removed the need for any 
                                                            
70. This argument uses what Armstrong calls the “Entailment principle”: 
“[s]uppose that T is a truthmaker for proposition p. Suppose further that p entails 
proposition q … Then T will be a truthmaker for q” (10). 
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truthmakers for truths of ‘mere possibility’ except the truthmakers for contingent 
truths” (84). And according to his argument, the truthmaker for <it is possible that 
not-p> is the very same truthmaker as the truthmaker for p. For all this shows, modal 
truths have truthmakers only because they are entailed by non-modal truths which 
have truthmakers. The Entailment principle means that, if fundamental normative 
truths are entailed by non-normative truths which have truthmakers, then normative 
truths also have truthmakers, for the same reason that modal truths have 
truthmakers. But just because modal truths are entailed by non-modal truths does 
not mean that fundamental normative truths are entailed by non-normative truths. 
And normative minimalists like Parfit and Scanlon, viewing the normative as a fully 
autonomous domain, unequivocally reject the notion that fundamental normative 
truths are ever entailed by non-normative truths.71 
Fundamental normative truths are probably necessary truths: if it is indeed 
wrong to cause suffering just for your own pleasure, there is not some other possible 
world in which this behaviour is somehow not wrong. Armstrong thinks that the 
truthmakers for necessary truths “are the entities, whatever they are … which are 
involved in the truths. These, and these alone, will be the truthmakers for necessary 
                                                            
71. Skorupski also believes that “propositions about reason relations are not 
about any domain of substantial facts [what we are calling worldly facts]” for the 
simple reason that “factual and normative propositions are different” (2010, 402). He 
endorses a fundamental “distinction between descriptive and normative … between 
propositions about the world and propositions about reasons,” factual propositions 
(in his sense) being propositions about the world and normative propositions being 
propositions about reasons (4). If this distinction is valid, then no non-normative 
proposition (a proposition about the world) ever entails a fundamental normative 
proposition (a proposition about reasons). 
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truths.” For instance, “[t]he necessary truth <7 + 5 = 12> has as its truthmakers the 
natural numbers 7, 5 and 12.” If all necessary truths have truthmakers, what kind of 
entities would serve as truthmakers for normative truths? In the mathematical case, 
Armstrong thinks that a natural number “is some sort of property of things … 
presumably a property of certain classes and/or mereological wholes” (2004, 99). If 
he is correct, then <7 + 5 = 12> describes a necessary relation between three properties 
(7, 5 and 12), a relation that holds entirely in virtue of the nature of the properties 
themselves—and that is why these properties are the truthmakers for this truth. In 
the normative case, the necessary truth that <it is wrong to cause suffering just for 
your own pleasure> would describe a necessary relation between the properties 
<causing suffering just for your own pleasure> and <being wrong>. Because of the 
nature of these two properties, if a relevant particular (an action, say) has the first of 
these properties, then, necessarily, it also has the second. These two properties, 
therefore, would be the truthmakers for this normative truth: if one or both of these 
properties did not exist, it would clearly not be true that it is wrong to cause 
suffering just for pleasure. So this normative truth implies that these properties exist. 
Doesn’t this clearly establish that (fundamental) normative truths have positive 
ontological implications after all? 
 
4.3. Two senses of “exist” 
In one sense, normative truths imply that normative properties exist. For the 
normative minimalist, however, this is not enough to entail that normative truths 
100 
have ontological implications. Although he of course accepts the existence of 
normative properties, Parfit denies that these properties exist “in some ontological 
sense” (2011b, 479). His position depends on distinguishing between two different 
senses of “exist”: the ontological and the non-ontological senses. According to Parfit, 
the ontological sense of 
’exists’ is not … the only important sense. If nothing had ever existed in any 
ontological sense, there would not have been any stars or atoms, nor would 
there have been space, time, or God. But it would not have been true that 
nothing ever existed … there would have been the truth that nothing existed in 
an ontological sense. This truth would have existed in a different non-
ontological sense. (485) 
 
In an empty universe, a universe in which nothing exists, it would be true that 
nothing exists, in which case, in that universe, there would be the truth that nothing 
exists, and that truth could therefore be said to exist in that universe. Wouldn’t the 
existence of that truth be inconsistent with the emptiness of that universe, meaning 
that that universe is not in fact empty after all? But in an empty universe, how could 
it not be true that the universe is empty, and if it is true that the universe is empty, 
how could that truth fail to exist? One solution to this apparent paradox could be 
that empty universes are just impossible, because the idea of such a universe 
involves precisely this contradiction (nothing exists, therefore the truth that nothing 
exists exists, therefore it is not the case that nothing exists). Another solution—the 
solution Parfit favours—is that empty universes are of course possible (logically 
possible, at any rate) and thus the truth that nothing “exists” does itself “exist” in a 
universe in which nothing “exists,” but this doesn’t entail a contradiction because 
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the sense in which nothing “exists” in an empty universe is the ontological sense, 
whereas the sense in which the truth “exists” is the non-ontological sense. 
Empty universes are at least logically possible: it is not an analytic truth that 
there are no such universes. Empty universes may in fact be impossible (because 
some things necessarily exist) but this is not something that follows from the 
meanings of the words “truth” and/or “exists.” So Parfit is probably right that there 
are two senses of “exist” such that the truth that nothing exists can consistently 
“exist” in a universe in which nothing “exists.”72 But that does not automatically 
mean that one of these senses is “ontological” whereas the other is “non-
ontological.” The distinction between the two senses of “exist” could be a distinction 
between concrete and abstract existents: stars or atoms, after all, are clearly concrete 
existents, whereas truths, facts and properties are (arguably) abstract existents. 
Although it is more difficult to classify things like space, time or God as concrete or 
abstract, it is also unclear what it means (or would mean) for such things to exist in 
                                                            
72. Skorupski provides another example to illustrate this point: 
 
Consider this statement: 
(1) There are characters in War and Peace who do not exist and characters who 
do. 
Here ‘exist’ is clearly used as a predicate to make an ontological distinction between 
the fictional characters and the real people who feature in the novel. However, 
‘exists’ can also be used to express the existential quantifier. When ‘exists’ expresses 
the quantifier, ‘Fs exist’ has the same force as ‘there are Fs’ … In this use it is trivially 
true that whatever domains semantics posits exist. (2010, 423) 
 
There is clearly one sense in which fictional characters “exist” (because there are such 
fictional characters) and another sense in which, being fictional, these characters do 
not exist. There is such a fictional character as Sherlock Holmes, so in one sense 
Sherlock Holmes “exists”; but of course, Sherlock Holmes does not exist. 
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an “ontological” sense rather than the “non-ontological” sense in which truths are 
supposed to exist. 
Skorupski, whose “cognitive irrealism” (2010, 439) is very similar to Parfit’s 
“Non-Realist Cognitivism” (2017, 56), attempts to clarify the distinction between the 
ontological and non-ontological senses of ‘exist’ by appealing to the notion of causal 
standing: “to exist [in the ontological sense] is to have causal standing … To be a 
substantial property, an attribute, is to have causal standing, where a property has 
causal standing if an object that has the property can cause or be caused in virtue of 
having it” (2010, 428). And Skorupski holds that normative properties (and relations) 
are irreal because they have no causal standing (439). Whether or not Skorupski is 
right that all normativity is fundamentally about reasons,73 I think that causal 
standing does explain the difference between things that do and things that don’t 
have (positive) ontological implications. When Parfit denies that normative 
properties “exist” in some ontological sense, he should be taken to be denying that 
such properties have causal standing. This makes sense of the distinction between 
the way in which things like atoms and planets exist and the way in which things 
like truths exist: atoms and planets cause things (and are caused themselves), truths 
do not.74 Certain properties, such as the physical properties of objects, also cause 
                                                            
73. He calls this the “Reasons thesis” (2). Scanlon subscribes to a similar view 
which he calls “Reasons Fundamentalism”; he too is inclined to believe that reasons 
are the only fundamental elements of the normative domain (2014, 2). 
 
74. Although facts (in the worldly sense) do cause things, and many facts are 
themselves caused to obtain. One might think that truths also have causal standing: 
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things—the properties of the earth and the sun (such as their relative masses) are 
what cause the earth to orbit the sun (rather than the other way round). For the 
normative minimalist, normative properties make normative propositions true but 
they do not cause things, and that is why (fundamental) normative truths do not 
have ontological implications. 
One might wonder why there could not be ontologically weighty properties 
or entities which have no causal standing at all. If mathematical Platonism is true, 
wouldn’t Platonic numbers “exist” in the ontological sense, but still lack causal 
standing of any kind? I think this would be the case only if we construe causal 
standing in a narrow sense, as involving something like energy transfer between 
concrete spatio-temporal objects. Of course, Platonic numbers would not have causal 
standing in this sense. If, on the other hand, we construe causal standing more 
broadly as covering any kind of productive power (Skorupski 2010, 426-427), the 
power to produce or influence contingent circumstances, then there is no problem 
with interpreting the distinction between ontological and non-ontological existence 
in terms of causal standing. Under mathematical Platonism, we acquire 
mathematical knowledge by some form of interaction with an independent 
mathematical realm, a realm which has some form of power to produce 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
the truth of a proposition, we might say, makes it more likely that it will be believed 
by rational creatures like us, and in cases where we do believe the proposition, the 
truth of this proposition is one of the things that causes us to believe it. But truths, of 
course, are propositions, and I am inclined to think that it is the (worldly) facts and 
properties that serve as truthmakers for propositions which cause things (such as 
our beliefs), and not the propositions themselves. 
104 
mathematical beliefs (and knowledge) in us. Similarly, if a robust version of 
metanormative realism is true, then at least some normative properties must have 
the power to produce certain beliefs in us, and to influence us to behave in certain 
ways. If normative properties have some kind of causal standing, these properties 
exist in the ontological sense, and the normative truths that involve these properties 
have (positive) ontological implications as a result. And this, I believe, is the very 
heart of the issue. 
 
4.4. Minimalism and fictionalism 
Given that there are two senses of “exist,” one of which (the “ontological” 
sense) implies causal standing, whereas the other implies the absence of causal 
standing, normative minimalism entails that normative facts and properties have no 
causal standing—that they “exist” only in the (“non-ontological”) sense that does not 
imply causal standing. Enoch rejects minimalism on the grounds that it is essentially 
a notational variation of normative fictionalism,75 i.e. the non-realist view according 
to which normative truths are only true, and normative facts and properties only 
exist, within the fiction of normativity, in the same way that truths about Sherlock 
Holmes (such as the truth that he smokes a pipe) are only true, and Sherlock Holmes 
himself only exists, within the Sherlock Holmes fiction (2013, 124). After all, it is clear 
that Sherlock Holmes does not exist in the spatio-temporal world, and that he does 
not exist in some non-spatio-temporal part of reality either, but it is still true that 
                                                            
75. Like McPherson, he refers to minimalism as “quietism” (2013, 121). 
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Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe, and as we have seen, a minimalist like Parfit would 
say that, although a normative property like moral wrongness does not exist in the 
spatio-temporal world, or in some non-spatio-temporal part of reality, it is still true 
that it is morally wrong to cause suffering just for pleasure. Sherlock Holmes does 
exist in some sense,76 but he does not exist in the ontological sense, the sense which 
implies causal standing, and neither, for the minimalist, do normative facts and 
properties; if normative facts and properties only “exist” in the same sense in which 
a fictional character like Sherlock Holmes “exists,” one might think that truths 
involving these facts and properties (normative truths), just like truths about 
Sherlock Holmes, cannot be mind-independent.77 Assuming, as I argued in the 
previous chapter (Section 3.5), that mind-independent normative truths are 
deliberatively indispensable, normative fictionalism must be false, so normative 
minimalism, if it cannot be substantively distinguished from fictionalism, must be 
false as well. 
The minimalist believes that first-order normative claims are licensed entirely 
by standards internal to the normative domain and normative discourse, as are 
claims to the effect that normative properties and facts exist, and that normative 
reasons exist. For this reason, Enoch argues that the minimalist is also committed to 
the existence of counter-reasons, first-order claims about which are licensed by 
standards internal to a counter-normative discourse: a discourse that is similar to 
                                                            
76. Recall Skorupski’s point from footnote 72. 
 
77. It is not a mind-independent truth that Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe. 
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normative discourse in so far as those engaged in this discourse “treat counter-
reasons much as we treat reasons … they take them to be relevant to their practical 
deliberation, or perhaps counter-deliberation, in much the same way we take 
reasons to be relevant to ours” (124).78 And this presents an insoluble problem for the 
minimalist, according to Enoch, because “when deliberating, one of the questions 
you may ask yourself is whether to ‘go’ with reasons or with counter-reasons,” and 
the minimalist “has nothing by way of an adequate reply” (126). In other words, if 
reasons and counter-reasons both exist, they are both relevant to deliberation, and 
they both recommend completely different decisions, then we have no non-arbitrary 
way of deciding whether to base our decisions on reasons or on counter-reasons, and 
hence no non-arbitrary way of arriving at any deliberative decision. 
Scanlon regards this problem as an illusion, because the conclusions about 
counter-reasons reached by participants in the counter-normative discourse “conflict 
with our conclusions about reasons only insofar as they are interpreted as 
conclusions about reasons. So the question of which one of us is correct is a 
normative question, which can be answered only through normative reasoning” 
(2014, 29). In other words, for Scanlon, there can be no question about whether to 
“go” with reasons or counter-reasons in deliberation, because either counter-reasons 
are relevant to deliberation, in which case they are just reasons, or they are not 
                                                            
78. Counter-reasons are supposed to be the kind of considerations that we 
would not consider as reasons. Enoch stipulates that those who engage in counter-
normative discourse “think that it is rather obvious that that an action will cause the 
agent pain is counter-reason for performing it” (125). 
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reasons, in which case they are not relevant to deliberation. The problem is supposed 
to be generated by the incommensurability of reasons and counter-reasons—they 
belong to different domains or discourses—plus the equal relevance of both reasons 
and counter-reasons to deliberation (we might just as well “go” with counter-reasons 
in deliberation as with reasons). But if reasons and counter-reasons are both equally 
relevant to deliberation, then, far from being incommensurable, they are in fact part 
of the very same domain, that is, the deliberative domain, and hence they are both 
considerations—deliberative considerations—of the same fundamental kind. And 
since the kind of deliberation in question is clearly the normative kind, the 
deliberative domain is just the normative domain. As far as Scanlon is concerned, 
therefore, the problem Enoch tries to create for the normative minimalist is 
incoherent, and his argument against minimalism fails. 
Counter-reasons may indeed be just reasons, as Scanlon says, but this does 
not eliminate the problem suggested by Enoch’s analogy between minimalism and 
fictionalism. In Chapter 2 (Section 2.4), we saw that normative truths cannot be 
entirely relative to frameworks: the normative domain cannot be relativistic all the 
way down.79 But this is exactly the scenario that would obtain if the normative 
domain is akin to a fiction like the Sherlock Holmes fiction, the truths of which are 
only true within that particular fiction and not outside. If it is true that it is wrong to 
                                                            
79. Unless, that is, normative deliberation is incapable of arriving at anything 
but (normatively) arbitrary answers, in which case we would have no normative 
reason to engage in it. By Parfit’s Wager, however, we do have normative reason to 
engage in normative deliberation. 
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cause suffering just for pleasure only within the normative fiction, just like it is true 
that Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe only within the Sherlock Holmes fiction, then 
causing suffering just for pleasure is clearly only wrong relative to a particular 
framework, and might just as well not be wrong relative to some other framework, 
in the same way that Sherlock Holmes might smoke a pipe in one fiction but not in 
another.80 Unless Sherlock Holmes exists in the ontological sense, there is no fact of 
the matter as to whether or not Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe, and since Sherlock 
Holmes does not exist in that sense, the “truth” that he smokes a pipe is not a mind-
independent truth. For the minimalist, normative properties and facts do not exist in 
this same sense, yet somehow this does not prevent the normative domain, unlike 
the Sherlock Holmes fiction, from containing determinate, mind-independent truths. 
So what, in that case, differentiates the normative domain from a piece of fiction like 
the Sherlock Holmes fiction? 
The Robust Realist can answer that normative properties and facts exist in the 
ontological sense (that they have some kind of causal standing) whereas Sherlock 
Holmes does not, and this explains why there are some fully determinate, mind-
independent normative truths and yet there are no such truths about Sherlock 
Holmes. The minimalist of course cannot say this. What the minimalist can say, 
however, is that fundamental normative truths, unlike truths about Sherlock 
                                                            
80. Compare the original Conan Doyle stories with the modern BBC 
adaptation (in which he doesn’t smoke a pipe). These might both be described as 
variants of the Sherlock Holmes fiction, just like, under normative fictionalism, 
different normative frameworks, to which different normative truths are relative, 
might be described as variants of the normative fiction. 
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Holmes, are a priori81; if it is an a priori truth that it is wrong to cause suffering just for 
pleasure, this normative truth will not be true only relative to a certain fiction or 
framework, and that is so regardless of whether or not the normative property of 
being wrong has some kind of causal standing. The minimalist can also say that 
fundamental truths about reasons are knowable a priori, whereas there are no such a 
priori truths about counter-reasons, even if some first-order claims about counter-
reasons are licensed by the internal standards of a counter-normative domain82; the 
participants in the counter-normative discourse have no a priori knowledge about 
counter-reasons, whereas we, as participants in the normative discourse, do have a 
priori knowledge about reasons. Since the normative minimalist can differentiate the 
normative domain from merely fictional domains by appealing to a prioricity, the 
Robust Realist must argue more directly for the conclusion that normative properties 
have a kind of causal standing. 
 
                                                            
81. For Skorupski, normative reason relations and fictional objects are both 
irreal (they have no causal standing), but what distinguishes mind-independent 
reason relations from mind-dependent fictional objects is that reason relations, unlike 
fictional objects, are “objects not of imagination but of pure cognition” (2010, 429). I 
take it that pure or fundamental truths about objects of “pure cognition” are known 
a priori. 
 
82. Scanlon would presumably say that it is an a priori truth that that an action 
will cause the agent pain is a reason against performing it, whereas the equivalent 
counter-reasons claim—that that an action will cause the agent pain is a counter-
reason for performing it—is not a priori, although it may be true relative to the 
counter-reasons framework. 
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4.5. Do normative properties have causal standing? 
Larry Temkin (2016) argues that “on both major philosophical accounts of 
causation—the counterfactual model and the deductive-nomological model—
reasons would count as having a causal impact on our actions,” and therefore that 
“reasons, or normative facts, can have a causal impact on us and, a fortiori, that they 
can have a causal impact, though us, on the world” (3-4). On the counterfactual 
model of causation, “A is a cause of B whenever it is the case that ‘but for’ A, B 
wouldn’t have occurred” (4). According to Temkin, if, for instance, it is a normative 
fact that I ought to stop my car at a red light, and, recognizing and responding 
appropriately to this normative fact, I stop at the red light, then, if, for whatever 
reason, it had instead been the case that I ought not to have stopped at the red light, 
since I am recognizing and responding appropriately to the normative facts, I would 
not have stopped at the red light (5). And so, “but for” the normative facts being as 
they are and not otherwise (it being the case that I ought, rather than ought not, to 
stop at the red light), I would not have done what I actually did (stopping at the red 
light), meaning that my action is counterfactually dependent on the normative facts, 
and thus that these normative facts, and the normative properties involved in 
them—by the counterfactual theory of causation—must have some kind of causal 
standing. 
The causal efficacy of normative facts and properties seems to be indicated by 
a fact that Parfit himself not only acknowledges but emphasises as integral to his 
position, namely, the fact that we have the capacity to respond appropriately and 
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sensitively to normative reasons, and hence (it would seem) to the normative facts 
and properties themselves. In Parfit’s own words, “when it is true that … we have 
decisive reasons to act in some way, this fact makes it true that … if we were fully 
informed and both procedurally and substantially rational, we would choose to act 
in this way” (2011a, 63). Say that we do have decisive reason to act in some way, and 
we are fully informed and both procedurally and substantially rational, and so we 
do, therefore, act in that way; does this not imply that, had we been just as informed 
and rational as we in fact are, but, instead of having decisive reason to act in that 
way, we actually had decisive reason to act in a different way, we would have acted 
in that different way, and thus that our acting in the way we actually do is 
counterfactually dependent on the normative fact that we have decisive reason to act 
in that particular way? In other words, if we could, in principle, hold all other 
variables fixed, and just change the normative facts sufficiently, would this not 
produce a different result in terms of our actions? And since our actions affect the 
world, does this not entail that normative facts, through our actions, affect the world 
as well (and therefore that they have some kind of causal standing)? 
I think Parfit would answer that normative reasons do affect the world 
through our responses to them: if the fact that I am at a red light is a reason for me to 
stop my car, and I respond to this reason I have by stopping my car, then one of the 
things that causes me to stop is clearly the fact that I am at a red light. And since this 
fact is also a reason, normative reasons are able to affect the world causally just like 
natural facts, because, after all, reasons are natural facts. Yet just because normative 
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reasons are causally efficacious does not entail that normative facts and properties 
have any causal standing of their own independently of the purely natural, non-
normative facts and properties which undoubtedly cause our actions and affect the 
world. Even though the natural, non-normative fact that I am at a red light is no 
doubt one of the things that causes me to stop my car, this does not entail that the 
specifically normative fact that I ought or have reason to stop at the red light also 
plays a role in causing my action. But in spite of this lack of entailment from the 
causal efficacy of the natural, non-normative fact (that I am at a red light) to the 
causal efficacy of the normative fact (that I ought to stop at the red light), this 
normative fact definitely does seem to play a causal role of its own: had it been the 
case that I ought not to have stopped at the right light, then, assuming that I am just 
as responsive to the normative facts and properties in this counterfactual scenario as 
I am in the actual world, I surely would not have stopped at the red light. It follows 
from this that, if the normative facts had been different, and if I am fully informed 
and both procedurally and substantially rational (which I am by the hypothesis), I 
would have acted differently than I actually did as a result. And thus my actions, at 
least some of the time, appear to be counterfactually dependent, not just on the 
normative reasons and the non-normative facts which constitute them, but on the 
specifically normative facts and properties as well, suggesting that these facts and 
properties do indeed have some kind of causal standing. 
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How might Parfit respond to this pretty straightforward argument? As far as I 
am aware, Parfit never responded to Temkin,83 but if he had, I believe he would have 
argued that our actions cannot be counterfactually dependent on the normative 
facts, because normative truths and normative facts are necessary, and facts that 
obtain necessarily cannot support counterfactuals.84 We cannot say truly, Parfit 
might argue, that “but for” a certain normative fact, I would not have acted as I did 
in any given situation, because this implies that there is a possible world—some 
alternative counterfactual scenario—in which this normative fact did not obtain, and 
in which I therefore acted differently than I did in the actual world as a result. But if 
normative facts are uniformly necessary, there simply is no such possible world—no 
alternative counterfactual scenario—and this counterfactual therefore cannot hold. 
After all, the mathematical fact that <7 + 5 = 12> is quite plausibly regarded as 
causally inert: nothing counterfactually depends on this mathematical fact, because 
it obtains necessarily, and there is thus no possible world in which anything is 
different because this fact does not obtain in that world. If normative facts are 
necessary, just like the fact that <7 + 5 = 12>, then we could not, even in principle, 
change the normative facts, while holding all other variables constant, to produce a 
                                                            
83. In spite of dedicating his Volume Three of On What Matters (partly) to him. 
 
84. For Parfit, since normative truths do not have ontological implications and 
do not have truthmakers, there are normative facts only in the propositional sense of 
“fact” (i.e. a normative fact is nothing but a true normative proposition), and so the 
normative facts and the normative truths are all one and the same. 
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different result in our actions and in the world, so normative facts cannot feature in 
counterfactual relations and hence cannot have causal standing of any kind. 
On the face of it, this response I have made on Parfit’s behalf is easy to 
dismiss on the grounds that, while some normative facts may be necessary and thus 
unable to support counterfactuals, some normative facts are certainly contingent, 
and our actions therefore can be counterfactually dependent on these facts. It is 
clearly false that, if it is a fact that I ought to stop at a red light, this normative fact 
obtains necessarily: circumstances could have been such that I very much ought not 
to stop (if I desperately needed to get to a hospital as quickly as possible, say), in 
which case, if I had been just as responsive to the normative facts as I in fact am, I 
would not have stopped. In such cases, there seems to be no reason to deny that my 
action is counterfactually dependent on the normative facts. Granted, if it is indeed 
morally wrong to cause suffering just for pleasure, this is probably a necessary truth, 
such that there is no possible world in which anyone acts differently than they do in 
the actual world because it is not wrong to cause suffering just for pleasure (in that 
world). But just because there are some necessary normative facts which cannot 
support counterfactuals does not mean that no normative facts can or that normative 
facts as a whole do not support counterfactuals. 
But now suppose that fundamental normative facts are indeed necessary, and 
that facts which obtain necessarily cannot support counterfactuals. In this scenario, 
fundamental normative facts would have no causal standing, and fundamental 
normative truths would have no ontological implications. Non-fundamental or 
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mixed normative facts (such as the fact that one ought to stop at a red light under 
specific non-normative circumstances) may be contingent and thus able to support 
counterfactuals, and mixed normative truths may have ontological implications as a 
consequence, but a mixed normative truth is nothing but the combination of a 
fundamental normative truth and a non-normative truth, and since, by the 
hypothesis, the mixed normative truth cannot derive its ontological implications 
from the fundamental normative truth (such truths having no ontological 
implications), the ontological implications it does have must come entirely from the 
non-normative truth. From this it follows that the only normative truths which have 
ontological implications (i.e. mixed normative truths) do not have any ontological 
implications of their own, and in fact only have ontological implications at all because 
they are partly non-normative truths. Unless either fundamental normative truths 
are not necessary or necessary truths are able to support counterfactuals after all, 
normative truths qua normative truths do not have ontological implications (and 
normative facts and properties do not have causal standing). Or so, I suggest, Parfit 
and other normative minimalists would argue. 
As we noted in Section 4.1, the normative minimalist should be taken to deny 
only that fundamental normative truths and normative facts have ontological 
implications/truthmakers and causal standing, not that mixed normative truths/facts 
do, because mixed normative truths/facts are partly composed of non-normative 
truths/facts that clearly do have ontological implications and causal standing. If 
fundamental normative truths/facts are necessary and hence unable to support 
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counterfactuals, this provides some reason to think that such facts are not causal or 
ontological in nature. 
Yet I think we still have reason to believe in ontological normative facts. Even 
if fundamental normative facts obtain necessarily, such facts will only fail to have 
ontological implications themselves if the normative properties featured in these 
facts also lack any kind of causal standing: if a necessary truth is about properties 
that have causal standing, these properties will be ontological truthmakers for this 
truth, and this truth will have ontological implications through these properties even 
though the truth itself is unable to support counterfactuals. And just because certain 
properties feature in necessary truths does not mean that these properties lack any 
kind of causal standing. The mathematical truth that <7 + 5 = 12> is clearly a 
necessary truth, and the properties involved in this truth probably do have a kind of 
causal standing: if the fingers on my right hand did not instantiate the property of 
being five, I would not see what I actually see when I look at my right hand. 
Mathematical properties (such as the property of being five) do have the power to 
produce and influence contingent, non-mathematical circumstances (such as by 
making me have a certain visual experience when I look at my right hand). That a 
mathematical truth like <7 + 5 = 12> is necessary does not prevent the mathematical 
properties involved in this truth from having causal standing. And since 
mathematical properties do appear to have causal standing,85 and the necessary 
                                                            
85. Some mathematical properties, such as the property of being prime, 
probably don’t have any causal standing: everything that has the property of being 
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truths of arithmetic are true entirely in virtue of these properties and the relations 
holding between them, we can say that these properties constitute ontological 
truthmakers for these truths, and that these truths, even though they are necessary, 
therefore have positive ontological implications. Can’t we say the same thing about 
normative properties, even if fundamental normative truths are uniformly 
necessary? 
Parfit insists that “[w]hen some fact has the property of being or giving us a 
reason, we cannot be causally affected by this normative property.” He thinks that 
our responsiveness to reasons involves no causal contact with normative properties. 
But although this responsiveness may not be causal in some narrow sense, involving 
spatio-temporal energy transfer, or direct object-to-object physical contact or the like, 
it is difficult to understand how it could not be causal in the broad sense in which 
causality simply involves productive or influential power of any kind (productive or 
influential power itself being understood in counterfactual terms). Fundamental 
normative truths may not support counterfactuals, but normative properties clearly 
do: if different non-normative facts instantiated the property of being a reason, then, 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
prime (the prime numbers) has this property necessarily, meaning that this property 
does not support counterfactuals. Yet the same does not appear to be the case for the 
natural numbers, considered as properties of classes and/or mereological wholes. 
And the point remains that just because such properties are involved in necessary 
truths (which do not support counterfactuals) does not mean that these properties 
do not support counterfactuals themselves. The fact that fundamental mathematical 
truths (truths which have no non-mathematical content) are necessary does not 
prevent the mathematical properties involved in them from having causal standing. 
Even if fundamental normative truths are necessary, therefore, this should not 
prevent the normative properties involved in these truths from having causal 
standing either. 
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assuming that we are sometimes responsive to reasons, we would sometimes 
respond and act differently as a result. And even if certain properties have causal 
standing only in the broad sense, this is surely enough for the truths involving these 
properties to have ontological implications: if God exists beyond space, time and 
causality (in the narrow sense), then the truth that He created the universe would 
still have ontological implications. Parfit himself says that “we respond to reasons 
when we are aware of facts that give us these reasons, and this awareness leads us 
[my emphasis] to believe, or want, or do, what these facts give us reasons to believe, 
or want, or do” (2011b, 493). If our awareness of the reasons we have leads us to 
believe what we have reason to believe, or to do what we have reason to do, then 
our reasons themselves, by means of our awareness of them, lead us to respond in 
these ways, and this surely suffices for the property of being a reason to have causal 
standing (at least in the broad sense). 
Parfit points out that our mental abilities allow us to form true mathematical 
beliefs by reasoning in valid ways, and he claims that, “[s]ince we cannot be causally 
affected by the validity of these kinds of reasoning, our abilities involve what we can 
call a non-causal response to this validity.” Our capacity to respond to normative 
reasons and normative properties, he suggests, is analogous to our capacity to 
respond to valid reasoning: both kinds of responses are non-causal, yet not 
somehow miraculous or contra-causal (500). But since, if a certain piece of reasoning 
is indeed valid (in the sense that its conclusion deductively follows from its 
premises), there is no possibility that this very same piece of reasoning might not 
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have been valid (because valid reasoning is always necessarily valid), our responses 
to valid reasoning are not in fact analogous to the majority of cases in which we 
respond to normative reasons and normative properties. We cannot say truly that, if 
a certain piece of reasoning, which actually is valid, had not been valid, we would 
not have come to form the true beliefs we actually formed on its basis, but we very 
much can say that, if the fact that I am at a red light was not a normative reason for 
me to stop my car, then (under certain non-normative circumstances) I would not 
stop my car. Validity is never contingent upon circumstances, but many of our 
normative reasons are; differences in our circumstances produce differences in our 
reasons, which in turn produce differences in our responses. And this appears to be 
a kind of causal standing. 
 
4.6. An appeal to supervenience 
Is there any way to resist the conclusion that normative properties have 
causal standing (of some kind) because they support counterfactuals? It seems 
undeniable that normative properties support counterfactuals if these properties 
exist at all and we are genuinely responsive to them. But the minimalist can 
potentially respond that, since, on any plausible view, normative properties 
supervene on non-normative, natural properties, it is actually these natural properties 
that do the causal work in cases where non-normative circumstances seem to be 
120 
sensitive to differences in the normative properties.86 Even though I would not stop 
my car if the fact that I am at a red light did not instantiate the normative property of 
being a reason for me to stop my car, it is not this normative property, the minimalist 
could say, that in any way causes me to stop: the natural facts and properties that 
explain why being at a red light is a reason for me to stop are the things that do the 
causing. The purely natural fact that stopping at red lights is required by traffic law 
may explain why the fact that I am at a red light is a reason for me to stop, in which 
case, it might be this non-normative fact,87 and not the normative reason it gives me, 
which actually causes me to stop. For the minimalist who makes this appeal to 
supervenience,88 our apparently causal responses to normative properties are really 
only caused by the underlying non-normative facts that give rise to the instantiation 
of these properties, and not the normative properties themselves. 
One thing to observe here is that, if this Supervenience thesis is combined 
with the equally plausible Grounding thesis, it entails that normative properties are 
necessarily co-extensive with natural properties. Grounding states that “it is impossible 
                                                            
86. As Wedgwood (2007) puts it, in the context of the debate about whether or 
not there are correct “moral explanations” for contingent, non-moral facts: “the 
question arises whether the alleged effects of a moral fact are really the effects of the 
moral fact or instead of some non-moral fact in which the moral fact is realized” 
(193). I will argue for the correctness of certain normative explanations for non-
normative facts in Chapter 7. 
 
87. Non-normative, that is, on the reason-involving conception of normativity. 
This fact may be normative on the rule-involving conception, but this is not the 
conception that is relevant here (see Chapter 1, Section 1.1). 
 
88. Parfit himself does not make this appeal, instead relying on the analogy 
with validity that we rejected above. 
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to have an ethical [or normative] property without also having a non-ethical [or non-
normative] property,” and Supervenience states that “there is no difference in ethical 
[or normative] nature without a difference in non-ethical [or non-normative] nature” 
(Jackson 2016, 201). It follows that whenever something has certain normative 
properties, it also necessarily has certain natural properties in virtue of which it has 
those normative properties. And some take this necessary co-extension between 
normative and natural properties to indicate that these properties are actually 
identical to each other. Frank Jackson, for instance, believes that “the necessary co-
extension of ethical and natural properties provides a strong reason to identify 
them” (201).89 If normative properties really are identical to the natural properties on 
which they supervene, they will of course have the exact same causal powers and 
effects as these natural properties. Normative properties will not then have 
irreducibly normative ontological implications, it is true, but, by Leibniz’s Law, they 
will still qualify as ontologically weighty properties by virtue of being identical to 
natural properties which obviously do have causal standing in their own right. 
Supervenience will not save ontological minimalism about the normative if 
properties that are necessarily co-extensive are also necessarily identical.90 The 
normative minimalist, therefore, must maintain that normative properties are 
                                                            
89. “Strong but not apodictic,” he adds. Jackson uses the word “natural” in 
the sense of “non-normative” (or “non-ethical”) (198). 
 
90. I will argue that the necessary co-extension of normative and non-
normative properties does not actually indicate that they are identical in Chapter 8 
(Section 8.3). 
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completely distinct from natural properties in spite of being necessarily co-extensive 
with them. 
The necessity of this response on the part of the minimalist—that normative 
properties do not exert any causal influence of their own, and nor do they reduce to 
the natural properties on which they nonetheless supervene—shows that normative 
minimalism essentially amounts to a kind of epiphenomenalism about the 
normative; and that it is fundamentally implausible for the same reason that 
epiphenomenalism about conscious experience is implausible. Epiphenomenalism 
about conscious experience implies that we have many conscious experiences, such 
as pain, which supervene on physical states of the brain, but which do not reduce to 
these physical states, and which have no causal influence whatsoever on the physical 
world and hence no influence whatsoever on our actions: if I instantly retract my 
hand after placing it on a hot stove, this action has nothing to do with the 
phenomenal quality of the pain I experience when I place my hand on the stove. 
Similarly, under normative minimalism, certain facts are often normative reasons for 
us to do and to believe certain things, but the normative properties of these facts 
never have any influence at all on our actions and beliefs; even when we do and 
believe exactly what we have normative reasons to do and believe, this is never 
because the relevant facts have the normative property of being a reason. Yet if there 
are such things as phenomenal conscious experiences, we surely act based on the 
conscious experiences that we have, such that if we had different experiences—if our 
experiences had different phenomenal properties—we would sometimes act 
123 
differently, and this means that our conscious experiences have some kind of causal 
standing. And if we have normative reasons for action and belief, as the minimalist 
believes, then we surely sometimes act and believe based on these reasons, such that 
if we had different reasons, we would (sometimes) act and believe differently as a 
result. Since we can act and believe for normative reasons, responding to changes in 
our normative reasons with changes in our actions and beliefs, the property of being 
a reason must be capable of having an influence on the real world through our 
actions and beliefs. Like phenomenal properties, therefore, normative properties 
seem to possess some kind of causal standing, whether or not they can be reduced to 
physical or natural properties. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
Even if fundamental normative truths are necessary truths, it would seem that 
normative truths as a whole do have positive ontological implications, in the sense 
that what makes normative propositions true is the existence of mind-independent 
entities (normative properties) that have genuine causal standing, at least in the 
broad sense of that notion. Differences in the instantiation of normative properties 
make a difference in the real world—the world of contingent facts and circumstances 
—in the same way that differences in the instantiation of certain mathematical 
properties, such as the natural numbers, make a difference in the real world, even 
though the fundamental mathematical truths which involve these properties are 
necessary and knowable a priori. Since we have the capacity to respond to reasons by 
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(sometimes) forming rational beliefs and by performing rational actions, the 
property of being a reason must have the capacity to affect us in some way. We 
should therefore reject ontological minimalism about the normative and opt instead 
for Robust Metanormative Realism. If we combine this thesis with Occam’s Razor, 
some version of normative naturalism appears to be called for. And this is what we 






If normative facts and properties are not natural facts and properties, one 
might think that they would have to be, in the words of J. L. Mackie (1990), “utterly 
different from anything else in the universe” (38) and therefore too “queer” for us to 
countenance, as he famously put it. One might also think that there are simply 
unlikely to be any facts and properties that are utterly different from anything else in 
the universe: of course there are many facts and properties that are very different 
from each other, but all the facts and properties that there actually are are part of one 
integrated, coherent universe, and thus no real facts and properties differ from each 
other in such a fundamental way as non-natural normative properties would differ 
from all other facts and properties if such facts and properties did indeed exist. 
Given that normative facts and properties exist, therefore, these facts and properties 
must be natural facts and properties that do not differ fundamentally from the kinds 
of facts and properties posited by natural science. This is the Argument from 
Queerness against normative non-naturalism (and when combined with arguments 
for metanormative realism, such as those I defended in Chapters 2 and 3, in favour of 
normative naturalism).91 
                                                            
91. Copp (2007) takes the Argument from Queerness to be an argument 
against normative naturalism (i.e. normative properties cannot be natural properties 
precisely because they are queer and unlike anything else in the universe) (251). I 
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Prima facie, the Argument from Queerness seems to have some considerable 
force. If we know that there are facts and properties of a certain kind, it is, I believe, 
by default more likely that facts and properties of this kind are at least not 
fundamentally different from all other facts and properties. But before we dismiss 
normative non-naturalism as untenable, we must ask exactly why normative facts 
and properties would be queer if they were non-natural. There could be certain facts 
and properties that are fundamentally different from all other facts and properties in 
the universe, even if this seems prima facie unlikely. Of course non-natural properties 
are going to be different from all other properties if these other properties are 
understood as natural properties. This straightforward observation is hardly an 
argument against non-naturalism about properties of any kind. The whole point of 
normative non-naturalism is that there is a fundamental “distinction between 
descriptive and normative … between propositions about the world and 
propositions about reasons” (Skorupski 2010, 4). So normative properties, for the 
non-naturalist, are utterly different from all descriptive (i.e. non-normative) 
properties, but then descriptive properties are utterly different from all normative 
properties, and neither kind of properties are to be dismissed as queer on that 
account. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
don’t think it is plausible to take this argument as an argument in favour of non-
naturalism: that normative facts and properties would be queer is clearly not an 
argument for the existence of non-natural normative facts and properties. In 
defending the Argument from Queerness, Olson (2014) explicitly takes himself to be 
arguing against non-naturalism (17). And this is how I will understand the 
argument. 
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Olson outlines four possible ways of explaining why non-natural normative 
properties are queer, in the form of “four distinct queerness arguments, focusing on 
supervenience, knowledge, motivation, and irreducible normativity.” He takes the 
first three arguments to be failures, but the fourth to be a success (2014, 79). In 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2, I will argue that Olson moves too quickly in his rejection of the 
first two queerness arguments (focusing on supervenience and knowledge 
respectively); he does not consider the possibility of a complete scepticism about a 
priori knowledge (or synthetic a priori knowledge at least), a doctrine which is 
obviously incompatible with normative non-naturalism. As such, I will consider 
(and reject) the case for this kind of scepticism in Section 5.3, focusing in particular 
on Quine’s (and Harman’s) arguments against the a priori and BonJour’s responses to 
them. Then, in Section 5.4, I will address Olson’s argument from the queerness of 
irreducible normativity: this argument only creates an impasse which Olson 
illegitimately assumes it is the task of the non-naturalist to resolve. Finally, in Section 
5.5, I will draw both upon the conclusion of the previous chapter and an analogy 
between non-naturalism and mind-body dualism to motivate a further queerness 
argument which locates the queerness in the interaction between the natural (and 
non-normative) and the non-natural (and irreducibly normative). The idea that 
physics is causally closed creates a problem for the non-naturalist, but the non-
naturalist can escape this problem by appealing to the causal overdetermination of 
events. I therefore conclude that the force of the Argument from Queerness 
essentially reduces to the force of parsimony and Occam’s Razor. 
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5.1. Queerness and supervenience 
The first queerness argument observes that the normative supervenes on the 
natural, and then states that, if normative properties are distinct from natural 
properties, there would have to be a unique, non-conceptual form of normative 
necessity to explain why any particular normative property supervenes on a 
particular natural property (such as, perhaps, the property of being right and the 
property of maximizing happiness), and concludes that this relation of normative 
necessity is queer (90-91). However, the non-naturalist can appeal to some 
fundamental normative principle(s), like, perhaps, “the property of maximizing 
happiness is the only property that makes actions right,” to explain the 
supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, and he can claim that the 
normative necessity involved in this supervenience is just the necessary truth of such 
a principle, in which case, the relation of normative necessity will be queer only if 
non-natural properties and facts are queer (98-99). Olson therefore rejects this first 
argument because “the charge that … non-naturalists must take supervenience 
relations between distinct properties to be brute relations reduces to a general worry 
about sui generis non-natural properties and facts” (100). In other words, it basically 
amounts to asserting the queerness of non-natural (normative) properties and facts.92 
                                                            
92. Not to mention that some non-naturalists, such as Terrence Cuneo and 
Russ Shafer-Landau (2014), think that the fundamental normative principles in 
question are conceptual truths, and thus that a unique, non-conceptual form of 
necessity is not needed to explain the supervenience of the normative on the natural. 
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However, as we noted in the previous chapter (Section 4.6), the supervenience 
of the normative on the natural means that normative properties are necessarily co-
extensive with natural properties, and the necessary co-extension of normative 
properties with natural properties may indicate that normative properties are 
identical to natural properties (and are therefore natural properties themselves). 
Non-natural normative properties would have to be properties that are necessarily 
co-extensive with natural properties but completely distinct from them at the same 
time. Streumer’s (2017) Reduction Argument purports to show that, “if there are 
normative properties, these properties are identical to descriptive properties” (40), 
on the grounds that normative properties are necessarily co-extensive with 
descriptive properties and necessarily co-extensive properties are necessarily 
identical. And this argument obviously implies that non-natural, irreducibly 
normative properties are queer in light of the supervenience of normative properties 
on natural (or descriptive) properties. I will address the Reduction Argument in 
Chapter 8 when I explicitly defend non-reductive normative naturalism. So for now I 
will simply assume with Olson that supervenience is not a problem for the non-
naturalist. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Their “moral fixed points” are fundamental moral principles that “are true in virtue 
of the nature of the nonnatural moral [and hence normative] concepts that constitute 
them” (403). We will consider the plausibility of this claim in Chapter 7 (Section 7.4). 
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5.2. Queerness and the (synthetic) a priori 
The second queerness argument states that, under normative non-naturalism, 
(fundamental) normative knowledge would have to be synthetic a priori knowledge, 
and synthetic a priori knowledge is queer (Olson 2014, 101-102), so normative non-
naturalism must be false.93 Olson responds that this argument generalizes beyond 
the normative in problematic ways; after all, 
Much philosophical knowledge seems to be synthetic a priori. Consider, for 
example, the question of whether there are abstract entities or whether 
everything that exists is ontologically continuous with a naturalistic view of 
the world. Knowledge of such matters would seem to be synthetic and a 
priori. (102) 
 
If the naturalist knows that naturalism is true, this very knowledge, one might 
argue, would itself have to be an instance of synthetic a priori knowledge, making it 
self-defeating for the naturalist to reject normative non-naturalism on the grounds 
that synthetic a priori knowledge is queer. And logical truths like modus ponens seem 
to be both synthetic and a priori, suggesting that there is such a thing as synthetic a 
priori knowledge and thus that synthetic a priori normative knowledge is (in 
principle at least) perfectly possible. 
Yet naturalism might be best construed, not as a proposed instance of 
synthetic a priori knowledge itself, but as an empirical hypothesis about the nature of 
the universe and the contingent parameters of our knowledge, to the effect that the 
                                                            
93. Assuming, that is, that normative knowledge does exist. Olson does not 
assume this, because he is considering these arguments in the context of defending 
the moral (and indeed the normative) error theory. But I am taking myself (by the 
arguments of Chapters 2 and 3) to have established that normative scepticism is false 
and that there is such a thing as normative knowledge. 
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only kind of substantive knowledge that beings like us, in the kind of world that we 
live in, are capable of possessing is empirical knowledge. The normative non-
naturalist is undoubtedly committed to substantive a priori knowledge, so if the 
naturalist has an argument against the existence of this kind of knowledge, he will 
automatically have an argument against normative non-naturalism. Olson is too 
quick to dismiss the second queerness argument just because it generalizes beyond 
the normative. If the naturalist can show that a priori knowledge either does not exist 
at all, or that, if it does, “it is nonetheless merely analytic in character—that is, merely 
a product of human concepts, meanings, definitions, or linguistic conventions” 
(BonJour 1998, 28), he will also have succeeded in showing that (normative) non-
naturalism is false.  
 
5.3. Scepticism about the a priori 
Quinean naturalized epistemology jettisons the whole idea of a priori 
knowledge (analytic or synthetic). Quine (1980) argues that there is no such thing as 
a priori knowledge on the grounds that “no statement is immune to revision,” 
because any belief can be given up in the face of recalcitrant experience (43). Genuine 
a priori truths would have to be necessarily true statements which, it would appear, 
could not conceivably fail to hold. But “Quine claims that we can conceive of any 
statement failing to hold and that for any view we could imagine circumstances in 
which we would give it up,” and he therefore “concludes that no truths are a priori 
or necessary” (Harman 1967, 132). We probably should accept that all statements are, 
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on some basic level, open to revision: what seems to be a priori knowledge—the 
Euclidean parallels postulate, for instance—can sometimes turn out not to be true in 
light of new evidence. Yet even if this is granted, Quine’s conclusion does not follow. 
Laurence BonJour points out that “there is no clear reason … why a proponent of a 
priori justification cannot admit or even insist that such justification is in fact both 
fallible and corrigible” (1998, 75). Just because a statement or proposition is, in 
principle, open to revision (perhaps in light of experience), does not mean that it is 
not in fact an a priori truth; what is needed for the a priori is not that there is anything 
we can know with some kind of absolute certainty, but only that experience is not 
the only source of (epistemic) justification and knowledge. The mere fact that 
nothing is, in principle, immune to revision should not be taken as an argument 
against the a priori.94 
                                                            
94. A priori truths may be necessary truths, in which case they will not turn 
out to be false, and will therefore not be revisable without error, either in principle or 
in fact. Even necessary truths are revisable in the psychological sense that we may 
choose to give up our belief in these truths (erroneous as this may be). Quine’s 
argument is presumably that even allegedly necessary truths are revisable in a 
stronger sense than this, i.e. that, for any statement whatsoever, no matter how 
necessary it may seem, there are in fact possible circumstances in which we would 
be warranted in giving it up. But even if a truth is genuinely necessary, there 
probably will be possible circumstances in which we would be epistemically 
warranted in giving it up, even if we would be in fact mistaken to do so: even if <2 + 
2 = 4> is a genuinely necessary truth, I might have evidence that an evil demon is 
merely deceiving me into accepting this statement, in which case I might be 
warranted in giving it up, even though I would thereby be giving up what is actually 
a necessary truth. Even if a priori truths are all necessary truths, I submit, Quine’s 
argument still fails. 
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However, there is a second Quinean argument, the Indeterminacy of 
Translation argument,95 which may have significantly more force against the a priori. 
Quine thought, on the basis of the apparent impossibility of “radical translation” of 
sentences from one language into another, that psychological attitudes like belief are 
attitudes, not to meanings or propositions expressed by sentences, but only to the 
sentences themselves (79). According to Quine, “it makes no sense to speak of the 
translation of a single sentence of one language into another language apart from 
other translations one would make … translation must always proceed against the 
background of a general scheme of translation from one language to the other” 
(Harman 1967, 143). As a result, we cannot say that a single sentence of one language 
has the exact same meaning or expresses the same proposition as a single sentence in 
any other language. For Quine, this indicates that meanings and propositions do not 
actually exist at all independently of specific sentences. And, as BonJour explains, 
“[i]f sentences have no isolable meanings, if their cognitive significance is merely a 
function of their de facto connections with other sentences in the ‘web of belief’ and 
with experiences or stimuli,” then no sentences would have “any autonomous 
significance that could provide a basis for singling them out as being justified a 
priori” (1998, 79). There would be no such thing as a priori knowledge in this 
scenario, even if we recognize that a priori statements are (in principle) revisable in 
light of experience. 
                                                            
95. BonJour thinks that this argument is better described as “the thesis of the 
indeterminacy of meaning and belief” (79). 
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BonJour, as a firm believer in a priori knowledge and justification, responds 
that this argument is simply question-begging: 
the argument against the isolable meanings that a priori justification requires 
depends on assuming that knowledge is confined to empirical science, so 
construed as to exclude both a priori justification and the sort of quasi-
introspective justification that would be relevant to the grasp of my own 
meanings. (81) 
 
We cannot use the Indeterminacy of Translation (or the indeterminacy of meaning 
and belief) argument as an argument against (normative) non-naturalism if it has to 
assume naturalism in order to rule out the a priori. But why is this assumption 
needed as Bonjour insists that it is? The answer is that, in order to get from the 
observation that we cannot translate single sentences from one language into 
another independently of a background scheme of translation, encompassing other 
sentences in both languages, to the conclusion that no sentences have the 
autonomous meanings needed to make them knowable a priori, it must be assumed 
that users of a single sentence in one language never have anything definite in mind 
that might serve as the meaning of the sentence and that might be shared by users of 
an equivalent sentence in another language. And the only way this assumption 
would be plausible is if we are already entitled to make an appeal to a form of 
“behaviourism and verificationism, and ultimately to the ‘naturalism’ that lurks 
behind them” (81) according to which entities that exist inside minds, such as 
meanings, but which are not directly observable using the senses, therefore do not 
exist. But this would indeed make the argument entirely question-begging as an 
argument against non-naturalism and the a priori. 
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Neither of Quine’s arguments could be called a knock-down argument 
against a priori knowledge in general, but the normative non-naturalist needs 
specifically synthetic a priori knowledge to avoid the second queerness argument. 
Perhaps the very thing that is queer about non-natural normative facts and 
properties is that (fundamental) knowledge of them would have to be a kind of 
knowledge that is not purely conceptual or linguistic in nature, but about robust 
features of the world, and which is nonetheless completely independent of 
experience.96 As we observed in the previous section, it may seem that there are 
certain truths which are quite clearly both synthetic and a priori, such as modus 
ponens. Yet the naturalist can argue that while modus ponens is undoubtedly 
synthetic, it is therefore not really a priori, and is in fact known empirically on the 
basis of inference to the best explanation. Gila Sher (2013) thinks that we can 
differentiate between different logical systems and principles on the basis of whether 
or not they work in the real world (as they are used in doing things like flying 
airplanes, computing salaries, etc.). According to Sher, “a logical system that 
contains a law like affirming the consequent will normally not work in the world, 
                                                            
96. The idea of such knowledge makes Yudkowsky (2007b) “wonder why 
eyes evolved in the first place, if there are ways to produce accurate beliefs without 
looking at things.” I think this nicely expresses the impression that there is 
something fundamentally “queer” about synthetic a priori knowledge. Of course no 
one is suggesting that all knowledge is synthetic a priori (even if there is such a thing 
as synthetic a priori knowledge, eyes are still an obvious epistemic necessity). But I 
take it that Yudkowsky’s point is that observation and sensory organs evolved 
because they are necessary for substantive knowledge about the world, a fact that is 
arguably in tension with the idea that substantive knowledge about the world is 
possible without relying on any kind of observation. 
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while a system containing the law of affirming the antecedent (Modus Ponens) 
normally will” (160). Logical principles like modus ponens, for Sher, are grounded in 
the formal or structural properties of objects, and these formal properties have 
essentially the same ontological status as physical properties (172).97 This suggests 
that the laws of logic are not actually different in kind from the laws of physics: 
modus ponens is no more of an a priori truth than the law of conservation of energy. 
And if as prime a candidate for being synthetic and a priori as modus ponens actually 
fails to be so, it starts to seem doubtful that there even is such a thing as synthetic a 
priori knowledge in the first place. 
The non-naturalist might respond by citing apparent examples of synthetic a 
priori knowledge, such as, “no object can be red and green all over at the same time” 
that allegedly cannot be explained away by appeal to IBE. But if logical truths are 
ultimately grounded in the formal properties of objects, knowledge of which is 
acquired in fundamentally the same way as knowledge of physical properties, then 
truths like the above are probably also grounded in these same formal properties, 
and are thus knowable on the basis of IBE after all. Does this indicate that synthetic a 
priori knowledge should be discarded as queer, and non-natural facts and properties 
(normative or otherwise) with it? I don’t think so. Just because certain seemingly 
                                                            
97. The formal properties of objects include such properties as the property of 
being self-identical, as well as cardinality and transitivity properties. Sher actually 
says that while physical properties hold “in limited ‘regions’ of the world,” formal 
properties hold “in all its regions” (172). But in spite of this difference between the 
two kinds of properties, if Sher’s picture is accurate, both physical and formal 
properties are clearly natural properties. 
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fundamental truths (and thus prime candidates for synthetic a priori knowledge) like 
modus ponens can in fact be known on the basis of IBE does not mean that they 
cannot also be known a priori. I can know that <45, 781 + 62, 943 = 108, 724> either a 
priori by adding up the numbers myself, or a posteriori by using my calculator. In the 
same way, modus ponens may be something I can know a posteriori by observing how 
this principle works in the real world, but it still seems that I can also know that it is 
true a priori just by reflecting on and understanding the proposition that if <p> is 
true, and if <if p then q> is also true, then <q> must be true.98 
In this context, the burden of proof is on the naturalist to show that there is 
something queer about synthetic a priori knowledge, since we are considering 
whether or not queerness can form the basis of a successful argument against 
normative non-naturalism and hence for normative naturalism. And even if certain 
truths that appear to be synthetic and a priori can in fact be known empirically, this 
does not itself establish that synthetic a priori knowledge is queer. Whatever reason 
there is to think that synthetic a priori knowledge is queer seems to come from the 
general impression that synthetic knowledge has to be knowledge of the outside 
world, and knowledge of the outside world has to be based on experience, and 
                                                            
98. Not to mention that an account of modus ponens as exclusively a posteriori 
fails to capture the apparently crucial necessary force of this “must.” Of course the 
naturalist could deny that there are any necessary truths, but once again, a necessary 
truth is not to be confused with a truth that is (in principle) completely immune to 
revision: a statement or proposition can seem to be necessary, but in fact turn out not 
to be in light of new evidence. This, however, does not mean that there are no 
necessary truths, just that we can never be absolutely certain about what the 
necessary truths are, just like we can never be absolutely certain about what the 
contingent truths are either. 
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therefore cannot be a priori. But even if this does constitute a reason to think that 
synthetic a priori knowledge is queer, it is not a strong enough reason to outweigh 
the reason to believe in synthetic a priori knowledge that comes from the many 
apparent instances of such knowledge. This includes philosophical knowledge such 
as (what I take to be) the very knowledge underpinning my defence of Robust 
Metanormative Realism in the first place: the knowledge involved in the 
Deliberative Indispensability Argument and Parfit’s Wager. The conclusion of 
Parfit’s Wager seems to be a synthetic a priori truth: something we can arrive at using 
a pure form of (normative) deliberation. If we accept these arguments, we should not 
be rejecting normative non-naturalism on the grounds that synthetic a priori 
knowledge is queer. And I don’t think the arguments against synthetic a priori 
knowledge outweigh the force of these arguments for metanormative realism. So in 
the end, like Olson, I conclude that the second queerness argument fails.99 
 
5.4. Queerness and irreducible normativity 
Olson himself endorses the fourth queerness argument, which states that (non-
natural) normative facts and properties are queer because they entail that there are 
facts that require or favour certain responses on our part (such as adopting certain 
                                                            
99. Following his discussion of the second queerness argument, Olson moves 
on to the third queerness argument, which focuses on moral motivation, arguing that 
moral facts are queer because such facts would exert an inescapable motivational 
pull on anyone who takes themselves to be aware of them (2014, 109). I will not 
discuss this third queerness argument because it specifically targets morality rather 
than normativity as a whole (not to mention the fact that Olson rejects it anyway). 
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courses of behaviour), where the requiring or favouring relation is irreducibly 
normative, and these irreducibly normative requiring or favouring relations are 
queer (2014, 123-124). Irreducibly normative requiring or favouring relations “are 
not reducible to facts about agents’ desires, roles, or engagement in rule-governed 
activities” (135) and this, according to Olson, is what makes them, and consequently 
(non-natural) normative facts and properties, queer. Requiring or favouring relations 
that are reducible to facts about agents’ desires, roles, engagement in rule-governed 
activities, or the like, do not pose a similar metaphysical problem. For instance, the 
fact that an act is a splitting of an infinitive counts in favour of not performing that 
act, and this favouring relation can be reduced to the fact that not performing that 
act accords with a grammatical rule according to which splitting the infinitive is 
inappropriate, and there is not supposed to be anything metaphysically mysterious 
about this. Irreducibly normative favouring relations, on the other hand, “appear to 
be metaphysically mysterious. How,” Olson asks the non-naturalist, “can there be 
such relations?” (136) 
If irreducibly normative favouring relations are simply reason relations that 
do not reduce to facts about agents’ desires, roles, or engagement in rule-governed 
activities, then (by the arguments of Chapters 2 and 3) we have already seen that 
such relations do exist, because there are such things as categorical reasons and 
mind-independent normative truths. As metanormative realists, we should not be 
rejecting these kinds of favouring relations any more than we should be rejecting 
synthetic a priori knowledge. But categoricity and mind-independence are not the 
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same thing as metaphysical irreducibility, and metaphysically irreducible normative 
favouring relations might be queer even if categorical normative favouring relations 
aren’t. The Robust Metanormative Naturalist is offering a view precisely according 
to which there is such a thing as real or categorical normativity,100 but this categorical 
normativity is not metaphysically primitive or sui generis.101 
Assuming that normative facts and properties do not reduce to supernatural 
facts and properties, non-natural normative facts and properties clearly do entail the 
existence of metaphysically irreducible normative favouring relations. And such 
relations are metaphysically mysterious, in the sense that, being metaphysically 
irreducible, they do not admit of a reductive explanation that would tell us what 
their normativity consists in. But that does not entail that they are metaphysically 
queer in a sense that implies that such relations cannot exist; the non-naturalist could 
respond to Olson’s question simply by asking, “Why can’t there be such relations?” 
Olson acknowledges that the non-naturalist “could maintain that it is a fundamental 
                                                            
100. Or “objective prescriptivity,” as Mackie would have said (Olson 2011, 64). 
 
101. Although, as I will explain in Chapter 8 (Sections 8.3 and 8.4), normative 
properties do not actually reduce to non-normative properties, even though they are 
metaphysically dependent on them (and thus not fundamental features of reality). 
The non-naturalist, however, is saying something more than that normative 
favouring relations are irreducible either in the sense that they do not reduce to facts 
about agent’s desires (etc.), or in the same sense in which biological properties, say, 
might not be completely reducible to physical properties, even though they are 
clearly metaphysically dependent on physical properties. The non-naturalist is 
saying that such relations are categorical, irreducible and metaphysically primitive 
and sui generis. The Robust Metanormative Naturalist believes in normative 
favouring relations that are both categorical and irreducible, but denies that these 
relations are metaphysically primitive and sui generis. 
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fact about reality that there are irreducibly normative reason relations,” and indeed 
this is what non-naturalists like Parfit and Scanlon actually do maintain. He also 
claims that, for this very reason, the issue between the naturalist and the non-
naturalist “is at a bedrock metaphysical level” (136). 
This seems to suggest that the Argument from Queerness simply has no force 
against the non-naturalist. Olson provides no argument that irreducibly normative 
relations are queer, beyond claiming that they appear to be so and insinuating that 
they require some (unforthcoming) further explanation; and he only argues that 
(non-natural) normative facts and properties are queer because they entail these 
allegedly queer relations. And the non-naturalist of course does not accept that 
irreducibly normative reason relations are or appear to be metaphysically queer, and 
nor does he accept that they are in need of any further explanation; on the contrary, 
such relations, for the non-naturalist, are fundamental features of reality and 
therefore admit of no further explanation in terms of anything more fundamental 
than themselves. If such relations really do exist, they probably are “mysterious,” 
but only in the rather tautological sense that, being fundamental, we cannot explain 
what they are in terms of something else. And the whole point of normative non-
naturalism is that normativity cannot be reduced to or explained in terms of 
something else.102 
                                                            
102. Copp expresses the sentiment that “[t]heories that simply postulate sui 
generis normative … properties or that help themselves to an unexplained 
normative notion of reasonableness or rationality are not satisfying” (2007, 2). I 
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In so far as there is an impasse between the naturalist and the non-naturalist 
(the naturalist just finds something especially queer about primitive, sui generis 
normativity, the non-naturalist just doesn’t), Olson places the onus on the non-
naturalist to find a way out of this impasse, perhaps by appealing to alleged 
companions in guilt (or innocence). The non-naturalist might say that facts about 
abstracta like logical and mathematical facts are no less metaphysically mysterious 
than (non-natural) normative facts, and since we should not deny the existence of 
logical and mathematical facts on grounds of queerness, we should not deny the 
existence of (non-natural) normative facts on queerness grounds either. And 
although Olson agrees that such facts about abstracta “may be metaphysically 
problematic in a number of ways,” he responds that they do not display the feature 
that he finds especially queer about non-natural normative facts—they do not entail 
irreducibly normative reasons (138). Yet Skorupski argues that logic itself is 
irreducibly normative: that logical truths are actually irreducibly normative truths 
about epistemic reasons (2010, 203). He also argues that all a priori truths, including 
mathematical truths, are either normative truths themselves or non-normative 
“offshoots” of irreducibly normative truths (149). 
However, as we saw in the previous section, there is a naturalistic way to 
account for logic in terms of formal laws which are themselves grounded in the 
formal properties of objects. And I think Sher’s naturalistic account of logic is far 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
agree. But unfortunately, the unsatisfying nature of normative non-naturalism does 
not constitute a direct argument against it. 
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more plausible than Skorupski’s normative account. Logical truths do not prima facie 
seem normative, and Sher’s account has the advantage of being able to explain why 
logic works in the (mind-independent) world. As we saw in the previous chapter 
(Section 4.1, pace Armstrong), there is also a naturalistic way to account for 
mathematics in terms of the properties of classes and/or mereological wholes. If 
these accounts are correct, they break the analogy between abstract objects and 
primitive, sui generis normativity, because logic and mathematics would be 
grounded in natural properties that are knowable on the basis of observation and 
IBE. Unlike irreducible normativity, logic and mathematics would not be queer in 
the sense of being mysterious and without further explanation. But if this is the sole 
reason why irreducible normativity is queer and logic and mathematics are not, then 
to reject irreducible normativity because it is queer would be to reject it because it is 
irreducible, and to assume that irreducible normativity is queer (because it is 
irreducible) is already, in effect, to assume that non-naturalism is false. Quite aside 
from the success or failure of the companions in guilt strategy on the non-naturalist’s 
part, therefore, Olson fails to make a significant case that irreducible normativity is 
queer, and so his fourth queerness argument in fact has no more real force than the 
previous three.103 
 
                                                            
103. As Matt Lutz and Stephen Finlay (2015) complain in their review of 
Olson’s Moral Error Theory, Olson “seems to treat a response to an objection to a 
premise [the premise that irreducible normativity is queer and the companions in 
guilt response] as an argument for it. But no guilt on the charge of intolerable 
queerness is thereby established” (1224). 
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5.5. Irreducible normativity and the interaction problem 
Nonetheless, there may be a way of explaining why non-natural normative 
facts and properties are queer without simply asserting, as Olson does, that 
irreducible normativity is queer. As I mentioned in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3), since 
normative properties have the capacity to exert some kind of causal influence on the 
natural world (so long as the argument of the previous chapter is sound), if they are 
not natural properties, then they must be, not just non-natural, but supernatural: 
properties that are not natural, but which are nonetheless able to affect nature, either 
in a brute way or by some process that is unintelligible to the natural sciences. And 
one can see why this might raise queerness issues: if normative properties are not a 
part of the natural world, how can they interact with it and influence it? Normative 
properties such as the property of being a reason are supposed to be able to 
influence our actions, and our actions, being spatio-temporal events, are not 
implausibly construed as simply the products of other spatio-temporal events, and it 
would not appear that non-natural properties can figure in any way in the spatio-
temporal chains of events which typically lead to our actions. The situation for the 
Robust Metanormative Non-Naturalist is therefore similar to that for the mind-body 
dualist: if mental properties are fundamentally different from physical properties, it 
is difficult to see how the two can interact as they nevertheless seem to do. And if the 
normative is fundamentally separate from the natural, it is likewise difficult to see 
how the normative can influence the natural even though the normative does seem 
to have an influence on the natural through its influence on human action. Unless 
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this interaction problem admits of a solution, non-natural (supernatural) normative 
properties are probably best set aside as queer. 
The non-naturalist might respond that the interaction problem applies no 
more to non-natural properties than it does to properties in general, normative or 
otherwise, because properties are abstract entities and so they “cannot, by definition, 
figure in the spatio-temporal events that make up causal regularities or chains in the 
way that concrete objects do” (BonJour 1998, 159). But at least some properties 
clearly do exert a kind of causal influence in spite of being abstract: if the fingers on 
my right hand did not have the property of being five, I would not see what I in fact 
see when I look at my right hand. The property of being five is clearly an abstract 
entity of some sort, but this does not prevent it from having an influence on perfectly 
concrete circumstances. BonJour claims that properties exert influence, not by being 
concretely involved in causal chains of events, but by virtue of “the presence in such 
a causal chain of an event or events involving concrete objects that instantiate these 
properties, where the fact that it is just those specific properties that are instantiated 
and not others affects the overall result” (160). And if the abstract can influence the 
concrete in this way, the non-naturalist could argue, there is no reason why the non-
natural cannot influence the natural as well. 
The objection to mind-body dualism that interaction between mental and 
physical properties would be impossible if these properties were fundamentally 
different from each other appears to be based on an appeal to at least one of three 
considerations: 1) a ‘billiard ball’ picture of causation, 2) the idea that the non-
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physical interacting with the physical violates the principle of conservation of 
energy, and 3) the idea that the world is causally “closed under physics” (Robinson 
2017). If the normative cannot interact with the natural because normative properties 
are fundamentally different from natural properties, this is probably the case for one 
of these three reasons. First of all, the non-natural having an influence on the natural 
is clearly incompatible with a “billiard ball” picture of causation, according to which 
causation inherently involves energy transfer through contact between concrete 
objects. But this picture of causation also appears to be incompatible with facts and 
properties having causal influence, even if the facts and properties in question are 
perfectly natural facts and properties. A fact is not a concrete object, so it cannot 
have an impact on other concrete objects the way a billiard ball can, but facts clearly 
seem capable of causing things: we can say truly, for instance, that the fact that the 
piers were broken is what caused the bridge to collapse. The “billiard ball” picture of 
causation, therefore, is probably invalid; it does not provide a reason why non-
natural normative facts and properties might be queer. 
What about the second consideration: the idea that the non-physical 
interacting with the physical, or the non-natural interacting with the natural, violates 
the principle of conservation of energy? According to Daniel Dennett (1991), 
A fundamental principle of physics is that any change in the trajectory of any 
physical entity is an acceleration requiring the expenditure of energy, and 
where is this energy to come from? It is this principle of the conservation of 
energy that accounts for the physical impossibility of ‘perpetual motion 
machines,’ and the same principle is apparently violated by dualism. This 
confrontation between quite standard physics and dualism … is widely 
regarded as the inescapable and fatal flaw of dualism. (35) 
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If this is an accurate assessment of mind-body dualism, the same point surely 
applies to Robust Metanormative Non-Naturalism as well: if normativity is not a 
physical or natural phenomenon, and yet it exerts a causal influence on our 
behaviour (which plainly involves changes in the trajectories of physical entities) the 
principle of the conservation of energy would seem to be violated. Can the non-
naturalist simply appeal to the causal capacities of abstracta like facts and properties 
to get around this objection (as with the ‘billiard ball’ picture of causation)? If 
abstracta really do cause things, their doing so must be compatible with the law of 
conservation of energy; if it is not compatible with this law, we should conclude that 
they do not in fact cause things after all. And abstract objects are of course incapable 
of providing the energy needed to elicit the kinds of physical changes involved in 
human action. 
In spite of this, natural properties clearly do figure in causal relations: 
dropping a square paperweight into soft clay will produce an impression, and the 
specific shape and depth of the impression will be caused by the shape and mass of 
the paperweight, shape and mass both being natural properties (Robb and Heil 
2019). These properties do not expend energy in order to exert a genuine causal 
influence, and yet their having this influence clearly does not violate the law of 
conservation of energy. Physics tells us that the change in the clay must be the result 
of the expenditure of energy, but not that energy expenditure is the only factor 
involved in the specific change that takes place; properties such as shape and mass 
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presumably affect the way in which energy is expended and transferred. Human 
action is also the product of energy expenditure of course, and with the above in 
mind, we should be able to say that normative properties serve to shape and 
influence the way in which this energy expenditure leads to the specific actions that 
it does. Would this be impossible if normative properties were non-natural? Non-
natural properties are properties which are both metaphysically irreducible and 
which can be known to be instantiated only a priori. And nothing about a property’s 
being irreducible or knowable only a priori seems, in principle, to rule out its being 
able to affect nature, at least not for the reason that this would violate a law of 
physics such as the law of conservation of energy. 
The final reason we will consider for thinking that non-natural normative 
properties are queer is the idea that natural (or physical) properties are the only 
properties able to exert any kind of causal influence, on account of the complete 
causal closure of physics. David Chalmers (1996) thinks that interactionist dualism 
about mind and body “requires a hefty bet on the future of physics, one that does 
not currently seem at all promising; physical events seem inexorably to be explained 
in terms of other physical events” (156). Robust Metanormative Non-Naturalism 
faces the same problem as mind-body interactionist dualism: if physical/natural 
causes are entirely responsible for physical/natural events, including all normatively 
responsive events like human actions and beliefs, then unless normative facts and 
properties are themselves natural, they can exert no influence at all on the natural 
world (and by the argument of the previous chapter, we have already seen that 
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normative properties do exert an influence on the world). So long as the causal 
closure of physics is understood in the broad sense of causality (covering all kinds of 
substantive influence on the world, not just spatio-temporal energy transfer or the 
like), it is flatly inconsistent with any form of robust non-naturalism or 
supernaturalism (normative or otherwise). 
We should probably accept that all physical/natural events, including human 
actions and beliefs, have physical/natural causes. But if causal overdetermination is 
possible, this does not in fact rule out the presence of non-natural causes for 
physical/natural events: human behaviour, in particular, could have both 
physical/natural and irreducibly normative (non-natural) causes at the same time.  
Even though, for any human action or belief, a physical/natural event is causally 
sufficient to produce it, the instantiation of a non-natural, irreducibly normative 
property might also be causally sufficient to produce this same action or belief. For 
instance, I might perform a certain action a and be in a physical state that includes a 
sufficient cause of my doing a, such that, in a possible world in which I am not in 
this physical state and in which I do not do a, it would be true that, had I been in this 
physical state (in that world), I would have done a. But at the same time, it might also 
be the case that a has the non-natural, irreducibly normative property of being the 
right thing to do, and it might also be true that, in a possible world in which a did not 
have this property and in which I did not do a, nonetheless had a had this property 
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(in that world), I would have done a.104 And so a’s having the non-natural normative 
property of being the right thing to do is in fact also causally sufficient for my doing 
a, but in a way that is compatible with every physical/natural event having a 
physical/natural cause. 
Wedgwood (2007) employs a distinction between “world-driven” and “effect-
driven” causes to defend the causal efficacy of irreducibly normative properties: 
“[t]he ‘effect-driven’ cause contains as little as possible that is not causally necessary 
in order to bring about the effect, while the ‘world-driven’ cause contains more 
elements and so reveals more about how the effect came about in the actual world” 
(195). Suppose that I have a reason to form an intention to go to London, and this 
normative fact obtains because of the non-normative fact that I wish to go to a 
concert (along with other suitable background circumstances, such as my other 
beliefs and desires). If I had a wish to go to a party, instead of a wish to go to a 
concert, I would still have a reason to form an intention to go to London, and I 
would still form an intention to go to London as a result. Wedgwood concludes that 
the normative fact [that I have a reason to go to London] is the effect-driven 
cause of my forming the intention to go to London, while the purely mental 
                                                            
104. Eugene Mills (1996) discusses causal overdetermination in the context of 
interactionist mind-body dualism, capturing the notion of a mental event, such as a 
belief, being causally sufficient for a physical action, such as one’s arm rising, and a 
physical cause P simultaneously being sufficient for the same action with the 
conditionals O1: “If P hadn’t occurred but my belief had, the arm-rising would have 
occurred,” and O2: “If my belief hadn’t occurred but P had, the arm-rising would 
have occurred” (107). In the normative case, the robust non-naturalist can replace the 
mental event—a belief—spoken of in these conditionals with the instantiation of a 
normative property. 
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[and hence non-normative] fact about the specific type and content of my 
mental states is the world-driven cause of my forming that intention. (196) 
 
It would appear that physical events, such as my actually going to London having 
formed an intention to do so, can have both normative and non-normative causes at 
the same time, and thus that the presence of a physical cause for every physical 
event does not exclude the presence of an irreducibly normative cause for some of 
those physical events. 
Is there anything metaphysically queer about this kind of causal 
overdetermination of physical events? Chalmers points out that, although such 
overdetermination “is often regarded with suspicion, it is hard to demonstrate 
conclusively that there is something wrong with it,” and that “[t]he nature of 
causation is sufficiently ill understood that overdetermination cannot yet be ruled 
out” (152).105 Purely physical causal overdetermination is clearly possible: a death by 
firing squad is causally overdetermined—each member of the firing squad is 
causally sufficient to kill the target, but if you were to remove any given member, 
the target would still be killed anyway. Causal overdetermination as such, it would 
appear, is not the problem; if there is something queer about overdetermination in 
the case of non-natural, irreducibly normative properties, this must stem from the 
queerness of the properties themselves. And since the non-naturalist can appeal to 
overdetermination in order to get around the objection that interaction between the 
normative and the natural is impossible because of the casual closure of physics, in 
                                                            
105. Although he does not specifically defend overdetermination (about 
mental causation). 
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addition to the failure of the previous two reasons for thinking that normative-
natural interaction is impossible under non-naturalism, the need for such interaction 
in fact fails to explain why non-natural normative properties are queer. What we 
might call the fifth queerness argument, therefore, based as it is on the alleged 
queerness of interaction between the non-natural and the natural, fails: like the 
previous arguments, it ends up simply assuming that non-natural normative 
properties are queer. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
We have looked at four different versions of the Argument from Queerness 
(or queerness arguments), focusing in turn on the supervenience of the normative on 
the natural, the (synthetic) a priori, irreducible normativity, and the interaction 
between the irreducibly normative and the natural (or between the non-natural and 
the natural). And we found that none of these arguments actually succeeds in 
explaining why non-natural normative properties and facts are (or would be) queer, 
at least not in any sense that entails that such facts and properties don’t exist. Apart 
from the second queerness argument, which shoulders too heavy a burden of having 
to show that there is no (synthetic) a priori knowledge across the board, each of these 
arguments simply asserts or assumes that irreducible normativity is queer, and this 
is not enough to provide an adequate case in favour of normative naturalism. If 
normative scepticism was still on the table, it might be plausible to take irreducible 
normativity as queer, but since (I have argued) we do have good reasons to believe 
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in real normativity, we should not just assume that normative facts and properties 
cannot be fundamental, sui generis features of reality, given that they do exist in 
some form or other. Like phenomenal experience, normativity is not to be dismissed 
as queer just because it is difficult to explain in terms of what we already know 
about the world through science. To do so would be to assume, in the words of 
William Fitzpatrick (2016), “that we know so much about the world through 
scientific inquiry as to know that the default is that it should not contain value (or 
phenomenal experience), or that it is somehow highly unlikely that it should” (545). 
And I believe we do not yet know enough about the world through science to know 
that it is highly unlikely to contain irreducible normativity.106 
But it will take a strong argument to show that normativity cannot be 
explained—that we have no hope of understanding it in a naturalistic manner, even 
if queerness does not mean that it must either be understood in such a manner or 
                                                            
106. Chalmers seems to deny the analogy between normativity and 
phenomenal experience when he remarks that “moral facts are not phenomena that 
force themselves on us. When it comes to the crunch, we can deny that moral facts 
exist at all … The same strategy cannot be taken for phenomenal properties, whose 
existence is forced upon us” (1997, 83-84). Eliminative materialists, however, do 
deny that phenomenal properties exist at all. And if my argument in Chapter 3 is 
correct, then, so long as normative reasons are epistemically possible and we do not 
know that they don’t exist, normative reasons and normative facts do end up forcing 
themselves upon us. We can also observe that, as we learned from Street in Chapter 
1 (Section 1.1), normative concepts are acquired from certain conscious experiences 
which can only be adequately described using these concepts, and so it is possible 
that at least some normative properties are phenomenal properties themselves. 
Kahane (2010) I believe correctly points out that “[t]he badness of pain seems to force 
itself upon us just like phenomenal properties. Indeed it imposes itself on us through 
a phenomenal property!” (47) In Chapter 7 (Section 7.7), I will argue that we cannot 
adequately explain our responses to certain of our conscious experience, such as 
agony, without appealing to normative properties. 
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rejected outright. The force that queerness does have against non-naturalism, I 
believe, reduces to the force of an appeal to Occam’s Razor.107 And Occam’s Razor 
clearly provides some genuine support for naturalism: if there is no conclusive 
argument in favour of either naturalism or non-naturalism, naturalism will come out 
ahead on plausibility points precisely for reasons of parsimony (especially since it is 
robust non-naturalism we are dealing with). The Argument from Queerness itself, I 
conclude, is basically redundant in so far as it rests on an obvious disadvantage 
(robust) non-naturalistic metanormative theories have when it comes to parsimony. 
This disadvantage, however, might not be at all decisive, so long as there is a strong 
argument against all forms of normative naturalism. In the next chapter, we will see 
whether or not there is such an argument. 
  
                                                            
107. Olson himself appeals to Occam’s Razor in defence of the premise that 
irreducible normativity is queer: if our normative “practices and beliefs can be 
explained without appeal to irreducibly normative properties and facts, a theory that 
dispenses with such properties and facts will have the advantage of being in this 
respect the more ontologically parsimonious theory” (2014, 147). In light of Olson’s 
appeal to considerations of parsimony, Daan Evers (2014) is left “with the sense that 
queerness is not doing any work in the argument against non-natural moral [or 





We have considered and rejected a potential knock-down argument against 
normative non-naturalism; now we will consider a potential knock-down argument 
against normative naturalism. Just as the Argument from Queerness is essentially 
based on asking: “How can there be irreducibly normative properties?” one can also 
ask the question: “How can natural properties be normative (or how can normative 
properties be natural)?” Maybe this second question can inspire a better argument 
than the Argument from Queerness. If normative naturalism is true, there must be 
some normative properties that are also natural properties (and some natural 
properties that are also normative properties). But many people, non-naturalists as 
well as error theorists and non-cognitivists, think that this is simply impossible: if a 
property is normative, it cannot therefore be natural (and vice versa). 
Why might it be impossible for normative facts and properties to be a subset 
of natural facts and properties? Parfit has three interrelated arguments for this 
conclusion, arguments that he calls, in turn: the Normativity Objection, the Fact 
Stating Argument, and, most importantly (I believe), The Triviality Objection. I don’t 
think any of these arguments succeeds, largely for the same reason that the various 
versions of the Argument from Queerness don’t succeed, namely, that they all end 
up relying on a certain basic intuition: the queerness intuition on the one hand and 
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the “just-too-different intuition” on the other. And whatever force these intuitions do 
in fact have, I think they pretty much cancel each other out as far as the debate 
between the naturalist and the non-naturalist is concerned. Before I address these 
arguments, I will first consider the force of the non-naturalist’s prima facie intuition 
that normative properties cannot be natural properties (Section 6.1). And then I will 
respond to Parfit’s arguments for the fundamental impossibility of normative 
naturalism one at a time over the course of Sections 6.2 to 6.4. 
 
6.1. The just-too-different intuition 
Enoch (2013) insists that “[n]ormative facts and properties … are just too 
different from natural ones to be a subset of them” (100). He supports this “just-too-
different intuition,” as he calls it, by appealing to the perspective of the deliberating 
agent: 
When I ask myself what I should do, it seems that just answering ‘Oh, 
pressing the blue button will maximize happiness’ is a complete non-starter, it 
completely fails to address the question. Of course, given some background 
commitments [such as a commitment to utilitarianism] it can be a better 
answer … But such background commitments are themselves 
paradigmatically normative, and themselves just too different from naturalist 
facts and beliefs. (107-108) 
 
But as that last sentence clearly testifies, if this line of reasoning is intended as an 
argument for non-naturalism, it assumes the very thing it is trying to support: that 
normative facts and properties are fundamentally different from natural facts and 
properties. After all, if some form of naturalistic utilitarianism is true, the fact that 
pressing the blue button will maximize happiness might actually be a normative fact 
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as well as a natural one. If the normative domain is autonomous from the domain of 
natural facts, this will of course not be the case, but that is the very thing presently at 
issue. To be fair, Enoch does not seem to intend the above passage as a direct 
argument so much as an attempt to trigger our basic intuitions; indeed he suggests 
that, when deciding between naturalism and non-naturalism, “[w]e may not be able 
to do here much more than just stare at the just-too-different intuition and try to see 
how plausible it seems to us, at least as a starting point” (108). 
Is Enoch’s just-too-different intuition any more plausible, prima facie, than 
Olson’s intuition that irreducible normativity is queer? Perhaps it would be if 
normative facts and properties were completely causally inert, but not when we 
consider that these facts and properties do (it appears) have some kind of causal 
standing. In light of our ability to respond in a sensitive manner to differences in the 
normative facts and properties (as illustrated in Chapter 4 (Section 4.5)), I think it is 
in fact prima facie more plausible that these facts and properties are a subset of the 
natural facts and properties with which they seem to interact—although, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, interaction between natural and irreducibly normative (non-
natural) properties should not be automatically ruled out as queer. Although he 
concedes that (robust) non-naturalism loses plausibility points due to its lack of 
parsimony compared to naturalism, Enoch claims that non-naturalism still comes 
out ahead on plausibility because naturalism conflicts with the just-too-different 
intuition (108-109). Yet since the normative and the natural appear to interact in 
some way, this intuition does not actually have the force (independently of a specific 
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argument for it and hence for non-naturalism itself) that Enoch takes it to have, and 
so, from a purely prima facie perspective, taking both parsimony and interaction into 
account, I submit that it is in fact naturalism that comes out ahead on plausibility 
points. 
I argued in Chapter 3 that normative deliberation (like inference to the best 
explanation) is plausibly construed as a basic belief-forming method, meaning that 
we can attain at least some normative knowledge without having to rely on 
empirical methods. This in itself may seem to provide a knock-down argument 
against normative naturalism: if normative deliberation is a basic, a priori method of 
acquiring knowledge, separate from IBE or any other belief-forming method, doesn’t 
this imply that the normative domain is separate from any other domain, including 
all natural and empirical domains, and thus that fundamental normative knowledge 
is entirely a priori? I don’t think so. Just because normative deliberation is a basic 
belief-forming method, capable of yielding synthetic a priori knowledge (as in the 
case of Parfit’s Wager), does not mean that fundamental normative knowledge 
cannot also be acquired empirically.108 To pick up on the analogy with phenomenal 
experience introduced in the previous chapter, introspective consciousness—the ability 
to directly discern one’s own conscious states—is probably a basic belief-forming 
method as well, but that does not mean that knowledge of conscious states cannot be 
acquired empirically by means of observation and IBE: my knowledge that I am 
                                                            
108. In the same way that, as we saw in the previous chapter (Section 5.3), just 
because a logical principle like modus ponens can be known empirically on the basis 
of IBE does not mean that it cannot also be known a priori. 
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currently thinking is not empirical knowledge, but the fact that I am thinking is still 
something that is knowable a posteriori, and through genuinely scientific methods 
(involving MRI machines and brain scans) at that.109 
 
6.2. The Normativity Objection 
Of the essence of the non-naturalist’s position is the conviction that 
naturalistic accounts of normativity lose the normativity of normative facts—the 
very feature they are supposed to capture (Enoch 2013, 105). Olson’s primary 
ground for rejecting normative naturalism is also that it “leaves out the irreducible 
normativity of normative facts” (2014, 83). Since normative facts cannot be construed 
in a naturalistic manner without sacrificing the normativity of these facts (for the 
non-naturalist), the likes of Parfit (2011b) conclude that “normative facts and natural 
                                                            
109. Some do classify introspective knowledge as empirical knowledge: 
BonJour (1998), for instance, claims that “[t]he justification of introspective 
knowledge pertaining to one’s own states of mind should surely count as empirical” 
(7). BonJour is trying to demarcate a priori justification from other forms of epistemic 
justification, and introspection does not seem to be a source of a priori justification, 
but I do not think it should thereby be classified as a posteriori. Some might argue 
that introspection is a sense, and that introspective knowledge is therefore in the 
same basic category as, say, visual knowledge (i.e. both are forms of empirical 
knowledge). Again, I don’t think this is right, because if introspection is a sense, like 
vision, its corresponding sense organ would presumably be the brain, and this 
would fail to demarcate introspective knowledge from a priori knowledge (one 
might just as well say that we have a mathematical sense, with the brain as its 
corresponding organ). But in any case, the point I am trying to make is that there are 
two ways of acquiring knowledge of conscious states, both of which involve appeals 
to distinct basic belief-forming methods: introspection and IBE. So just because 
(fundamental) normative knowledge can be acquired using an a priori basic belief-
forming method (normative deliberation) does not mean that such knowledge 
cannot also be acquired using another, empirical belief-forming method (such as 
IBE), and thus qualify as empirical knowledge on that account. 
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facts are in two quite different, non-overlapping categories.” If normative facts were 
not in a different, non-overlapping category from natural facts, the implication is, 
they would not, and indeed could not, be genuinely normative facts. But why should 
this be? Why should subsuming normative facts within the category of natural facts 
sacrifice the normativity of such facts? The naturalist may not be able to capture the 
irreducible normativity of normative facts, but the normative naturalist might be 
someone who does not believe in irreducible normativity at all, at least not in the 
metaphysical sense of “irreducible”; there would be no point objecting to such a 
naturalist that his view does not capture the irreducible normativity of normative 
facts.110 And, according to this naturalist, normative facts do not need to be 
irreducibly normative in order to be normative facts, any more than biological facts 
must be irreducible to physical facts in order to be genuine biological facts. The 
naturalist Parfit is targeting is someone who thinks that, “[t]hough we make some 
irreducibly normative claims, there are no irreducibly normative facts” (324). So 
Parfit needs to show that irreducibly normative claims could not state facts that are 
not themselves irreducibly normative. 
Parfit believes that “when we have decisive reason to act in some way, or we 
should or ought to act in this way, this fact could not be the same as, or consist in, 
some natural fact, such as some causal or psychological fact,” and he defends this 
belief by appealing to the meanings of the words, “reason,” “should,” and “ought” 
                                                            
110. Though I myself will be defending a form of non-reductive naturalism 
(according to which normative facts are both natural and irreducibly normative) 
over the course of Chapters 7 and 8. 
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(325). But in spite of the meanings of these words, irreducibly normative claims 
might state natural facts in the same way that true claims about water state facts 
about H2O, or true claims about heat state facts about molecular kinetic energy: the 
meaning of “water” does not entail anything about H2O, but true claims about water 
nonetheless state facts about H2O. Of course it turned out that facts about water 
really are facts about H2O (because water is H2O), but this did not mean that facts 
about water are not really facts about water, nor that the concept of water is reducible 
to the concept of H2O. A naturalist might argue that normative facts about which 
actions are right are really just natural facts about which actions maximize 
happiness, even though the concept of being right is not reducible to the concept of 
maximizing happiness. In this scenario, true normative claims would be irreducibly 
normative (because they feature irreducibly normative concepts) and yet they would 
be made true by natural facts, and these natural facts, being the truthmakers for 
normative truths, would therefore be normative facts as well as natural facts. This 
suggests that normative facts can indeed be construed as natural facts without losing 
their normativity. 
Parfit argues that normative facts cannot be like the natural facts that water is 
H2O or that heat is molecular kinetic energy. The concept of heat does not logically 
entail that heat is molecular kinetic energy, just like the concept of a right action does 
not logically entail that right actions are those that maximize happiness. But whereas 
true claims about heat are nonetheless able to state facts about molecular kinetic 
energy, it does not follow that true normative claims, such as claims about which 
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actions are right, are also able to state natural facts, such as facts about which actions 
maximize happiness. For Parfit, this is because the relevant concepts both leave open 
various possibilities and exclude various others at the same time. The concept of heat 
leaves open the possibility that heat could be molecular kinetic energy, but excludes 
the possibility that heat could be a shade of blue, or a medieval king (325). Similarly, 
according to Parfit, the normative concept of being a right action excludes the 
possibility that being a right action could be the same thing as being an action that 
maximizes happiness.111 The point is that, even though the concept of heat does not 
have to entail that heat is molecular kinetic energy for claims about heat to state facts 
about molecular kinetic energy, these claims can state these facts because the concept 
of heat does not entail that heat is not molecular kinetic energy, although it does 
entail that heat is not a shade of blue. For the non-naturalist, the irreducibly 
normative concept of being a right action specifically excludes the possibility that 
being a right action is the same thing as being an action that maximizes happiness, in 
the same way that the concept of heat specifically excludes the possibility that heat is 
a shade of blue. 
Of course Parfit is right that, on a conceptual level, heat could not have turned 
out to be a shade of blue, but that in itself does not mean that being a right action 
                                                            
111. The possibility that the concept of being a right action is supposed to 
exclude here is not the possibility that right actions are those that maximize 
happiness, in the sense that actions which have the natural property of maximizing 
happiness also thereby have the normative property of being a right action, but the 
possibility that the normative property of being a right action is the same property as 
the natural property of maximizing happiness. 
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could not be the same thing as being an action that maximizes happiness. The 
concept of being a right action no doubt excludes certain possibilities: being a right 
action could not turn out to be the same thing, for instance, as being an action that 
involves counting a certain number of blades of grass in a certain amount of time. 
But that does not mean that this normative property could not turn out to be the 
same property as any natural property (such as the property of maximizing 
happiness). Why think that the claim that being a right action is the same thing as 
being an action that maximizes happiness is analogous to the claim that heat is a 
shade of blue, rather than analogous to the claim that heat is molecular kinetic 
energy? Parfit says that, given the meaning of certain claims, like the claim that 
rivers are sonnets, or that experiences are stones, these claims could not possibly be 
true, and he also says that this “is the same way in which … Normative Naturalism 
could not be true” (325), the implication being that, because of the meaning of the 
claim that being a right action is the same thing as being an action that maximizes 
happiness, this claim likewise could not possibly be true. But this does not actually 
explain why this claim, or any other fundamental normative claim of the kind that a 
normative naturalist might make, is analogous to obviously absurd claims like the 
claim that rivers are sonnets, or that experiences are stones, rather than to 
undoubtedly true claims like the claim that water is H2O, or that heat is molecular 
kinetic energy. 
The Normativity Objection, it would seem, basically amounts to insisting that, 
because of the meaning of normative claims and the concepts involved in them, 
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these claims could not possibly state natural facts. Parfit considers the possibility 
that a normative claim, like the claim that you ought to jump from a burning hotel 
window into a canal in order to save your life, might state the same fact as the 
naturalistic claim that jumping would do most to fulfil your present fully informed 
desires, or is what, if you deliberated in certain naturalistically describable ways, 
you would choose to do. But he concludes that, given the difference between the 
meanings of these two claims, they could not possibly state the same fact (326), and 
that, on this basis alone, normative truths “could not possibly be the same as, or 
consist in, some merely natural fact” (327). It should be clear by now that Parfit’s 
Normativity Objection is just another way of stating the just-too-different intuition, 
and thus that it is just as inadequate as an argument against normative naturalism as 
a simple unvarnished appeal to this intuition (and indeed as inadequate as the 
Argument from Queerness is as an argument against non-naturalism). At the least, 
we are going to need more of an explanation as to why fundamental normative facts 
cannot be analogous to facts about natural kinds like the fact that water is H2O (and 
are instead analogous to absurd claims like the claim that heat is a shade of blue), if 
normative naturalism is going to be ruled out on conceptual grounds. 
 
6.3. The Fact Stating Argument 
Parfit’s second argument against naturalism might be able to explain why 
normative facts cannot be natural facts (like the fact that water is H2O). According to 
what he calls the Fact Stating Argument: 
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(1) We make some irreducibly normative claims, 
(2) According to Non-Analytic Naturalists,112 when such claims are 
true, they state facts that are both normative and natural. 
(3) If such normative facts were also natural facts, any such fact could 
also be stated by some other non-normative, naturalistic claim. 
Therefore 
(4) Any such true normative claim would state some fact that is the 
same as some fact that could be stated by some other, non-
normative claim. 
(5) If these two claims stated the same fact, they would give us the 
same information. 
(6) This non-normative claim could not state a normative fact. 
Therefore 
If these two claims stated the same fact, by giving us the same 
information, this normative claim could not state a normative fact. 
Therefore 
Such normative claims could not, as these Naturalists believe, state 
facts that are both normative and natural. (339) 
 
If normative facts can also be stated by naturalistic, non-normative claims, as well as 
irreducibly normative claims, then irreducibly normative claims must give us the 
same information as these non-normative claims. Since non-normative claims are 
obviously unable to give us any normative information, if they give us the same 
information as irreducibly normative claims, irreducibly normative claims must not 
be able to give us any normative information either. Yet of course irreducibly 
normative claims can give us normative information. If normative naturalism entails 
that irreducibly normative claims state the same facts and therefore give us the same 
information as certain naturalistic, non-normative claims, Parfit argues, normative 
naturalism must be false. 
                                                            
112. Non-analytic naturalists are simply those who think that fundamental 
normative facts are analogous to (non-analytic) facts about natural kinds like the fact 
that water is H2O or that heat is molecular kinetic energy. 
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How might the naturalist respond to this argument? One way might be to 
simply deny premise (1) and maintain that even normative claims (and therefore 
normative concepts) are not irreducibly normative. Then, however, the naturalist 
would also have to maintain that fundamental normative truths are actually analytic 
truths that are true solely in virtue of the meanings of the terms involved. This 
would imply that, if a fundamental normative claim, such as the claim that right 
actions are those which maximize happiness, was true, this claim would be true 
entirely because the claim that a particular act is right means the same thing as the 
claim that this act would maximize happiness, in the same way that an analytic 
claim like “if it will rain tomorrow, then it will rain the day after today,” is true 
because “it will rain tomorrow” means the same thing as “it will rain the day after 
today.” On the most plausible account of analyticity, however, analytic claims have 
no content, that is, they do not give us any information at all, let alone normative 
information (Skorupski 2010, 167). This means that, if fundamental normative claims 
are uniformly analytic, they do not give us any normative information; and if 
fundamental normative claims do not give us normative information, it follows that 
non-fundamental/mixed normative claims (derived from fundamental normative 
claims plus non-normative claims) do not give us normative information either. 
Since, in this scenario, no normative claims would give us any normative 
information, such claims could not state normative facts, an outcome which is 
obviously fatal for the normative naturalist.113 
                                                            
113. Of course there are some analytic normative truths, such as, “a mother 
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Instead, the naturalist could deny premise (5) and maintain that normative 
and non-normative claims do not give us the same information even if they state the 
same facts. If we understand “fact” in the propositional sense, then of course two 
claims which state the same fact would give us the same information, because they 
would be the same proposition. But in the worldly sense, the same fact could be the 
truthmaker for two different claims that do not give us the same information 
because they present this fact in two different ways. “Hesperus is Hesperus” and 
“Hesperus is Phosphorus” state the same fact (in the worldly sense) but clearly do 
not give us the same information. In Fregean terms, these claims have the same 
referent (the fact that the planet Venus is the planet Venus, or just the planet Venus 
itself) but different senses and different cognitive value: “Hesperus is Phosphorus” 
allows us to get its truthmaker in mind in a way that “Hesperus is Hesperus” does 
not (even though they have the same truthmaker, i.e. the planet Venus114). For the 
naturalist, the normative claim that some act is right and the non-normative claim 
that this act would maximize happiness might have the same referent but different 
senses: they both have the same truthmaker but allow us to get this truthmaker in 
mind in different ways. These claims might consequently give us different 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
should do anything that all parents should do” (167). But such claims, like non-
normative analytic claims like “tomorrow is the day after today,” have no 
informational content, and if all fundamental normative claims were like this, the 
entire normative domain would have no informational content. 
 
114. Or perhaps the fact that Venus exists (in the ontological sense). See 
Chapter 4 (Section 4.3) for the distinction between the ontological and non-
ontological senses of “exist.” 
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information in spite of stating the same (worldly) fact. Parfit ignores this possibility 
probably because, as a minimalist, he does not believe in worldly normative facts, 
and so he assumes that normative facts are indistinguishable from true normative 
propositions, and irreducibly normative propositions are obviously not equivalent to 
propositional facts which are not irreducibly normative. 
But even if premise (5) is actually true, and claims which state the same fact 
must therefore give us the same information, I think the naturalist could still deny 
premise (3), and hence deny that facts that are both normative and natural must 
therefore be stated either by irreducibly normative claims or by naturalistic, non-
normative claims. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the way that a claim 
gives us a certain kind of information is by stating a certain kind of fact, if a claim 
states a normative fact, then it must be a normative claim, because it gives us 
normative information. For the same reason, if a claim states a natural fact, then it 
must be a natural claim. Therefore, if a claim states a fact that is both normative and 
natural (it gives us both normative and natural information) the claim itself must be 
both normative and natural. So the naturalist could say that, if a fundamental 
normative claim, such as the claim that right actions are those that maximize 
happiness, is true, then the obviously normative claim that an action is right 
nonetheless states a natural fact, the fact that the action maximizes happiness, and is 
therefore also a natural claim, and the obviously naturalistic claim that the action 
maximizes happiness nonetheless states a normative fact—the fact that the action is 
right—and is therefore also a normative claim. The first claim (that the action is 
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right), he might say, is obviously normative, but unobviously natural, whereas the 
second claim (that the action maximizes happiness) is obviously natural, but 
unobviously normative, since both these claims, according to the naturalist, state a 
fact that is both normative and natural. If the naturalist can say something like this, 
then Parfit’s Fact Stating Argument will fail, even if we accept that different kinds of 
claims cannot state the same facts by presenting these facts in different ways. 
Parfit might respond that the naturalist cannot actually say this, because to 
maintain that normative claims are also natural claims, because they state facts that 
are both normative and natural, would be to give up on the irreducible normativity 
of such claims, amounting to a rejection of premise (1) that we have already seen is 
untenable. If the normative claim that an action is right states the natural fact that 
this action maximizes happiness, this normative claim, the non-naturalist would 
argue, could not be an irreducibly normative claim. If normative claims stated natural 
facts, therefore, there would be no irreducibly normative claims, but, as the 
naturalist should agree, there clearly are such claims, and so these irreducibly 
normative claims could not state natural facts. Yet this response on the part of the 
non-naturalist simply assumes that a claim must either be natural or irreducibly 
normative—that it cannot be both. On the contrary, the naturalist could hold that a 
normative claim like the claim that an action is right is irreducibly normative in spite 
of being natural, and hence that it is both natural and, not just normative, but 
irreducibly normative as well: it is natural because it states a natural fact, and 
irreducibly normative because it uses an irreducibly normative concept (the concept 
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of being right). For the naturalist, a claim can be both natural and irreducibly 
normative precisely because the normative and the natural do not constitute 
fundamentally separate categories or domains. 
The non-naturalist might still object that, if an irreducibly normative claim, 
like the claim that an action is right, states a natural fact, like the fact that this action 
would maximize happiness, then, since this fact can also be stated simply by the 
claim that this action would maximize happiness, this claim must give us the same 
information as the irreducibly normative claim that the action is right. But if it did, 
then the claim that the action would maximize happiness would not only be a 
normative claim, but an irreducibly normative claim. And if this claim is an 
irreducibly normative claim, just like the claim that the action is right, then it must 
contain at least one irreducibly normative concept. Yet a clearly naturalistic claim 
such as the claim that an action maximizes happiness does not feature any 
irreducibly normative concepts. Therefore, according to the non-naturalist, this claim 
cannot be an irreducibly normative claim; hence it cannot convey the same 
information, or state the same fact, as the irreducibly normative claim that the action 
is right. 
If the claim that an action maximizes happiness is a normative claim as well 
as a naturalistic one, then it must contain at least one normative concept: if a claim is 
both natural and normative, it must contain at least one concept that is natural and 
at least one concept that is normative. And this should not pose a problem for the 
naturalist so long as there is already no problem with saying that some obviously 
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naturalistic claims are nonetheless (unobviously) normative—the concept of 
happiness, for instance, while clearly a naturalistic concept, could also be a 
normative concept (albeit unobviously). But could any such natural concept also be 
an irreducibly normative concept? A concept like happiness, it would seem, may be 
both natural and normative, but if it is indeed natural, it might be difficult to see 
how it could also be irreducibly normative. And if it could not be, the claim that an 
action maximizes happiness could not be an irreducibly normative claim, in which 
case it could not give us irreducibly normative information, and this threatens to 
entail the conclusion that it could not state the same fact as an irreducibly normative 
claim (such as the claim that the action is right). 
I don’t think this conclusion actually follows, however. On the one hand, it 
could be that all normative concepts are irreducibly normative, even if normative 
facts and properties are not, in which case, if the concept of maximizing happiness is 
indeed a normative concept, it is also an irreducibly normative one, just like the 
concept of being right. Perhaps the concept of maximizing happiness cannot be 
adequately explained or analyzed without invoking (other) normative concepts. But 
even if naturalistic concepts are not irreducibly normative, for the naturalist that 
Parfit is arguing against, the non-analytic naturalist, there are no irreducibly 
normative facts, so even irreducibly normative claims do not give us irreducibly 
normative information in the sense of stating irreducibly normative facts. For such a 
naturalist, the claim that an action maximizes happiness does not need to give us 
irreducibly normative information (in the sense of stating an irreducibly normative 
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fact) in order to state the same fact as an irreducibly normative claim (such as the 
claim that the action is right). So the issue becomes whether or not a claim that is 
irreducibly normative can state a fact which is not irreducibly normative. According 
to the non-analytic naturalist, the situation precisely is that facts that are not 
irreducibly normative can be and often are stated by irreducibly normative claims, 
because it is these claims, and the concepts featured in them, which are irreducibly 
normative, and not the (natural and normative) facts which they state or the (natural 
and normative) properties involved in these facts. This cannot be assumed to be 
impossible without begging the question against the non-analytic naturalist. And so 
I conclude that, like the Normativity Objection, the Fact Stating Argument fails. 
 
6.4. The Triviality Objection 
Parfit’s third and final argument against normative naturalism, the Triviality 
Objection, states that, if naturalism was true, and normative facts and properties 
were also natural facts and properties, no normative claim that is both substantive 
and positive could be true. In Parfit’s terms, normative claims are substantive and 
positive if they “state or imply that, when something has certain natural properties, 
this thing has some other, different, normative property,” and if they “are 
significant, because we might disagree with them, or they might tell us something 
we didn’t already know” (2011b, 343). And if there were, in this sense, no 
substantive, positive normative truths—no truths which tell us that something 
actually has a certain normative property, and which, in doing so, also tell us 
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something significant that we might not already know—there would not be any 
irreducibly normative truths either, from which it follows that no irreducibly 
normative claim could state any fact at all, let alone a natural fact (or a fact which is 
both natural and normative). This means that, if normative facts and properties are 
natural facts and properties, irreducibly normative claims could not state natural 
facts, but normative naturalism requires both that normative facts and properties are 
natural and that irreducibly normative claims can state such facts. Normative 
naturalism, therefore, must be false (if, that is, Parfit is right that no substantive, 
positive normative claim could be true if normative facts and properties were also 
natural facts and properties). 
Why couldn’t there be any substantive, positive normative truths (in Parfit’s 
sense) if normative facts and properties were also natural facts and properties? Parfit 
takes two paradigmatic claims that a normative naturalist might make: the 
(apparently) first-order normative claim (A) that “when some act would maximize 
happiness, this act is what we ought to do,” and the second-order, metanormative 
claim (C) that “when some act would maximize happiness, this property of this act is 
the same as the property of being what we ought to do” (343). He then argues that: 
(1) (A) is a substantive normative claim, which would, if it were true, state a 
positive substantive normative fact. 
(2) If … (C) were true, (A) could not state such a fact. (A) could not be used to 
imply that, when some act would maximize happiness, this act would 
have the different property of being what we ought to do, since (C) claims 
there is no such different property. Though (A) and (C) have different 
meanings, (A) would only be another way of stating the trivial fact that, 




Premises (1) and (2) form an inconsistent triad with the naturalist’s claim (C): by 
premise (2), if (C) was true, (A) would not be a substantive, positive normative claim 
(in Parfit’s sense)—it would not tell us that acts which maximize happiness also have 
the different property of being what we ought to do (because, according to (C), 
maximizing happiness is the same property as being what we ought to do). Yet, by 
premise (1), (A) is a substantive, positive normative claim. Therefore, either claim (C) 
is false, along with any equivalent metanormative claim that a naturalist might 
make, meaning that no normative property is the same as any natural property, or 
premise (1) is false, and claim (A), along with any other naturalistic, (apparently) 
first-order normative claim of this kind, is not in fact a substantive, positive 
normative claim. So if there were no non-natural, irreducibly normative properties, 
and all normative properties were the same as certain natural properties, there 
would be no substantive, positive normative truths, and therefore no irreducibly 
normative truths. 
Jackson’s response to this argument is to defend the significance of identity 
claims between natural properties and normative properties. According to Jackson 
(2016), to identify a certain natural property with the normative property of being 
right is not just to make the trivial claim that some property is the same as itself, but 
rather to say that this natural property fulfils a certain job description specified by 
the concept of being right, and since “it takes real work to find the natural property 
to identify with being right … the identification isn’t trivial” (207). He gives the 
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analogy of the concept of a random sequence in probability theory and statistics, 
where what it takes to be a random sequence is a controversial and difficult 
question. In this case, “when someone offers an account of what it takes to be a 
random sequence, the proposal isn’t that there are two properties, that of being a 
random sequence and that of being so and so, where so and so is the account on 
offer … [Rather, the proposal is that] there’s one property” (208). And yet such an 
account, whatever it might be, will clearly be far from trivial. In the normative case, 
therefore, the presence of only one property, to which concepts such as maximizing 
happiness and being right both refer, will not make the resulting identity claim 
trivial either. 
Identity claims between natural and normative properties are not trivial 
claims, even if they do effectively say that some property is the same as itself. Claim 
(A), no doubt, is not a trivial claim, even if claim (C) is true. If (C) is true, then (A) 
would not so much be another way of stating the trivial fact that, if some act would 
maximize happiness, this act would maximize happiness, but rather another way of 
stating the fact that (C)—that maximizing happiness is the same property as being 
what we ought to do. And (C) is clearly not a trivial claim: we might not know that 
being what we ought to do is the same property as maximizing happiness (indeed 
Parfit doesn’t know this) and this is something it might be hard for us to learn. But 
just to point out that either claim (A) or claim (C) is not a trivial claim is not an 
adequate response to Parfit’s argument, because although the argument is called the 
Triviality Objection, the objection it actually makes to normative naturalism is not 
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that it would make claims like (A) trivial, but that it would prevent such claims from 
being substantive, positive normative claims, and that it therefore implies that, not 
only are there no irreducibly normative facts and properties, but no irreducibly 
normative truths either. And, according to premise (1) of Parfit’s argument, claim 
(A) is a substantive, positive normative claim, and as we have already seen, even if 
there are no irreducibly normative facts (in the worldly sense), there must be some 
irreducibly normative truths if the normative domain is to have any meaningful 
content at all. 
If it is not enough to simply defend the non-triviality of identity claims like 
(C), how might the naturalist respond to the so-called Triviality Objection? The first 
thing to note is that whatever force this argument does have applies only to reductive 
forms of naturalism: those naturalistic theories which purport to metaphysically 
reduce normative properties to natural properties by identifying certain 
uncontroversially normative properties (such as the property of being what we 
ought to do) with certain uncontroversially natural properties (such as the property 
of maximizing happiness). It does not address non-reductive forms of naturalism 
which do not rely on identity claims between normative and natural properties like 
(C). Even if no claim like (C) was true, and no (uncontroversially) normative 
property was the same as any (uncontroversially) natural property, normative 
naturalism could still be true in the epistemic sense that fundamental normative 
knowledge can be acquired empirically and not just a priori as the non-naturalist 
believes. If we could know on the basis of inference to the best explanation that right 
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actions are those which maximize happiness, normative naturalism would still be 
true even if the property of being right was a completely different property from the 
property of maximizing happiness, and indeed was a different property from any 
uncontroversially natural property. As we observed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3), 
Epistemic Normative Naturalism is not the same thing as (metaphysical) normative 
reductionism. 
But even as an argument against reductionism, the Triviality Objection, I 
believe, still ultimately fails: even if a metanormative claim like (C) is true, this 
would not mean that there are no substantive, positive normative truths, nor that 
there are no irreducibly normative truths. Remember, according to Parfit, a 
normative claim is both substantive and positive when it tells us that something with 
certain natural properties has some other, different, normative property.115 And if (C) 
is true, and the property of being what we ought to do is the same property as the 
property of maximizing happiness, then the property of maximizing happiness will 
itself be a normative property as well as a natural property, just like the property of 
being what we ought to do. So if a truth tells us that some act, which has certain 
(other) natural properties, also has the normative (and natural) property of 
                                                            
115. “Different” here cannot mean different from all natural properties if 
Parfit’s criteria for a substantive, positive normative truth is not to be question-
begging. It must therefore simply mean different from certain other natural 
properties that the thing in question has; if a normative claim says that an act with a 
certain natural property also has a certain normative property which is different 
from that natural property, even if this normative property is itself a natural 
property, then this normative claim will come out as substantive and positive on 
Parfit’s definition. 
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maximizing happiness, then this will be a substantive, positive normative truth in 
Parfit’s sense. And it will also be a fundamental normative truth, since it will tell us 
that, whenever something has certain non-normative properties, such as the kind of 
non-normative properties that make an act have the property of maximizing 
happiness, it will thereby also have a certain normative property, such as (perhaps) 
the property of maximizing happiness.116 
There are certain identity claims between properties, at least one of which is a 
normative property, that do not seem to raise a problem for Parfit’s own version of 
non-naturalism. After all, Parfit himself (2011a) implies that the normative property 
of being a reason for something is the same property as the property of counting in 
favour of that thing (31).117 While this does make certain normative claims at least 
somewhat trivial (for instance, the claim that, if something is a reason for an act, then 
that thing also counts in favour of that act), it is far from making all fundamental 
normative claims trivial—any claim that says that something is a reason for an act, or 
that something counts in favour of an act, will be a substantive, positive normative 
claim, because both these kinds of claims informatively state that something (which 
no doubt has various non-normative properties) also has a particular normative 
                                                            
116. Recall Streumer’s definition of fundamental normative truths (2017) as 
“normative truths that obtain independently of which objects have which 
descriptive [or non-normative] properties” (34). 
 
117. In his words, “[i]t is hard to explain the concept of a reason, or what the 
phrase ‘a reason’ means. Facts give us reasons, we might say, when they count in 
favour of our having some attitude, or acting in some way. But ‘counts in favour of’ 
means roughly ‘gives a reason for’” (31). 
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property, even if this property is in fact the same property as some “other” 
(normative) property. And this is exactly the scenario that obtains under (reductive) 
normative naturalism: fundamental normative claims say that something with 
various non-normative properties also has a particular normative property (such as 
the property of being what we ought to do), which may be the same as some “other” 
normative property (such as, for some naturalists, the property of maximizing 
happiness), even if this property is also a natural property. Even for Parfit, the truth 
of “normative property = normative property” identity claims does not threaten the 
substantive and positive status of fundamental normative truths (nor indeed do 
“natural property = natural property” identity claims); it is supposed to be only 
“normative property = natural property” identity claims that do this. But, for the 
reductive naturalist, “normative property = natural property” identity claims are 
“normative property = normative property identity claims” (and “natural property = 
natural property” identity claims as well, of course). And since these identity claims 
do not undermine the substantive and positive status of fundamental normative 
claims, naturalistic metanormative claims like (C) need not do so either, and thus the 
truth of a claim like (C) should not imply that there are no irreducibly normative 
truths. 
Parfit might still object that, even though reductionism does in fact allow for 
substantive positive normative claims and irreducibly normative truths, it would 
still imply that claim (A) is not a substantive, positive normative claim, and since (A) 
is a substantive, positive normative claim (by Parfit’s premise (1)), reductionism 
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must be false. After all, the claim that, when some act would maximize happiness, 
this act is what we ought to do, certainly looks like a first-order normative claim that 
is both substantive and positive. But if reductionism is true, and hence claim (C) is 
true, claim (A) would be no more of a substantive, positive normative claim than the 
claim that, when something is a reason for an act, that thing counts in favour of that 
act, or the claim that, when some act is what we ought to do, this act is right.118 And 
these claims are not substantive, positive normative claims, and so, contrary to 
appearances, (A) would not be a substantive, positive normative claim either. 
Embracing reductive naturalism would therefore mean giving up on the substantive, 
positive normative status of certain claims like (A) which nonetheless seem to 
possess this status. For this reason, reductionism does involve some loss of 
plausibility points—having the somewhat implausible implication that the utilitarian 
claim that, when some act would maximize happiness, this act is what we ought to 
do, does not actually give us any positive normative information—but this is far 
from a knock-down argument against reductionism, and we have already seen that 
non-naturalism comes with its own loss of plausibility points in other areas, 
parsimony being foremost among them. 
 
                                                            
118. Claim (A) may be more substantive than these claims in the sense that it 
is less obviously true then they are, but it would not be any more of a positive 
normative claim, because none of these claims tells us that something has some 
normative property because it has some different, non-normative property. 
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6.5. Conclusion 
The Triviality Objection fails as an argument against normative naturalism for 
basically the same reason that the Normativity Objection and the Fact Stating 
Argument fail: they all end up simply assuming that natural facts and properties 
cannot be normative facts and properties. If an uncontroversially natural property, 
like the property of maximizing happiness, was also a normative property (albeit 
unobviously), then a property identity claim such as “maximizing happiness is the 
same thing as being what we ought to do” could well be analogous to a natural kind 
identity claim like “water is H2O,” and not to an obviously absurd claim like “heat is 
a shade of blue.” If the natural fact that some act would maximize happiness was 
also a normative fact, this fact could well be stated by an irreducibly normative 
claim, such as the claim that this act is right. If maximizing happiness was also a 
normative property, claims that say that some act maximizes happiness would be 
substantive, positive normative claims, because they would say that something, 
which no doubt has certain non-normative properties (or other natural properties), 
also has a certain normative property (even if this property is also a natural 
property), just like the claim that some act is what we ought to do. And if the claim 
that some act maximizes happiness could indeed be a substantive, positive 
normative claim, then the claim that this act is what we ought to do could be an 
irreducibly normative truth, even if what makes it true is an entirely natural fact: the 
fact that this act would maximize happiness. 
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Of course one might think that a natural property like maximizing happiness 
is just too different from any normative property to be a normative property itself, 
but in light of the fact that normative properties very much seem to interact with 
natural properties, this just-too-different intuition just does not have enough force to 
provide good support for non-naturalism. One might also wonder what it would 
even mean for a property like maximizing happiness to be a normative property, but 
if maximizing happiness really is a normative property, this could be explained 
precisely by the fact that this property is the same property as some obviously 
normative property, such as the property of being what we ought to do. Thus I 
conclude that the kind of conceptual and metaphysical considerations that Parfit 
appeals to in his arguments are not in fact a problem for normative naturalism. If 
non-naturalism is actually the more plausible view, I believe, this must be for 
epistemological, rather than metaphysical, reasons. In the next chapter, therefore, we 




7. Normative Explanations 
 
If normative facts and properties can interact with and affect non-normative 
facts and properties, normative facts should also be able to explain why certain non-
normative facts obtain. If a certain non-normative fact is in part counterfactually 
dependent on a certain normative fact,119 then part of what explains why that 
particular non-normative fact obtains is not just other non-normative facts but also a 
normative fact. As such, we should sometimes have reason to believe that a certain 
normative fact obtains because it is an indispensable part of the best explanation for 
a certain non-normative fact (or facts). And if normative knowledge can be acquired 
in this way through inference to the best explanation from non-normative, empirical 
facts, this knowledge will itself qualify as a branch of empirical knowledge, not 
different in kind from knowledge of the “irreducible posits” of natural science, like 
subatomic particles and forces of nature (Quine 1980, 44-45). 
We have seen that many of our responses do seem to be counterfactually 
dependent on normative facts and properties (Chapter 4, Section 4.5). But 
nonetheless, many think that the empirical, explanatory model of knowledge 
appropriate to the natural sciences is simply inapplicable to the normative domain. 
                                                            
119. If I would not have stopped my car at the red light “but for” the 
normative fact that I had a reason to stop at the red light, to return to Temkin’s 
example (2016, 5). 
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And this, I believe, is the main challenge for normative naturalism: to explain how 
we can draw plausible normative conclusions from non-normative, empirical facts 
alone, without relying on implicit, a priori normative assumptions in order to do so. 
Hume thought that no normative conclusions could be drawn from purely non-
normative, empirical premises without relying, implicitly or explicitly, on at least 
one purely normative, non-empirical premise—you cannot go from an “is” to an 
“ought,” as the saying goes. If I ought to push the blue button, Hume would say, this 
cannot be concluded just from the natural fact that pushing the blue button would 
maximize happiness; we also need the purely normative premise that what I ought 
to do is maximize happiness. And how can we conclude that what I ought to do is 
maximize happiness (or anything else for that matter) on the basis of empirical 
evidence alone, without relying on some further normative premise or taking that 
normative premise itself as epistemically basic, and hence as a priori and non-
natural? 
In my attempt to answer this question and meet what we might call the 
“Humean challenge” to normative naturalism, I will start by considering Sturgeon’s 
moral explanations argument in Section 7.1. Although I of course agree with 
Sturgeon that there are correct normative explanations for empirical facts, Sturgeon’s 
well-known examples do not actually show what the naturalist needs to show: that 
fundamental normative knowledge can be acquired on the basis of observation and 
IBE. For the non-naturalist, fundamental normative facts play no role whatsoever in 
explaining non-normative, empirical facts, and thus IBE is never the method we use 
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to acquire fundamental normative knowledge. For some non-naturalists, normative 
knowledge is always the product of the “reflective equilibrium” method originally 
described by John Rawls. In Scanlon’s words (2003), “this method, properly 
understood, is … the best way of making up one’s mind about moral [or normative] 
matters … Indeed, it is the only defensible method: apparent alternatives to it are 
illusory” (149). Other non-naturalists endorse an intuitionist model of normative 
knowledge, according to which certain fundamental normative truths are 
epistemically basic and self-evident, and may even be conceptual truths. According 
to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014), certain moral propositions, which they call “the 
moral fixed points,” are conceptual truths: truths that are known a priori solely on the 
basis of understanding the concepts involved (normative and non-normative) and 
the necessary relations between them (405).120 We do not arrive at knowledge of 
these truths either by using IBE or through a process of seeking reflective 
equilibrium; rather, we immediately and intuitively grasp that the concepts involved 
in these propositions necessitate that they must be true. 
In Sections 7.2 and 7.3, I will argue that the reflective equilibrium method 
cannot be taken as a basic method of forming justified normative beliefs, and that, as 
far as the non-naturalist is concerned, it must be underpinned by some form of 
foundationalist intuitionism. In Section 7.4, I will argue that the non-naturalist 
should regard fundamental normative truths as conceptual truths, after the fashion 
                                                            
120. A couple of examples of these so-called moral fixed points are: “It is pro 
tanto wrong to engage in recreational slaughter of a fellow person,” and “It is pro 
tanto wrong to torture others just because they have inconvenienced you” (405). 
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of Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, but that the substantive nature of the conceptual truths 
in question means that the non-naturalist still needs a further account of how these 
truths are known in the first place. To this effect, in Section 7.5, I will outline what I 
believe to be the most plausible non-naturalistic account of normative knowledge: 
Skorupski’s spontaneity and convergence account, according to which warranted 
normative beliefs are those that are based on normative dispositions which are not 
the product of “debunking” causal explanations and which converge sufficiently 
well with the normative dispositions of others. I will then supply a critique of this 
account in Section 7.6, arguing that, on its own terms, it actually ends up implying 
that normative knowledge can be acquired on the basis of IBE, and thus that there 
are correct normative explanations for non-normative, empirical facts. This in turn 
implies that our normative dispositions are themselves causal responses, contrary to 
the very hypothesis of normative non-naturalism. 
Finally, in Section 7.7, I will explicitly make the argument that IBE can take us 
to knowledge of fundamental normative truths. In particular, I will argue that we 
cannot adequately explain why conscious beings respond in the specific ways that 
they do to the specific kinds of feelings and sensations they experience without 
positing that these feelings and sensations have normative properties. We can know 
the fundamental normative truth that agony always gives us a reason to want and to 
try to avoid it, because this offers the most plausible explanation of why conscious 
beings (at least those that actually know what agony is like) universally want to 
avoid agony. 
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The thrust of my argument is partly inspired by Mill’s famous (or infamous) 
“proof” of the Principle of Utility. As a proponent of the “inductive” school of ethics, 
according to which “right and wrong, as well as truth and falsehood, are questions 
of observation and experience” (50), Mill (1998) claimed “that happiness is desirable, 
and the only thing desirable, as an end.” In defence of this principle, he argued that 
The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people 
actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: 
and so of the other sources of our experiences. In like manner, I apprehend, 
the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that 
people actually desire it. (81) 
 
In Humean fashion, Russell dismissed this reasoning as committing an obvious 
fallacy. As Russell (2004) understands Mill, “[h]e does not notice that a thing is 
‘visible’ if it can be seen, but ‘desirable’ if it ought to be desired. Thus ‘desirable’ is a 
word presupposing an ethical theory; we cannot infer what is desirable from what is 
desired” (741). 
What Russell did not notice, however, is that Mill was not making a deductive 
inference from the premise that happiness is desired to the conclusion that it is 
desirable: of course the (empirical) fact that happiness is desired does not entail the 
(normative) conclusion that happiness is desirable. But Mill is more charitably (and 
more plausibly) interpreted as meaning that this fact constitutes pro tanto evidence 
for the conclusion that happiness is desirable, not that it deductively entails it. In his 
words: 
No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that 
each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own 
happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which 
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the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a 
good. (1998, 81) 
 
And I think Mill was right: the fact that happiness is desired does constitute good 
evidence for the conclusion that happiness is desirable. If happiness ought to be 
desired as an end in itself, it must be the very nature of happiness that makes it the 
case that happiness ought to be desired in this way. And if happiness ought to be 
desired, not as a means to something else but for itself by its very nature, we would 
expect the kinds of beings who (to some extent at least) are capable of experiencing 
happiness, who know by direct experience what happiness is like, and who are 
therefore well acquainted with the intrinsic nature of happiness, precisely to have a 
strong desire for happiness. If it turned out, on the contrary, that these beings did not 
have any desire for happiness at all, this would surely falsify the hypothesis that 
happiness is intrinsically desirable: it would be incredible that beings who know 
exactly what happiness is like (and who are not completely insane, let’s say) 
nonetheless fail to have any desire for happiness if happiness is indeed intrinsically 
desirable. But if, on the other hand, these beings do universally possess a strong 
desire for happiness—as a result of their direct acquaintance with happiness and its 
nature—I believe this is evidence for the hypothesis that happiness actually is 
desirable: it confirms a falsifiable prediction that this hypothesis genuinely seems to 
make. And if there is no more plausible alternative explanation for the fact that 
happiness is desired (and hence no significant evidence against the hypothesis that 
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happiness is desirable), this evidence should be enough to indicate that this 
hypothesis is likely to be true. 
Yet I think we can ultimately vindicate normative naturalism without relying 
on Mill’s contentious assumption that happiness—defined simply as “pleasure, and 
the absence of pain” (55)—is the only thing desired for its own sake (rather than, say, 
freedom, integrity, or meaning). Even if it is far from clear that everyone desires a 
positive balance of pleasure over pain, it seems perfectly clear that everyone has 
some desire to avoid intense agony. And if agony is intrinsically undesirable and by 
its nature ought to be avoided for its own sake, this is exactly what we would expect 
to find: that beings like us, who know exactly what it’s like to experience agony and 
who are thus directly acquainted with its nature, would always have at least some 
desire to avoid agony. This observation should therefore give us hope of placing 
normative knowledge on a firmly empirical basis. 
 
7.1. Normative facts and best explanations 
Taking after the “inductive” tradition of Mill, Nicholas Sturgeon (1988) 
purports to show that there can be empirical evidence for normative facts on the 
grounds that normative facts feature in the best explanations for certain non-
normative, empirical facts. According to Sturgeon, the best explanation (or part of 
the best explanation) for the non-normative fact that 
vigorous and widespread moral opposition to slavery arose for the first time 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, even though slavery was a very 
old institution … [and that] this opposition arose primarily in Britain, France, 
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and in French- and English-speaking North America, even though slavery 
existed throughout the New World … is [the normative fact] that chattel 
slavery in British and French America, and then in the United States, was 
much worse than previous forms of slavery, and much worse than slavery in 
Latin America. (245) 
 
If chattel slavery in North America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had 
not been much worse than previous forms of slavery, there would not have been 
such vigorous and widespread opposition to slavery at that time. The severe badness 
of this form of slavery was presumably not the only factor that contributed to such 
vigorous and widespread opposition. But if there really are normative facts, and if 
these normative facts really do have causal standing (as I argued in Chapters 2, 3 
and 4), then surely this normative fact was at least one of the contributing factors to 
this opposition. And since we know on empirical grounds that opposition to slavery 
was indeed as vigorous and widespread as it actually was (at that time), we are also 
in a position to know the normative fact that chattel slavery in North America was 
much worse than previous forms of slavery on the basis of observation and IBE, 
without having to rely on a priori normative assumptions.121 122 
                                                            
121. One could argue that inference to the best explanation is itself an a priori 
normative truth, but as we suggested in Chapter 3, the reason to accept IBE as a 
legitimate or reliable form of inference in the first place probably derives from a 
combination of empirical observation and IBE itself (the observation that IBE usually 
works by leading us to have true beliefs, plus inference to the best explanation of that 
observation that IBE is probably a legitimate or reliable form of inference), and thus 
it is not a purely a priori truth, even if it is a normative one. 
 
122. Those who actually engaged in the vigorous and widespread opposition 
to slavery at that time presumably were not basing their knowledge that slavery is 
wrong on IBE from the empirical fact of their own opposition, but the point of the 
example is that normative truths can be known on the basis of IBE, not that they 
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Examples like this seem clearly to show that normative knowledge can be 
acquired a posteriori. But even if we do know certain normative facts, such as the fact 
that chattel slavery in eighteenth and nineteenth century North America was 
particularly bad, or that Hitler was a morally depraved person (234), on the basis of 
IBE,123 this will not be enough to establish that normative knowledge is in-and-of-
itself a form of empirical knowledge. As in the debate between the normative 
minimalist and the Robust Realist, it is the status of fundamental or pure normative 
truths and facts that is at issue between the naturalist and the non-naturalist.124 A 
normative fact like the fact that Hitler was morally depraved is not a fundamental 
but rather a mixed normative fact, and mixed normative facts can of course be 
known empirically because they are in part empirical facts: if we didn’t have 
empirical knowledge about who Hitler was and what he did, we wouldn’t know 
that Hitler was a morally depraved person, so this normative fact cannot be known 
purely a priori. But just because mixed normative facts, which partly depend on 
uncontroversially empirical facts, are not purely a priori does not mean that 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
must be. And even for those who opposed slavery at the time, one of the things that 
caused them to believe that slavery was wrong would have been the normative fact 
that slavery is wrong, so their knowledge would have had a causal basis even if it 
was not based on IBE. 
 
123. In the Hitler case, from the empirical fact that he did the things that he 
did. 
 
124. The epistemic status in the present case, the ontological status in the 
previous case. 
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fundamental normative facts are not a priori or that they can ever be known 
empirically. 
 
7.2. Reflective equilibrium 
Let’s turn to the reflective equilibrium method. What exactly does this 
method involve? For the non-naturalist, remember, the normative is a completely 
autonomous domain; Gilbert Harman (2000) describes the approach involved in 
what he calls “autonomous ethics” as one in which 
We begin with our initial moral beliefs and search for general principles. Our 
initial opinions can be changed to some extent so as to come into agreement 
with appealing general principles and our beliefs about the facts, but an 
important aspect of the appeal of such principles will be the way in which 
they account for what we already accept. (81) 
 
For Scanlon (2014), this basic method applies not only to the moral or normative 
domains, but to non-normative domains like set theory as well. As he describes it, 
“[o]ne begins by identifying a set of considered judgements, at any level of 
generality, about the subject in question. These are judgements that seem clearly to 
be correct and seem so under conditions that are conducive to making good 
judgments of the relevant kind about this subject matter.” Next, “we formulate 
general principles that would ‘account for’ these judgements … principles such that, 
had one simply been trying to apply them, rather than trying directly to decide what 
is the case about the subject at hand, one would have been led to the same set of 
judgements.” If these general principles conflict with our (specific) judgements, we 
must decide “whether to give up the judgements that the principles fail to account 
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for, to modify the principles, in hopes of achieving a better fit, or to do some 
combination of these things” (77). And we continue this process indefinitely until we 
achieve a state of coherence between our general principles and our specific 
judgements, at which point we are justified in concluding that our normative 
principles and judgements constitute knowledge. 
The reflective equilibrium method has coherentist implications for normative 
knowledge. In this process, although we may start with certain specific judgements 
or general principles that are not inferred from anything else, these judgements and 
principles can always be given up if they turn out to conflict with other judgements 
or principles that we find more plausible. No normative judgement or principle, this 
suggests, is truly foundational or self-evident. The non-naturalist who defends the 
reflective equilibrium method may argue that it is enough if our normative 
judgements and principles are consistent, with each other and with our (justified) 
non-normative beliefs, for them to qualify as knowledge, although none of them can 
be considered foundational or self-evident. Even if there are no self-evident 
normative truths, there may be no self-evident non-normative truths either, in which 
case, our normative beliefs would be epistemically on par with our non-normative 
beliefs, so long as these two sets of beliefs are internally consistent and do not 
conflict with each other. If coherentism is broadly the correct theory of knowledge, 
and thus there is no need for our scientific beliefs to possess some kind of ultimate 
justification prior to the natural sciences themselves, there may also be no need for 
our normative beliefs to be justified in non-normative terms (by being supported by 
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or inferred from purely empirical premises, for instance, as the naturalist thinks they 
can be). And if scientific knowledge does not rest on a bedrock of self-evident non-
normative, empirical truths, normative knowledge might not require a bedrock of 
self-evident normative truths either.125 
Yet the non-naturalist requires not only that normative knowledge can be 
acquired using the reflective equilibrium method, but also, as Scanlon says, that 
there is no alternative to this method—that fundamental normative knowledge 
cannot also be acquired using IBE.126 Even if our normative beliefs are justified so 
long as they cohere with each other and do not conflict with our (justified) non-
normative beliefs, this does not mean that fundamental normative knowledge 
cannot be acquired empirically. It is not incompatible with normative naturalism 
that some normative knowledge can be acquired just by reflection, without relying 
on empirical observation or the explanation thereof. Normative truths that are 
knowable a priori might also be knowable through naturalistic means, or there may 
be other (fundamental) normative truths that can be known empirically, even if there 
are some purely a priori normative truths that can’t. 
 
                                                            
125. Such as Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s moral fixed points. 
 
126. That is, knowledge of fundamental or pure normative truths. The non-
naturalist should admit that knowledge of mixed normative truths can be acquired 
using IBE, specifically in order to determine the specific (non-normative) facts of the 
case on which these mixed normative truths depend. 
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7.3. The need for intuition 
For the non-naturalist, of course, fundamental normative truths are known a 
priori, and only a priori. But not all normative judgements can be known to be true a 
priori: when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these 
judgements is correct (Streumer 2017, 6-7).127 How do we tell which (fundamental) 
normative judgements represent genuine a priori truths, or which we are warranted 
in taking to be genuine a priori truths? Parfit (2011a) takes it to be an a priori truth 
that, in his words, “[w]e all have a reason to want to avoid, and to try to avoid, all 
future agony” (76), even in cases where “I know that some future event would cause 
me to have some period of agony,” and “[e]ven after ideal deliberation, I have no 
desire to avoid this agony. Nor do I have any other desire or aim whose fulfilment 
would be prevented either by this agony, or by my having no desire to avoid this 
agony” (73-74).128 When he considers the possibility that someone might deny this 
and instead claim that, in cases like the above, “though the approaching flames 
threaten to cause me excruciating pain, this fact does not count in favour of my 
wanting and trying to move my hand away,” his response is simply to say: “that is 
hard to believe” (81). 
                                                            
127. Streumer takes this claim to be one of the central thoughts about 
normative judgements and properties, which reflects the nature of these judgements 
and properties (6-7). 
 
128. The point being that we have a reason to want to avoid, and to try to 
avoid, agony, not just because avoiding agony would fulfil our desires, but because 
of the nature of agony itself. 
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It is not enough simply to appeal to reflective equilibrium here. As Scanlon 
himself says, “the justificatory force of the fact that we have arrived at certain 
judgements in reflective equilibrium depends on the substantive merits of the 
judgements we make along the way” (2014, 82). After all, “different people, applying 
this method about the same subject, may reach different reflective equilibria” (79), 
and thus accept conflicting normative judgements which, by this criterion alone, 
would both be equal candidates for a priori knowledge. Parfit would probably say 
that his normative judgement that we all have a reason to want to avoid, and to try 
to avoid, future agony (let’s call it “the Agony Principle”) has the same basic 
epistemic status as logical truths like modus ponens or the law of non-contradiction, 
and thus it needs no further justification or evidence to support it.129 But as we 
learned from Sher (2013) in Chapter 5 (Section 5.3), logical truths may not be 
epistemically basic and a priori, but known empirically on the basis of IBE (from how 
logical principles work in the real world as they they are used in doing things like 
flying airplanes, computing salaries, etc.) (160). And even if logical truths are 
knowable a priori, this does not mean that they are not knowable a posteriori as well. 
The reflective equilibrium method, moreover, fits better with the minimalistic, 
ontologically light account of normative truth that Parfit and Scanlon favour, 
according to which there are normative truths, but not robust or worldly normative 
                                                            
129. Specifically, Parfit (2011b) claims that “we cannot give helpful arguments 
for Non-Contradiction or Modus Ponens, nor could we have any direct reasons to 
believe these truths. These and some other logical truths are too fundamental to be 
supportable in such ways.” But nonetheless, “our belief in such truths can be fully 
justified” (508-509). 
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facts and properties. If normative truths do not have truthmakers, it makes more 
sense for the coherence of our normative beliefs (with each other and with our non-
normative beliefs) to be sufficient for them to amount to knowledge, but it makes far 
less sense if our normative beliefs have to correspond to robust or worldly 
normative facts in order to be true. After all, under Robust Realism, our normative 
beliefs could in principle be fully coherent but completely out of touch with the 
(robust or worldly) normative facts. We have already seen that the robust form of 
metanormative realism is more plausible than the minimalistic form (Chapter 4). 
Since our responses are sometimes counterfactually dependent on the normative 
facts and properties, normative knowledge must involve some kind of interaction 
between us and these normative facts and properties. An adequate account of 
normative knowledge, therefore, must explain how this interaction is supposed to 
work, and a mere appeal to reflective equilibrium does not provide this explanation. 
As Scanlon suggests, normative judgements need to have “substantive merits” 
independent of reflective equilibrium itself for reflective equilibrium to even be 
relevant in the first place. If non-naturalism is true and these substantive merits, 
prior to reflective equilibrium itself, are not empirical in nature, then they clearly 
involve some kind of intuitive warrant that normative judgements must possess in 
order to be candidates for knowledge. So the non-naturalist needs an intuitionist 
account of normative knowledge, going beyond reflective equilibrium to confirm the 
a priori truth of certain fundamental normative judgements, while at the same time 
ruling out the possibility that these truths can also be known a posteriori. 
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7.4. Are (fundamental) normative truths conceptual truths? 
Take a fundamental normative proposition like the moral proposition that 
“[i]t is pro tanto wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a fellow person” 
(Cuneo and Shafer-Landau 2014, 405) or perhaps the instrumental principle that 
“there is a reason for a’s G-ing, or … a has a reason to G, if G-ing would lead to the 
fulfilment of some desire or purpose or ideal that a now has, and a knows this” 
(Mackie 1990, 77),130 or indeed the Agony Principle itself. If these propositions are 
conceptual truths—true by virtue of the concepts involved and the necessary 
relations between them—this would provide the non-naturalist with the intuitionist 
model of normative knowledge he needs. The intuitive warrant a normative 
judgement must possess in order to be a candidate for a priori knowledge could then 
be explained in terms of grasping the concepts involved in the judgement; to “intuit” 
that a normative judgement is true would be to grasp, or seem to grasp, its 
constituent concepts and the necessary relations between them. According to Parfit, 
some of our beliefs, including some of our normative beliefs, are “self-evidently true, 
in the sense that, if we fully understand these beliefs, we can recognize that they are, 
or must be, true.” If a belief is true entirely by virtue of the concepts involved in it 
and the relations between them, it is no wonder that we can know that this belief is 
(and indeed must be) true simply by fully understanding the content of this belief. 
                                                            
130. I am assuming for the sake of argument that this is a normative claim, 
rather than a non-normative, “hypothetical” reasons claim. See Chapter 2 (Section 
2.3) for the distinction between normative and hypothetical reasons. 
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Parfit actually suggests that substantive normative truths “are self-evidently true, 
not because their truth is implied by the concepts they involve, but because it is so 
obvious that these claims are, or must be, true.” But he seems to think that 
conceptual truths are the same thing as analytic truths, and thus that substantive 
normative truths cannot be conceptual truths because they are not analytic (2011b, 
508).131 Conceptual truths, however, are not necessarily analytic: that nothing can be 
both red and green all over at the same time is a not an analytic truth, but it is 
nonetheless a conceptual one. And if fundamental normative truths are uniformly 
synthetic and (purely) a priori, and are known to be true solely because they seem 
obviously true when they are adequately understood,132 then it would make sense if 
they had the same status as the truth that nothing can be both red and green all over 
(at the same time) and other conceptual truths. 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau outline four “marks” of a conceptual truth. The 
first is that “p is, if true, necessarily true,” the second, that “p enjoys framework 
status, fixing the boundaries as to what counts as a type of subject matter,” and the 
third, that “p’s denial would tend to promote bewilderment among those competent 
                                                            
131. The status of analytic normative truths is not something that is at issue 
between the naturalist and the non-naturalist. The naturalist can accept that analytic 
normative truths (such as the truth that murder is wrong, “murder” being defined as 
a wrongful killing) are purely a priori, just like non-normative analytic truths. 
 
132. I say seems obviously true, because, as Parfit acknowledges, “when some 
belief seems to us self-evidently true, we may be mistaken. Such beliefs may be 
false.” Parfit, 508. The non-naturalist does not need our foundational normative 
beliefs to be infallible, only that, when some fundamental normative proposition 
seems to us to be obviously true if we fully understand this belief, this gives us 
reason to accept this proposition. 
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with its constituent concepts—a response to the effect that its denial would be almost 
crazy” (2014, 407-408).133 If p exemplifies all of these marks, this may not entail that p 
is a conceptual truth, but it does give us good reason to believe that it is (408). The 
proposition that it is pro tanto wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a 
fellow person does seem to exemplify all these marks. If it is true, it is probably a 
necessary truth: it is not as if recreational slaughter just happens to be wrong in this 
particular world, and yet is somehow not wrong in other possible worlds. It 
probably “enjoys framework status” in the sense that it must be true unless there is 
something fundamentally wrong with the relevant discourse: if you engage in moral 
discourse but claim that it is not even pro tanto wrong to engage in the recreational 
slaughter of another person, you are probably not actually employing the moral 
concept “wrong” and are instead suffering from a conceptual confusion.134 
Moreover, if you were to deny this proposition to anyone who engages in moral 
                                                            
133. The fourth mark is that “p is knowable a priori, simply by adequately 
understanding its constituent concepts and their relations to one another” (408). But 
whether or not fundamental normative truths are a priori is of course the very thing 
at issue here, and in any case, it is not clear why Cuneo and Shafer-Landau think 
that being knowable by adequately understanding its constituent concepts and their 
relations to one another is a mark of a conceptual truth, rather than just being what a 
conceptual truth is. 
 
134. Cuneo and Shafer-Landau compare this to the situation with a 
proposition like “God is a perfect being.” This proposition is bound to be true unless 
there is something fundamentally wrong with the relevant discourse (theological 
discourse in this case, for instance because God does not exist), and if you engage in 
theological discourse (and therefore assume that there is nothing fundamentally 
wrong with it) but yet reject the proposition that God is a perfect being, this 
probably indicates that you are not actually using the theological concept “God” 
(408). 
201 
discourse and is competent with its concepts, your denial would indeed seem crazy. 
The same kind of things could be said about the instrumental principle: it is 
probably a necessary truth that, if G-ing would fulfil some goal of yours (and you 
know this), then you have at least some reason to G, and if you were to deny this to 
anyone who engages in the discourse of practical rationality, your denial would 
seem crazy and would probably indicate that you are not actually using the concept 
of a practical reason. And Parfit suggests something very similar about the Agony 
Principle: “[i]f we can have some reasons, nothing is clearer than the truth that, in 
the reason-implying sense, it is bad to be in agony” (2011a, 82). So there clearly is 
some reason to believe that fundamental normative propositions such as these are 
conceptual truths. 
If fundamental normative truths are conceptual truths, this would also 
answer Copp’s main argument against normative non-naturalism: that no synthetic 
normative proposition can be strongly a priori (i.e. empirically indefeasible), because 
disagreement can always supply an epistemic defeater for any (synthetic) normative 
proposition. According to Copp (2007), “our warrant for believing a proposition can 
be undermined or weakened by the disagreement of others in cases in which we 
have no independent reason to think we are in a better epistemic position than they 
are” (48-49), and since disagreement is an empirical phenomenon, disagreement 
about a proposition always constitutes (at least some) empirical evidence against it. 
Unless, that is, disagreement “would not affect the credibility of the proposition to an 
ideal thinker—a thinker who had no psychological weaknesses or computational 
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limitations and who had a full conceptual repertoire.” And Copp suggests that 
disagreements about (synthetic) normative propositions are never due to 
psychological weaknesses or computational limitations or the lack of a full 
conceptual repertoire, such that these disagreements would not affect the credibility 
of these propositions to an ideal thinker.135 His sole reason for holding this view, 
however, seems to be nothing but the fact that these propositions are synthetic, 
combined with the idea that, if the denial of a proposition could only issue from 
conceptual confusion, then this proposition must be analytic (51). Like Parfit, Copp 
makes the mistake of conflating conceptual truths with analytic truths.136 Conceptual 
normative truths could be both synthetic and such as could not be rejected in the 
absence of a conceptual confusion. Disagreement about these propositions would 
not affect their credibility to an ideal thinker, who suffers from no conceptual 
confusions, and thus would not qualify as empirical evidence against them. 
                                                            
135. Copp actually only refers to moral propositions and moral disagreement, 
but his argument is just as relevant for normative propositions as a whole. 
 
136. Cuneo and Shafer-Landau hold that 
 
some conceptual truths have substantive content and needn’t be obvious. The 
moral fixed points are hardly empty tautologies, but that doesn’t distinguish 
them from many non-moral propositions plausibly viewed as conceptual 
truths. That justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge; that God’s 
possible existence entails God’s necessary existence; that meaningful 
statements may be neither empirically verifiable nor analytic—these are 
substantive truths, surely, and yet also good candidates for being conceptual 
ones. (2014, 408) 
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Conceptual, synthetic normative truths would remain “strongly a priori” (2007, 43) 
even in the face of substantial normative disagreement.137 
I think the non-naturalist should say that fundamental normative truths—and 
all synthetic a priori truths for that matter—are conceptual truths. If a truth is both 
synthetic and a priori, it must tell us that at least two entirely separate properties are 
nonetheless necessarily connected in some way. And if the connection between these 
two separate properties is not something that we can access empirically, then our 
epistemic access to this connection must come from our access to our mental 
representations of these properties—that is, to our concepts. If our concepts 
adequately represent the relevant properties, they must represent the necessary 
connection between these properties, and thus there must be also a necessary 
connection between the concepts themselves. To fully understand a proposition, 
after all, is to fully understand its concepts and the relations between them, and thus, 
if I know that a proposition is true solely by understanding this proposition, then the 
concepts involved in this proposition must be sufficient for me to know that the 
proposition is true. I know that nothing can be both red and green all over (at the 
same time) because my concepts of red and green (and of space and time) are 
adequate mental representations of these properties, and the necessary relations 
between these mental representations—these concepts—thus reflect the necessary 
                                                            
137. A strongly a priori truth being one that is a) weakly a priori, which means 
that it can be reasonably believed in the absence of empirical evidence, and b) 
empirically indefeasible, which means that it admits of no empirical evidence against it 
(42). 
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relations between the actual properties. Suppose I have adequate concepts of being 
(pro tanto) wrong and of slaughtering a fellow person for recreational purposes; if I 
know a priori that it is pro tanto wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a 
fellow person, then the adequacy of my concepts and my understanding of them 
must tell me that, whenever the concept of recreationally slaughtering a fellow 
person adequately represents something, the concept of being (pro tanto) wrong will 
also adequately represent this same thing, even though neither of these concepts is 
actually contained within the other. 
Assuming that fundamental normative truths are conceptual truths, therefore, 
the question for the non-naturalist then becomes, “how do we know that our mental 
representations of the relevant properties are adequate?” My concept of being (pro 
tanto) wrong may be necessarily connected with my concept of recreationally 
slaughtering a fellow person, such that anything I represent with the first concept, I 
will also represent with the second (and must always do so unless my concepts 
change). But if this is to provide a basis for a priori knowledge, my concepts must be 
adequate representations of the relevant properties: the necessary connection 
between my concepts as mental representations must reflect a necessary connection 
between the properties they are supposed to represent. To know that my concepts of 
being wrong and of recreationally slaughtering a fellow person are adequate, given 
that these concepts are connected representationally, I must know that the properties 
themselves are necessarily connected in the way that my concepts represent them as 
being. And to know this, or at least to know that I know this, I must know that it 
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actually is pro tanto wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a fellow person. 
This does not mean that fundamental normative knowledge is not conceptual 
knowledge: even if I don’t know that my concepts are adequate, they may 
nonetheless be so, and thus I may still have a priori knowledge of the relevant truth 
(assuming that you don’t need to know that you know that p in order to know that 
p). But it does mean that just observing that fundamental normative truths must be 
conceptual truths if they are not empirical truths does not give us the complete 
epistemological account we are looking for. 
 
7.5. Spontaneity and convergence 
For Scanlon, what makes a judgement a “considered judgement” (i.e. one that 
has the kind of “substantive merits” necessary for reflective equilibrium to provide 
justificatory force) is whether or not it is “something that seems to me to be clearly 
true when I am thinking about the matter under good conditions for arriving at judgements 
of the kind in question” (2014, 82). According to Skorupski (2010), the epistemic basis 
of normative knowledge—and thus what constitutes good conditions for arriving at 
normative judgements—“consists solely in spontaneity and convergence” (405). 
“Spontaneity,” he explains, “is a property of responses and dispositions to respond. 
The basic idea is that a spontaneous response or disposition is one that comes in the 
right way from, is genuinely that of, the actor.” This is as opposed to “one that is 
accepted uncritically into one’s thinking from others, or one that results merely from 
a wish to please or to annoy … and so on”; one that is the result of what Kant would 
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call “subjectively determining grounds” or “alien causes.” A truly spontaneous 
response, on the other hand, “is simply one that is free of such grounds or causes” 
and which instead “comes in the right way from the actor: that is, from the actor’s 
nature” (406-407). What determines whether or not a normative judgement is 
warranted is precisely whether or not it is spontaneous. As Skorupski puts it, in the 
form of what he calls the “norm of spontaneity”:  
when one is warranted in taking oneself to have a spontaneous disposition to 
judge that a set of facts πi would give one reason to ψ then, in the absence of 
defeaters, that warrants the judgement that the set of facts πi would give one 
reason to ψ. (409) 
 
Take a normative judgement like the Agony Principle. By Skorupski’s norm 
of spontaneity, to find out whether or not we are warranted in taking this judgment 
to be a genuine a priori truth, we must ask, first of all, whether or not we really are 
spontaneously disposed to make this judgement. For Skorupski, “spontaneity in 
one’s cognitive, affective or practical dispositions is typically marked by a certain 
experienced or felt normative harmony.” Normative harmony occurs when a 
“disposition to ψ … blends with a disposition to take oneself (more or less explicitly) 
to have reason to ψ.” And a disposition to take oneself to have reason to ψ “is an 
experience, impression or spontaneously persuasive representation of a given response—
belief, feeling, or action—as reason-supported: normatively apt, proper” (407). 
Therefore, if we have the experience or impression that wanting to avoid agony is 
reason-supported or normatively proper, and this disposition blends with a further 
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disposition to actually want to avoid agony,138 and in a way that produces an 
experience of harmony between the two dispositions, then we have warrant that the 
Agony Principle is indeed a spontaneous judgement on our part, and thus that it 
expresses a genuine a priori truth. 
By the norm of spontaneity, however, this is not all that is required for a 
normative judgement to be warranted; there must also be an absence of “defeaters”: 
external or “alien” causes of the judgement that would explain away its apparent 
spontaneity and warrant. As has been mentioned, if a response is produced by a 
desire to please or annoy, for instance, then it is not a truly spontaneous response 
and therefore is not a warranted response for the actor to make, or so Skorupski 
argues. But why does the fact that a response can be explained by such factors mean 
that it is not warranted, whereas truly spontaneous responses universally (and for 
that very reason) do possess warrant? On this account, 
explanations that subvert or explain away the spontaneity of a response (or 
lack of a spontaneous response) also remove its epistemic value. One could 
say that they work by showing that the response isn’t, so to speak, tuned 
solely to its object (the object of normative assessment). It is not solely an 
interaction between the object and the subject’s nature that gives rise to the 
response. There is interference from other factors. (409) 
 
What makes a spontaneous response also a warranted response is precisely the fact 
that such responses must, by virtue of the absence of any interfering causes (such as 
                                                            
138. By contrast, in cases where it seems to me “that I have reason to ψ and 
yet I find I'm not at all disposed to ψ … whether I really do have reason to ψ comes 
into question” (408). 
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ulterior motives on the part of the actor) be based solely on the normatively relevant 
features of the object.139 
Imagine a response that we are generally disposed to make, but for which we 
could find no subverting explanation: one that could not plausibly be explained 
away by appealing to factors that clearly have nothing in particular to do with 
whatever normatively relevant features the object of the response might possess. 
Now suppose that we ask the question, “Why are we so disposed to make this 
response, to respond in this particular way to that particular object?” By the 
hypothesis, the answer to this question could not be an epistemically negative one 
that shows the response to be lacking in warrant. Could it be an epistemically 
neutral one: one that indicates neither that the response is warranted nor that it is 
unwarranted? I don’t think it could. A subverting explanation for the response 
would of course be one that shows it to be a product of factors that are not among 
the normatively relevant features of the object. If such an explanation from 
normatively irrelevant factors is not available, the only alternative answer to the 
question, “Why do we respond in this way?” must find its answer in normatively 
relevant factors. These two alternatives, it would be appear, are exhaustive: if a 
response or disposition to respond in a certain way to an object is not the product of 
normatively irrelevant factors (rather than the normatively relevant features of the 
object), then the reason (or reasons) for this response must be a normative reason (or 
                                                            
139. The object here is simply whatever it is that the response is a response to, 
and hence it might be a set of facts rather than a specific concrete object. 
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reasons), and hence it must be precisely the normatively relevant features of the 
object that the response is a response to.140 
The story is still not complete. The final ingredient needed for a normative 
judgement to be warranted is for it to test positively against the normative responses 
of others. Just like the kinds of normatively irrelevant causes that can defeat the 
warrant one might appear to have for a normative judgement, disagreement can 
supply a defeater for one’s judgement in cases “when one has insufficient reason to 
believe that the disagreeing judgements are faulty.” As such, Skorupski advocates 
what he calls the “Convergence thesis”:  
if I judge that p, I am rationally committed to holding that either inquirers who 
scrutinized any relevant evidence and argument available to them would 
agree that p or I could fault their pure judgements about reasons or their 
evidence. (412) 
 
This follows from the fact that, if I make a truly spontaneous normative judgement, 
and my judgement is therefore not the product of normatively irrelevant causes but 
instead is a direct response to the normatively relevant features of the object, then 
                                                            
140. Of course there is a third option: that the response is neither the product 
of normatively irrelevant factors, nor a warranted response to normative reasons—it 
could be a completely random and arbitrary response. But if a response is neither the 
product of purely naturalistic causes, nor a response to (non-natural) normative 
reasons, we would not expect the kind of uniformity we see in our responses to 
something like agony; we would instead expect a variety of responses to it, some 
people wanting to avoid it, others wanting to seek it out. The uniformity we do in 
fact see is surely something that prompts a “why?” question, whether this is to be 
answered by some kind of purely causal, non-normative explanation or by a 
normative reason. And in any case, we are taking ourselves to have established 
metanormative realism here (by the arguments of Chapters 3 and 4). Since normative 
reasons, facts and properties, I believe, do exist, they must find their place 
somewhere, and it would not be surprising if they found their place precisely where 
non-normative explanations fail to account for our responses. 
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anyone else who likewise responds to the object without being influenced by 
normatively irrelevant causes will thereby also be responding directly to these same 
normatively relevant features, and will thus come to the same normative judgement. 
If they do not come to the same judgement, then at least one of us must be unduly 
influenced by normatively irrelevant factors; if I do not have sufficient reason to 
believe that the other party is compromised in this way, I also do not have sufficient 
reason to believe that I am not compromised in a similar way, and thus I am not 
going to be warranted in my original judgement. If a normative judgement is 
warranted if and only if it is a response solely to the normatively relevant features of 
its object, then, since the normatively relevant features of the object will be the same 
no matter who is making the judgement, the only way that our normative judgments 
could fail to converge is if at least one of us is subject to normatively irrelevant 
influences. The absence of convergence on a normative judgement is therefore 
evidence that the judgement is not truly spontaneous but a product of compromising 
influences. If there is widespread convergence on a judgement, on the other hand, 
this constitutes (at least) an absence of evidence that the judgement is compromised, 
which, when combined with the other factors mentioned above—the felt harmony 
between an impression that a certain response is or would be reason-supported or 
normatively apt, and a disposition to respond in that very way, plus the absence of 
any plausible non-normative explanation for the judgement that would remove its 
warrant—will suggest that the judgement is indeed fully warranted.141 
                                                            
141. Even if there is full convergence on a normative judgement, this 
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How would this model of normative knowledge work when applied, once 
again, to Parfit’s Agony Principle? Remember, for Skorupski, a response is truly 
spontaneous only if it is “solely an interaction between the object and the subject’s 
nature that gives rise to the response” (409), and as such there is no interference from 
other (normatively irrelevant) factors. For the Agony Principle to be spontaneous, 
interaction between our nature and the object of the judgement (agony) must give 
rise to 1) a disposition to make the judgement, that is, an experience or impression to 
the effect that wanting to avoid agony is a reason-supported or normatively apt 
response to the object, and 2) a disposition to (always) want to avoid agony, which is 
attendant upon, and experienced as blending harmoniously with, the first 
(normative) disposition. If these conditions are met, the Agony Principle is backed 
up by a first-person experience of normative harmony, given rise to, at least in part, 
by interaction between the subject’s nature and the nature of the relevant object, 
making it a candidate for a warranted normative judgement. And indeed, these 
conditions very much seem to be met as far as Parfit is concerned: as he says, 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
judgement might still fail to be warranted, because this convergence could itself be 
the product of distorting influences (e.g. evolutionary factors). But Skorupski is not 
saying that convergence is a sufficient condition for a normative judgement to be 
warranted, only that it is a necessary condition. The absence of convergence 
undermines the warrant for a normative judgement, but the presence of 
convergence, while necessary for the judgement to be warranted, means nothing in 
the absence of spontaneity; and if the convergence for a judgement is the product of 
distorting influences, the judgement is not going to be spontaneous. A convergent 
normative judgement that is nothing but the product of evolutionary factors (which 
apply to all of us and which are therefore the reason for our convergence on this 
judgement) would not be a spontaneous judgement in Skorupski’s sense of 
“spontaneous.” 
212 
remembering what it is like to have intensely painful sensations makes it hard for 
him to believe that, “though the approaching flames threaten to cause me 
excruciating pain, this fact does not count in favour of my wanting … to move my 
hand away,” even if he happened not to have any goals or desires that would be 
furthered by moving his hand away (2011a, 81). I think we can also assume that 
Parfit (like most of us) always does have a desire to avoid agony, a desire which 
blends harmoniously with his distinct impression that this particular response to 
agony is reason-supported. 
So, for Parfit at least, the Agony Principle seems to have the kind of first-
personal support necessary, on this account, for it to be a warranted normative 
judgement. The next step is to ask whether or not there is anything that might 
explain away this first-personal support—this appearance of spontaneity and 
normative harmony. Might his judgement simply be the product of normatively 
irrelevant causes, rather than flowing spontaneously from a pure interaction 
between Parfit and the object of his judgement (agony)? But what, other than the 
nature of agony itself, might supply the reason why Parfit thinks he has a (non-
instrumental) reason to want to avoid agony? One might think that Parfit just really 
doesn’t like agony, and wants others not to do anything that might cause him agony, 
and this somehow provides an ulterior motive for him to think and perpetuate the 
idea that his desire to avoid agony is reason-supported. Perhaps if others think that 
this desire is reason-supported, and not just some (normatively) arbitrary preference 
of his, they will be more inclined to respect this desire, and hence less likely to do 
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anything that might cause him agony, and perhaps more likely to help him avoid 
agony in the future. But this would not really explain why he is disposed to respond 
to agony by wanting to avoid it in the first place, nor why this response actually feels 
reason-supported (to him). And in any case, it is not clear why perpetuating the idea 
that one’s desire to avoid agony is reason-supported would help one to avoid agony; 
to say that one always has a reason to want to avoid agony is not to say that others 
have sufficient reason to spare you agony. Not only that, but why would Parfit even 
dislike agony in the first place, if not through an interaction between his nature as a 
subject who knows what agony is like and the nature of agony itself? In any case, it 
is not obvious that there is a debunking explanation available that would prevent 
Parfit’s judgement from being warranted. 
Finally, we must ask how the Agony Principle converges with the normative 
judgements of others. As Parfit acknowledges, some people appear to reject it, 
believing instead that “the nature of agony gives us no reason to want to avoid being 
in agony” (81). These people are those who endorse what he calls “Subjectivism 
about Reasons” (58): the position that the only reasons we have are to respond in 
ways that fulfil (at least some of) our desires (from which it follows that we have 
reason to avoid or want to avoid agony, not because of the nature of agony, but only 
because being in agony would conflict with our desires).142 And since, according to 
Parfit, “Subjectivism about Reasons is now very widely accepted” (65), this may 
                                                            
142. This is the same thing as what we referred to as Internalism about reasons 
in Chapter 3 (Section 3.5). 
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seem to indicate that the Agony Principle simply does not pass the convergence test, 
and thus that it does not express a warranted, a priori truth after all. But some of 
these subjectivists no doubt reject the Agony Principle, not because they find another 
conflicting first-order normative judgement more plausible, but for metaethical or 
metanormative reasons, perhaps because they think that reasons which do not 
fundamentally stem from our desires, or reasons to have certain desires as such (like 
a reason to want to avoid, and to try to avoid, agony even if you don’t in fact want to 
avoid agony), are metaphysically or epistemologically queer. Assuming, for 
instance, that the Argument from Queerness fails against these kinds of reasons,143 
the disagreement of these subjectivists will not undermine the warrant for Parfit’s 
judgement. Other subjectivists, however, do seem to be making a conflicting 
normative judgement of their own, which might be just as spontaneous for them as 
Parfit’s judgement appears to be for him; “Korsgaard for example writes, if some act 
‘is a means to getting what you want … no one doubts that this is a reason’. Williams 
writes: ‘Desiring to do something is of course a reason for doing it’” (65). It follows 
from these judgements that if (for some reason) one desired to be in agony, one 
would have a reason to pursue agony rather than to avoid it, and these normative 
judgements appear to conflict, rather than converge, with the Agony Principle. 
However, this appearance, I think, is an illusion: the Agony Principle only 
says that we all have a reason to want to avoid agony, not that we always have 
                                                            
143. We of course rejected the Argument from Queerness against non-natural 
normative reasons, facts and properties in Chapter 5. 
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decisive or sufficient reason to do so. Having a reason to want to avoid, and to try to 
avoid, agony is compatible with also having a reason, perhaps even sufficient 
reason, to do things that involve being in agony (resisting torture, for instance), and 
perhaps with actually wanting to be in agony (maybe so one can endure it for 
Nietzschean purposes). And if wanting to do something always provides a reason 
for doing it, even if it would involve being in agony, as Korsgaard and Williams both 
firmly believe, this does not mean that we do not also have a reason to (want to) 
avoid agony; we could have conflicting reasons both to do and not do something 
that would fulfil some of our desires but would also involve being in agony. So the 
Agony Principle is not in fact inconsistent with the judgements of subjectivists about 
reasons like Korsgaard and Williams, and hence these people only reject the Agony 
Principle on purely metaethical/metanormative grounds, something which does not 
indicate that this first-order normative judgement fails to converge with the first-
order normative judgements of others who are equally rational. 
Would anyone be spontaneously disposed to reject the Agony Principle, so 
long as we make explicit the qualification that we may also have other reasons not to 
avoid agony (or at any rate to do things which may require being in agony)? Safe to 
say, we are all disposed to want to avoid agony; the masochist who desires pain, I 
believe, at most desires pain up to a certain intensity and not beyond—such a person 
is likewise disposed to want to avoid a certain level of agony. And even someone 
who genuinely desires to be in agony probably also has a desire to avoid it, even if 
this desire is outweighed by the strength of his desires that, for whatever reason, 
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bend towards being in agony.144 We know that, for Parfit, this response to agony 
feels reason-supported or normatively appropriate, hence why he is disposed to 
endorse the Agony Principle. Does our desire to avoid agony universally feel reason-
supported, that is, like a response that is well attuned to its object, without 
interference from any distorting influences? I think the answer is yes: for those who 
know what agony is like, the desire to avoid it flows directly from this knowledge—
knowledge based on direct experience of the object and its nature. We experience 
agony, we know what it’s like, and so we want to avoid it, and since this desire 
cannot be separated from our knowledge of the nature of agony (and indeed, it 
seems that it would vanish entirely in the absence of this knowledge), I think we can 
say that wanting to avoid agony is a response that is well attuned to its object if any 
response is, and thus, to beings like us who experience agony and know what it’s 
like, having some desire to avoid agony genuinely feels like a reason-supported or 
normatively appropriate response. When the Agony Principle is properly 
understood, therefore, and when all (for the present purposes) irrelevant 
metaethical/metanormative doubts are set aside, I think we find that it does 
converge well with the normative responses of others, and thus that it is a truly 
spontaneous response to its object (if there are any such responses). As this 
                                                            
144. An example of this might be someone who is experiencing extreme levels 
of guilt and/or self-hatred, and who perhaps believes that they deserve to be 
severely punished and suffer for some transgression (real or imagined). Such a 
person might actually want to experience a degree of agony, but it seems that the 
reason for this would be, at least in part, to mitigate the psychological/emotional 
agony the person is currently experiencing, and thus this person, despite having a 
desire to be in agony, also clearly has a desire to avoid it. 
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illustrates, the notions of spontaneity and convergence do seem to provide a way for 
us to know certain fundamental normative truths a priori, and to differentiate 
genuine a priori truths from merely (epistemically) possible or apparent ones.145 If 
our (fundamental) normative judgements conflict, we can potentially use the criteria 
of spontaneity and convergence to settle our disagreements. 
 
7.6. The problem with spontaneity 
As Skorupski understands it, spontaneity contrasts fundamentally with 
“receptivity” as a basis for knowledge. Knowledge of the natural world “involves 
productivity in the object, on the one hand, and receptivity in the knowing subject, 
on the other,” whereas normative knowledge, on the other hand, “involves no 
receptivity at all” (2010, 405). What this means is that normative knowledge, unlike 
empirical knowledge, is not causal in nature; when we know something about the 
natural world, this is because we have been causally affected (through our receptive 
faculties, i.e. our senses) by some part of it,146 but when we make a warranted 
                                                            
145. This account could be taken either as a way for reflective equilibrium to 
get off the ground, or as a foundationalist model of normative knowledge in its own 
right. Spontaneity and convergence are clearly supposed to be foundations for 
normative knowledge (they constitute its “epistemic basis” as Skorupski puts it 
(2010, 405)). But they could also supply the “substantive merits” of the judgements 
we make in reflective equilibrium (Scanlon 2014, 82), in cases when that process 
leads us to arrive at epistemically justified normative conclusions. 
 
146. Skoruspki specifically says that “[k]nowledge of reasons relations [i.e. 
normative knowledge] does not require either identity with or causal relation to 
substantial facts” (405). And by a “substantial fact” he means a fact that can cause 
and/or be caused (404). 
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normative judgement, not only is this judgement not the product of “alien causes” or 
normatively irrelevant causes—it is not the product of any causal influences 
whatsoever. Instead, as we have mentioned, if a response is truly spontaneous and 
thus normatively warranted, it must be “solely an interaction between the object and 
the subject's nature that gives rise to the response” (409). On this account, therefore, 
normative knowledge must arise solely from these kinds of non-causal interactions 
(between the nature of the object of knowledge and the nature of the knowing 
subject). 
Assuming that the Agony Principle is a fundamental normative truth, if this 
truth is known a priori, this must be because, when we respond to agony by having a 
desire to avoid it, it is nothing but the nature of agony itself that gives rise to this 
response in us, and in an entirely non-causal manner at that. But if the interaction 
between our nature and the object of our response (when we respond to agony by 
wanting to avoid it) is not causal interaction, what kind of interaction is it? Is the 
non-naturalist really committed to saying that agony does not cause us to want to 
avoid it, that when we experience agony and consequently want to avoid it, this is 
not a causal response to agony? Undoubtedly, my experience of agony (or the fact 
that I’ve experienced agony) does cause me to want to avoid being in agony: if I had 
never experienced agony, I would not have any desire to avoid it.147 But this might 
not mean that agony itself, or the nature of agony, exerts any causal influence on me. 
                                                            
147. Or at least if I had never experienced anything else, such as less intense 
pain, that might indicate to me what agony is like. 
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If my desire to avoid agony is a truly spontaneous response, then it is a response 
solely to the nature of agony. The non-naturalist would argue that we cannot say 
that, if agony had a different nature than it actually has, I wouldn’t respond to it in 
this same way: if agony had a different nature (if what it’s like to be in agony was 
different), it would not really be agony at all. There is no possible world in which the 
nature of agony (what it’s like to be in agony) is different, so there is no possible 
world in which I respond differently to agony (assuming that I am responding solely 
to the nature of agony). There is no counterfactual dependence between my response 
to agony and its nature, so by the counterfactual theory of causation, the nature of 
agony does not cause me to respond to it in the way that I nonetheless do. 
The basic idea, therefore, is that some of our responses, and some of our 
knowledge, is counterfactually dependent, and thus fundamentally causal in 
nature—these are our receptive responses. Other responses of ours, however, are 
responses to things (namely, the inherent natures or essences of things, such as the 
nature of agony) that necessarily are the way that they are and which, for this 
reason, do not support counterfactuals, and these are our spontaneous responses. 
Our spontaneous responses do not admit of any causal explanation; the reason for a 
spontaneous response—why we respond in that particular way—cannot be a causal 
or explanatory reason, so it must be a normative reason, and this is why our 
spontaneous responses are warranted and thus constitute the basis for normative 
knowledge. This also appears to tell us that (fundamental) normative knowledge is 
always a priori and never a posteriori: since there are two fundamental kinds of 
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knowledge—the receptive and the spontaneous—and empirical knowledge plainly 
falls into the receptive category (involving as it does the causal stimulation of our 
sensory receptors), whereas normative knowledge falls into the spontaneous 
category, normative knowledge cannot possibly be empirical knowledge. And this 
obviously means that normative naturalism must be false. This is made especially 
plausible when we consider that, if we succeed in finding a fully causal, naturalistic 
explanation for a response (a desire, say), this seems to remove any need to posit a 
normative reason for that response, and Occam’s Razor would seem to count against 
doing so. 
The problem with this line of reasoning, however, and hence the non-
naturalist’s position as a whole, is that, if the reason why we respond in the way that 
we do to something like agony is the inherent nature of agony itself, then the nature 
of agony must be able to explain why we respond to agony in that specific way. That 
we universally want to avoid and try to avoid agony is after all an empirical 
observation, and thus we can reasonably ask what explains this observation. And if 
the answer comes down to nothing but the nature of agony itself, and this is 
supposed to indicate that our response is not the product of normatively irrelevant 
causes but is instead truly spontaneous and warranted, then it must be the case that 
agony, by its nature, possesses some normative property, and that it is this property 
that ultimately explains why we respond to agony in the way that we do.148 But this 
                                                            
148. Skorupski’s view implies that there are two ways in which we respond to 
agony: 1) by wanting (or having a disposition to want) to avoid it, and 2) by taking 
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surely means that we can know that agony has this normative property on the basis 
of IBE, and thus that this piece of fundamental normative knowledge can be 
acquired empirically and not just a priori. Someone who had never experienced 
agony themselves (or anything that might suggest to them what agony is like) could 
nonetheless observe that those who have experienced agony universally want to 
avoid it, ask what explains this empirical observation, find no plausible non-
normative, purely causal explanation and hence conclude that the best explanation 
for this observation is that agony has some normative property. And since the non-
naturalist is saying that there is no adequate causal explanation for the fact that those 
who have experienced agony universally want to avoid it, he must admit that this 
would be a sound conclusion to draw for someone who has never experienced 
agony but who is trying to explain why those who have universally want to avoid it. 
But this would mean that fundamental normative knowledge can be acquired using 
observation and IBE, without the need for a spontaneous response to the object on 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
ourselves (or having a disposition to take ourselves) to have a reason to want to 
avoid it. For normative harmony to be achieved, and thus for the Agony Principle to 
be warranted, both of these dispositions must be present. But the non-naturalist 
could argue that it is only the second response/disposition that is normative and 
spontaneous, whereas the first response/disposition is indeed purely causal (these 
two ways in which we respond to agony corresponding to the naturalistic, causal 
order and the non-natural, normative order respectively), and thus avoid having to 
say that we don’t respond to agony in a causal manner, or that our desire to avoid 
agony is not explained by some property of agony (normative or otherwise). Yet 
since the Agony Principle specifically claims that our desire to avoid agony is 
reason-supported (not just our disposition to take ourselves to have this reason), and 
since, for the non-naturalist, a response must be spontaneous if it is reason-
supported or warranted, it is not enough for only the second response to be 
spontaneous: the first response—the actual desire itself—must be spontaneous as 
well, or else the Agony Principle will not only be unwarranted but false. 
222 
the part of the knowing subject—and this is all the naturalist requires and the very 
thing the non-naturalist thinks is impossible. 
The non-naturalist might still deny that the nature of agony explains why we 
respond to agony in the way that we do, insisting instead that explanation is simply 
not the right relation between the nature of agony and our response to it. The nature 
of agony, for the non-naturalist, does not explain why we respond to agony by 
wanting to avoid it; it gives us a reason for this response, and the domain of 
explanations is fundamentally distinct from the domain of reasons. The non-
naturalist might also accuse the naturalist of an equivocation: there is a sense, even 
for the non-naturalist, in which the nature of agony can be said to “explain” why we 
respond to agony as we do, because it answers the question, “Why do we respond to 
agony in the way that we do?” But this does not mean that the nature of agony 
causally explains our response to agony, and to assume that it does based upon the 
above question alone is to equivocate between two sense of “explain”: the narrower, 
causal sense and the broader sense that involves answering any kind of “why?” 
question whatsoever, whether or not this question is specifically causal.149 Yet this 
response on the part of the non-naturalist does not seem to eliminate the possibility 
that someone who has never experienced agony and has no idea what it’s like could 
nonetheless arrive at the conclusion that there is a universal reason to want avoid it 
by inference to the best explanation from the empirical fact that those who do know 
                                                            
149. The question, “Why does <2 + 2 = 4>?” is presumably not a causal 
question, and so the answer will not constitute a causal explanation, but it is clearly 
still possible to explain (in the broad sense) why <2 + 2 = 4>. 
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what its’s like universally want to avoid it. If such a person could not, in principle, 
make this inference, this would have to be either because there is some debunking 
causal explanation for why we want to avoid agony which shows it not to be a 
warranted response on the non-naturalist’s own terms, or because the absence of 
such a causal explanation does not in fact suggest that there must be a normative 
reason for this response after all. The whole point of spontaneity as a basis for 
normative knowledge, however, is that, if there is no causal explanation for a 
particular response, there must be a normative reason for that response, and that it is 
for this reason and no other that the response occurs. 
Someone who does not possess the concept of a normative reason, or who 
does not know that there are any normative reasons, would not be able to conclude 
from the universal desire to avoid agony, plus the absence of a plausible debunking 
causal explanation for it, that there is a normative reason to want to avoid agony. But 
someone who does know that there are normative reasons must also know that, if 
we have sufficient reason to respond in a certain way, and we are subject to no 
distorting influences that might prevent us from responding as we have sufficient 
reason to respond, then we would indeed respond in that particular way. And if 
there is no debunking causal explanation for why we respond to agony by wanting 
to avoid it, and thus no distorting influences that might makes us want to avoid 
agony even though we have no reason to do so, then, if the nature of agony does 
give us a reason to want to avoid agony, we would expect there to be a universal 
desire to avoid agony—and this is indeed what we find. On other hand, given that 
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(as the non-naturalist assumes) there is nothing causing us to want to avoid agony, if 
there were no normative reason for us to want to avoid agony, we would not expect 
there to be a universal desire to avoid agony. The fact that there is this universal 
desire, therefore, is empirical evidence for the hypothesis that there is a normative 
reason to want to avoid agony. To arrive at this conclusion (by IBE), one does not 
need to have a spontaneous response to agony oneself: one just needs to know 1) 
that there are normative reasons, 2) conscious beings universally respond to agony 
by wanting to avoid it, and 3) that there is no (plausible) debunking causal 
explanation for this response. This appears to make this fundamental normative 
truth also an empirical, naturalistic truth, even if we grant the non-naturalist’s 
premise that truly warranted responses are not causal. 
It is difficult to see how, on the spontaneity and convergence model of 
normative knowledge, it can be denied that fundamental normative truths can, in 
principle, be acquired a posteriori, even if these truths can always also be known a 
priori. If it is possible to know a normative truth a priori on the basis of one’s own 
spontaneous response and how well it converges with the responses of others, it 
should be possible to know this same truth empirically by observing the 
spontaneous responses of others (and how well these responses converge with each 
other). It might be asked how one could possibly know that another person’s 
response is truly spontaneous if one does not have that spontaneous response 
oneself, and thus the felt experience of normative harmony that comes with it. But if 
one knows that another person’s response is not causal—that there is (probably) no 
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causal explanation for it (which is what the non-naturalist claims anyway)—and that 
there is also widespread convergence on this response, and therefore that there is 
likely to be at least some kind of reason for it, then one can infer that this reason 
must be a normative reason, and one can thus arrive at knowledge of a fundamental 
normative truth by empirical observation and IBE alone without relying on a form of 
a priori intuition; we do not necessarily need to be spontaneously disposed to make a 
normative judgement ourselves in order to know a (fundamental) normative truth. 
The non-naturalist might argue that this is just a specific case of a quite 
general phenomenon: that a priori truths can also be known a posteriori by observing 
reliable sources of information about those truths.150 The truths of arithmetic, for 
instance, can be known a priori by working them out oneself, or a posteriori by using a 
calculator. Andrew Wiles knows that Fermat’s Last Theorem is true a priori, but I 
know that it is true (I imagine) a posteriori. If I can acquire (fundamental) normative 
knowledge a priori based on my own spontaneous responses, therefore, I can also 
acquire this same knowledge a posteriori based on observing the responses of others. 
For me to be able to acquire normative knowledge from my own responses, I must 
have reason to believe that I am in good conditions for responding in the 
appropriate manner, and if am not in good conditions (if I don’t know what agony is 
like, say), I might nonetheless have reason to believe that others are in such 
conditions, in which case their responses, and my observations of them, will 
                                                            
150. Yudkowsky (2007b) even claims (perhaps hyperbolically) that “[t]here is 
nothing you can know ‘a priori’, which you could not know with equal validity by 
observing the chemical release of neurotransmitters within some outside brain.” 
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constitute a sound basis for normative knowledge (so long as my own responses 
ever constitute a sound basis for normative knowledge). But this does not 
differentiate the normative from any other domain in which a priori knowledge is 
possible, such as logic or mathematics. And if these domains are non-natural, in 
spite of the fact that the fundamental truths within them can also be known a 
posteriori, then the normative domain, the non-naturalist might argue, is still non-
natural as well. The problem with this response is that (as we saw in Chapters 4 and 
5) logic and mathematics are simply not best construed as non-natural; although 
logical and mathematical truths probably can be known a priori without relying on 
IBE, these domains are nonetheless perfectly continuous with science. 
In Chapter 4 (Section 4.6), I argued that normative non-naturalism amounts to 
a kind of epiphenomenalism about the normative, and that epiphenomenalism about 
the normative is implausible for the basically same reason that epiphenomenalism 
about conscious experience is implausible. Phenomenal properties appear to support 
counterfactuals: if our conscious experiences had different phenomenal properties, 
we would sometimes respond differently to them as a result. If the experience I have 
when I place my hand on a hot stove had the phenomenal property of being 
pleasant, rather than the phenomenal property of being painful, I might keep my 
hand on the stove for a period rather than instantly withdrawing it. And this, I 
believe, is what happens when we respond to agony by wanting to avoid it: we have 
a conscious experience, and we respond to that experience in a certain way by virtue 
of its phenomenal properties. Agony is simply an experience which has the 
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phenomenal property of being extremely unpleasant. If certain experiences did not 
have this property, but instead had the property of being pleasant, say, we would 
not respond to those experiences by wanting to avoid them. This means that the 
phenomenal property that makes agony what it is—the property of being extremely 
unpleasant—supports counterfactuals and thus has causal standing. For the non-
naturalist, this means that our universal response to agony must not in fact be 
warranted after all, because it is a caused response and therefore not a truly 
spontaneous one. But just because our response to agony is caused by a phenomenal 
property surely does not mean that this response is not warranted. Given that it is 
this phenomenal property that causes us to want to avoid agony (or experiences to 
which we give the label “agony”), we can ask why this phenomenal property causes 
us to respond in this particular way. And if we can answer that the best explanation 
for this observation is that being extremely unpleasant gives us a normative reason 
to want to avoid experiences which have this property, then it is not spontaneity, as 
the non-naturalist understand it, that provides the epistemic basis for (fundamental) 
normative knowledge, but inference to the best explanation. 
 
7.7. Is normativity really the best explanation for our response to agony? 
I have argued that our aversion to agony is not plausibly construed as a non-
causal response. Although this does not entail that this response is not warranted, it 
might remove some of the rationale for thinking that it is warranted in the first place. 
If wanting to avoid agony is just a straightforward causal response to a certain 
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natural property (the property of being extremely unpleasant), the non-naturalist 
could argue that there would not be any reason to think that this response is 
warranted. The non-naturalist’s argument, remember, is that, if a particular response 
is not a causal response—that there is probably no “debunking” causal explanation 
for it—and if there is enough convergence on that response to suggest that there is 
probably at least some reason of some kind for it (whether causal or normative), then 
since, by the hypothesis, there is (probably) not a causal reason for this response, the 
reason that there is for it must be a normative reason. So if, on the contrary, there is a 
causal reason for our response to agony, in the form of the natural fact that we want 
to avoid experiences that are extremely unpleasant, then what reason is there to 
think that this response is warranted, and not just another response with a 
“debunking” causal explanation for it? 
For a naturalist such as myself, the best explanation for the fact that we want 
to avoid experiences which are extremely unpleasant is that experiences which have 
this phenomenal property also, and for that very reason, have the normative 
property of giving us a reason to want to avoid them.151 But why think that this 
normative explanation is really the best explanation for the uncontroversially natural 
fact that we want to avoid agony (or that we want to avoid extremely unpleasant 
experiences)? Wouldn’t another uncontroversially natural fact represent a superior 
                                                            
151. Or that they have the property, ought-to-be-avoidedness. I will presently 
leave it open whether the normative property is reducible or identical to the 
phenomenal property, or whether it is sui generis (metaphysically, not 
epistemologically). We will discuss reductionism in the next (and final) chapter of 
this dissertation. 
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explanation, perhaps because it would be more informative and/or more 
parsimonious? Or one could even argue that there actually isn’t anything to explain 
here, on the grounds that it is simply a brute fact that we want to avoid experiences 
which we find extremely unpleasant. Perhaps it is simply the phenomenal property 
itself which explains our response to these experiences, and there is simply no need 
to explain why we respond as we do to that phenomenal property. After all, if it is a 
normative property that explains why we respond in that way to experiences with 
that phenomenal property, then the link between that normative property and our 
response would arguably be just as brute and inexplicable, so why not just accept the 
bruteness and inexplicability at the phenomenal level, rather than positing a 
normative property as a supposed explanation which really only succeeds in 
pushing the mystery back? 
First of all, I think there is genuinely something to be explained here: a 
universal desire to avoid extremely pleasant experiences and to pursue extremely 
unpleasant experiences is at least conceivable.152 Nature might conceivably have 
disposed us to avoid stimuli that give us pleasure and to pursue stimuli which cause 
us pain and suffering.153 Yet this is of course the reverse of what we actually find, 
                                                            
152. Not to say that this combination is possible. But if it isn’t possible, this is 
itself something that calls out for explanation. 
 
153. The aversion to pain is probably not completely universal, and thus it is 
not the aversion to pain as such that is the basis for the conclusion that we have a 
normative reason to want to avoid agony. Kahane (2010) points out that 
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and thus we can reasonably ask why this is the case. Pleasant experiences have an 
ineffable phenomenal character that differentiates them essentially from unpleasant 
experiences, which have a different ineffable phenomenal character, and we find that 
the specific phenomenal characters of these different experiences universally give 
rise to certain specific responses on the part of those who have these experiences: 
attraction in response to the pleasant experiences, aversion in response to the 
unpleasant experiences. So the question is why do those particular conscious 
experiences, with those particular ineffable phenomenal characters, universally give 
rise to those particular responses in us: why is it that we want and try to avoid 
unpleasant experiences such as agony—experiences with that ineffable phenomenal 
character—and want and try to pursue pleasant experiences—experiences with that 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
there seem to be cases, such as when patients undergo frontal lobotomy, where the 
sensation of pain seems to lose its hurtfulness. When lobotomy patients can still feel 
the sensation of pain but they do not dislike or mind it, and there seems to be no 
reason to suppose that what they experience is nevertheless bad. (28) 
 
These are cases in which pain is experienced, but without suffering. Kahane himself 
thinks that “the state that is intrinsically bad is not that of having a sensation of pain, 
but that of suffering—of having this sensation and disliking it. And what makes this 
state bad is what it feels like” (38). The aversion to suffering, I believe, is universal, 
and agony is clearly a form of intense suffering. Cases of pain asymbolia, in which 
subjects feel pain but appear to be indifferent to it, are not instances in which the 
aversion to suffering is not present, because these are cases in which pain is not 
experienced as unpleasant, so these cases do not break the universal link between 
unpleasant experiences and the aversion response. One might think that the fact that 
suffering involves disliking a certain sensation removes the need for an explanation 
of our aversion to it. Yet the experience of disliking a certain sensation is itself a 
phenomenal sensation, so there is still a need to explain why we respond in that 
particular way to that particular sensation. To not like a certain sensation is surely 
just to experience that sensation as unpleasant (and thus to have an unpleasant 
experience). 
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other ineffable phenomenal character—rather than wanting and trying to avoid 
pleasant experiences and wanting and trying to pursue unpleasant experiences 
instead? 
Nor can the link between the phenomenal characters of these experiences and 
the different responses to which they give rise just as plausibly be taken to be as 
brute as the link between our responses and our normative reasons. As a conceptual 
matter, if we have sufficient reason to respond in a certain way, and we are subject 
to no distorting influences that might prevent us from responding as we have reason 
to respond, this surely means that we will respond in that way; the link between 
having a reason to respond in a certain way and actually responding in that way is 
not something that calls out for explanation, beyond appealing to the absence of any 
distorting influences that would compromise this link.154 If we want to explain why 
someone did what they had sufficient reason to do, for instance, it seems to be 
enough to cite the absence of distorting influences (like depression, weakness of will, 
or excessive emotion, etc.), either explicitly or implicitly by appealing to the person’s 
character (someone who does what they have sufficient reason to do by virtue of 
their character is surely just someone who does not tend to be affected by these 
distorting influences). The link between our phenomenal experiences and our 
responses to them, on the other hand, does seem to call out for explanation: it is not a 
                                                            
154. Unless, that is, we possess some form of radical libertarian free will, 
whereby we can have sufficient reason to respond in a certain way and be subject to 
no distorting influences, yet nonetheless just arbitrarily choose not to respond in that 
way. I will assume for the sake of argument that this is not the case. 
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conceptual truth that we want to avoid unpleasant experiences but not pleasant ones 
(so long as we are subject to no distorting influences). It makes sense, therefore, for 
the explanatory buck to stop at our responses to our normative reasons, rather than 
at our responses to our phenomenal experiences, and thus that our responses to our 
phenomenal experiences should ultimately be explained in terms of our normative 
reasons.155 
It might be argued that to explain our responses to our phenomenal 
experiences by saying that we have normative reasons for those responses is not 
really to offer an informative explanation. It may not seem particularly informative 
to answer the question, “Why do we want to avoid agony?” with, “Because we have 
a reason to want to avoid agony.” But the explanation being offered is not just that 
we have some reason or other to want to avoid agony; it is not just that agony gives 
us a causal reason to want to avoid it—simply another way of saying that agony 
causes us to want to avoid it (the very thing to be explained). The reason we have to 
want to avoid agony does cause us to want to avoid it, but its content is not 
exhausted by this causal role: this reason not only causes this response, it counts in 
                                                            
155. Of course I am taking myself to have established that normative reasons 
exist (pace the arguments of Chapters 2 and 3). If there was no independent reason to 
believe that normative reasons exist, it might not make sense to explain our 
responses to our phenomenal experiences in terms of (our responses to our) 
normative reasons. But if we already know that normative reasons exist, and we 
know that we have some capacity to respond to these kinds of reasons, then I believe 
it does make sense to ultimately explain our responses to our phenomenal 
experiences in terms of normative reasons, because we would be explaining 
something that may seem mysterious (why we respond in certain specific ways to 
certain specific phenomenal experiences) in terms of something that we already 
know: that we have a capacity to respond to normative reasons. 
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favour of it (indeed it causes this response by counting in favour of it). And it is 
perfectly informative to explain why we respond to agony as we do by saying that 
the nature of agony counts in favour of this response (and that this is what causes 
this response in the first place).156 The claim that the nature of agony inherently 
counts in favour of the aversion response tells us something that is both far from 
trivial—it gives us irreducibly normative information—and that we might not 
already know. A being who has never experienced agony, and who has never 
considered why those who have experienced agony respond to it with aversion, 
would certainly not know that this claim is true. And if we can add that there are no 
distorting influences acting upon us, and that the absence of such influences 
combined with the reason-giving nature of agony is what ultimately explains our 
response, then we have an explanation which is both adequately informative and 
                                                            
156. To say this is arguably to offer a teleological explanation for our response 
to agony, teleological explanations, on one interpretation, being those that 
 
seek to explain a contingent event by showing what is good about that event … The 
plants put out leaves because it is good for them to do so; the rain falls because it is 
good for it to help the plants grow; the stars move in a circular course around the 
earth because it is good for them to have such a perfect and beautiful motion. 
(Wedgwood 2007, 197) 
 
Modern science completely refuses all teleological explanations for non-mental 
phenomena (such as the growth of plants, etc.), but this does not rule out the 
existence of such explanations for mental phenomena, such as our responses to our 
conscious experiences. For instance, we can often explain why someone forms a 
certain belief by pointing to the fact that it was rational for her to form this belief, 
and as Wedgwood points out, this appears to be a teleological explanation, because 
“we are explaining why a certain contingent event occurs (her forming that belief) by 
appeal to a certain sort of goodness—specifically, rationality—that is exemplified by 
that event” (197). 
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which does not simply replace one mystery with another: if the nature or essence of 
agony (its ineffable phenomenal character or what it’s like) is inherently reason-
giving, if it calls for us to respond to it in a specific way, namely, by wanting and 
trying to avoid it, then it is no wonder that we actually do respond to agony in 
precisely that way. 
So the normative explanation is a reasonable explanation for the fact that we 
universally want to avoid agony. But that in itself does not mean that there is not a 
more parsimonious or consilient non-normative explanation which removes the 
warrant our universal response to agony appears to have. Perhaps the universal 
desire to avoid agony can be explained in evolutionary terms, without the need to 
posit any robust normative properties. The sensation of agony is generally caused by 
things that harm or injure us, and from an evolutionary perspective, this sensation is 
clearly designed to motivate us to engage in self-preserving behaviour.157 The desire 
to avoid agony obviously has an immense survival benefit, motivating us to avoid 
stimuli which not only cause us agony but which threaten to harm or injure us and 
hence threaten our survival. On one level, therefore, it is not at all surprising that we 
have simply evolved to have a desire to avoid agony. But nonetheless, I don’t think 
evolution can provide us with the complete explanation that we need. Our innate 
evolutionary hardwiring punishes us with agony when we engage in certain 
behaviours that threaten our survival, like coming directly into contact with 
                                                            
157. Figuratively speaking (I am not implying that evolution itself is in any 
way teleological). 
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dangerous stimuli, but this only presupposes our desire to avoid agony—it doesn’t 
explain it. Nor is the survival utility of this desire sufficient to explain it in purely 
non-normative terms. In particular, it doesn’t explain why we don’t have a similar 
desire to avoid pleasant experiences, rather than extremely unpleasant experiences. 
We conceivably might have evolved to experience pleasure in response to survival-
threatening stimuli, and if pleasant experiences were the kind of experiences we 
wanted to avoid, rather than unpleasant experiences, this desire would have the 
same survival utility that the desire to avoid agony actually has. But of course we 
haven’t evolved to experience pleasure in response to survival-threatening stimuli, 
and we have a desire to avoid unpleasant experiences like agony rather than a desire 
to avoid pleasure. Evolution itself does not appear to tell us why this scenario, and 
not the reverse, is the one that actually obtains. Evolution only explains why we 
have a reward-punishment mechanism hardwired into us, rewarding us with 
pleasant experiences and punishing us with unpleasant experiences to motivate us 
to behave in a manner that is conducive to our survival. What evolution cannot 
explain is why pleasant experiences constitute the reward side of the reward-
punishment equation and unpleasant experiences the punishment side, and thus 
why it is that unpleasant experiences give rise to a desire to avoid these experiences 
and pleasant experiences give rise to a desire to pursue these experiences, rather 
than the other way round.158 And yet this is exactly what normative properties and 
normative reasons do seem able to explain. 
                                                            
158. Another way to put this point is to say that evolution only explains why 
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Kahane tells us that “[t]he epistemology of the badness of suffering is like the 
epistemology of a self-evident truth or of an immediate experience.” If an agent who 
has never experienced pain before were to feel pain for the very first time, when he 
“first feels the pain he immediately knows with certainty that this strange new 
experience is bad and gives reasons to get rid of it” (2010, 35). I have argued that we 
respond to agony by wanting and trying to avoid it because this phenomenal 
experience has the normative property of giving us a reason to want to avoid it. If I 
am correct that agony has this property, this does suggest that we can know that 
agony is bad and gives us reasons to avoid it simply by having the experience of 
agony, and thus without having to rely on IBE. We learned from Street (2016b) in 
Chapter 1 (Section 1.1) that the concept of a normative reason is acquired from the 
conscious experience we sometimes have of one thing’s counting in favour of or 
calling for another (127). And while this experience might not necessarily indicate 
that one thing really does count in favour of another if the thing in question is 
something that exists completely independently of experience, in the case of agony, 
there seems to be no reason to suppose that our experience of agony as inherently 
calling for the aversion response does not reflect the nature of agony itself.159 Since, 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
we have a desire to avoid whatever sensation it is that accompanies injury (or the like); 
it does not explain why this sensation is the specific phenomenal sensation of agony. 
 
159. Being at a red light could easily seem to count in favour of stopping one’s 
car, but not actually be a reason to stop one’s car. But in the case of agony, we are 
much closer and more intimately related as conscious beings to the phenomena 
which seems to give us a reason. If agony seems to count in favour of the aversion 
response, I believe this makes it highly probable that it actually does give us a reason 
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as conscious beings, we have privileged access to the inherent nature of agony, I 
think we can know by direct experience that the nature of agony counts in favour of 
the aversion response. But the point remains that the reason-giving nature of agony 
can also be known about on the basis of IBE.160 And if we acquire new normative 
knowledge upon experiencing pain for the very first time, this in itself seems to 
entail that fundamental normative knowledge is not purely conceptual and a priori. 
 
7.8. Conclusion 
I have defended the epistemological version of normative naturalism on the 
grounds that fundamental normative knowledge can be acquired, not only a priori, 
but empirically by a combination of observation and inference to the best 
explanation. I think we can first make the observation that all conscious beings have 
a desire to avoid agony (at least those that actually know what agony is like) and 
then legitimately infer that the best explanation for this empirical fact is the 
normative fact that the nature of agony (it’s intrinsic, ineffable phenomenal 
character, or what it’s like) gives us a normative reason to want to avoid agony. The 
only reasonable alternative explanation might be that evolution has hardwired us to 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
for this response. We are less likely to be in error about the properties of our 
phenomenal experiences. 
 
160. We might say that we can know that agony gives us reasons to (want to) 
avoid it just by having the experience of agony, but to know that we know that agony 
has the inherently reason-giving nature that it has, we have to rely on IBE. IBE 
indicates that our conscious experience to the effect that agony counts in favour of 
the aversion response is not somehow an illusion. 
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have this desire because of the survival benefit it provides. But this does not actually 
explain the thing that needs to be explained: the link between the phenomenal 
character of agony and our universal response to it. Only a normative fact and a 
normative property, like the property of being a (normative) reason, is, I believe, 
capable of this.161 The reason why we do not find conscious beings who are attracted 
to experiences that they themselves find unpleasant, such as agony—not for some 
greater good, but entirely for their own sake—is that no being could possibly be so 
irrational as to desire unpleasant experiences for their own sake. And the normative 
fact that we all have a reason to want to avoid agony does not obtain in virtue of 
some more fundamental normative fact (it is not a mixed normative fact), but it can 
nonetheless be known a posteriori and is thus a case of a fundamental normative fact 
that is also a natural fact in the epistemological sense. Fundamental normative facts 
and properties, therefore, are not only deliberatively indispensable, but 
explanatorily indispensable as well: without them, we would not be able to explain 
our universal responses to certain of our experiences, such as agony, and their 
intrinsic phenomenal characters. 
As far as a non-naturalist like Parfit is concerned, 
When we consider our beliefs about the world, we often have empirical 
evidence for the truth of these beliefs. These beliefs can help to explain 
                                                            
161. An alternative explanation for our response to agony would only end up 
pushing the question back, purporting to explain this response in terms of our 
response to something else, and thus raising the same question about our response 
to this other thing. Only a normative property which is intrinsically response-
guiding could answer the original question without simply raising a further 
question that it is unable to answer. 
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observable facts, and can provide testable predictions. But when we consider 
beliefs about what we have reasons to care about, and to do, we have no such 
evidence. For example, from my claim that we have reasons to want to avoid 
being in agony, no testable predictions follow. (2011b, 539) 
 
Yet the Agony Principle does yield a testable prediction: the prediction that, if we 
know what it’s like to be in agony, and we are subject to no distorting influences that 
prevent us from responding to agony as we have reason to respond to it, then we 
will, for that reason, want to avoid agony. And this prediction is no doubt 
confirmed: we all do want to avoid agony, and our desire to avoid agony is not the 
product of distorting influences—it flows directly from our knowledge of what 
agony is like in a way that allows no room for distorting influences to get in the way. 
The fact that we have this desire therefore constitutes empirical evidence for the 
truth of a normative belief: that we all have reasons to want to avoid being in agony. 
Since this is incompatible with non-naturalism, we can conclude that non-naturalism 
is false and that naturalism must be true. Having defended normative naturalism in 
this chapter, in the next chapter, we will consider whether or not normative 
reductionism is also true, that is, whether or not normative properties are irreducibly 






Simon Blackburn (2016) defines reductionism as the thesis that “the facts or 
entities apparently needed to make true the statements of some area of discourse are 
dispensable in favour of some other facts or entities” (311). In the normative case, 
reductionism entails that it is not distinctly or irreducibly normative facts or entities 
that make normative statements true, but actually non-normative facts or entities.162 
For the normative reductionist, the normative is entirely constituted by and 
dependent on the non-normative, and normative facts and properties are therefore, 
in some sense, identical to certain non-normative facts and properties. 
Since, as I have argued, there really are genuinely normative facts (Chapters 2 
and 3), and there really are ontological weighty normative properties (Chapter 4), 
how can these facts and properties possibly be identical to non-normative facts and 
properties? Obviously normative facts and properties are not identical to facts and 
properties that aren’t normative. But what the reductionist should be understood to 
affirm is that normative facts and properties can also be specified in entirely non-
                                                            
162. According to Blackburn, a scientific reductionist “might advocate 
reducing biology to chemistry, supposing that no distinctive biological facts exist, or 
chemistry to physics, supposing that no distinctive chemical facts exist” (311). I take 
a normative reductionist, therefore, to be someone who holds that there are no 
distinctive normative facts (without being an error theorist or a non-cognitivist, 
however). 
241 
normative terms.163 For the reductionist, normative and non-normative claims are 
simply two different ways of presenting what are actually the same underlying facts 
and properties, facts and properties which are not themselves normative 
independently of being presented in a normative way. Normative facts and 
properties are also non-normative facts and properties, in the sense that the very 
same facts and properties can be presented in both normative and non-normative 
ways.164 And for the non-reductionist, normativity is not just a way of presenting 
certain facts and properties; it is a way that certain facts and properties actually are 
in-and-of-themselves, independently of how these facts and properties might be 
presented by us. 
The reductionist and the non-reductionist both agree that some normative 
claims are true and that normative facts and properties (really) exist. Streumer (2017) 
argues that the central difference between the two lies in what they each take to be 
primarily normative, that is, in what kind of things they each think that normativity 
comes from in the first place: the normative facts and properties themselves, or the 
kinds of things directly involved in our normative claims, like the normative 
                                                            
163. As Jackson (2016) says, “what we affirm is that ethical [or normative] 
properties are identical with properties that can be specified in non-ethical [or non-
normative] terms” (and thus that ethical (or normative) properties can themselves 
also be specified in non-ethical (or non-normative) terms) (200). 
 
164. For the reductionist, the normative claim that some act is what we ought 
to do could be the normative way of presenting a fact that can also be presented with 
the non-normative claim that this act would maximize happiness (for instance). See 
Chapter 6 (Section 6.3) for the distinction between sense and reference. 
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predicates and concepts which these claims use and the normative judgements 
which they express.165 As he explains, 
non-reductive realists [or non-reductionists] take the primary things that are 
normative to be properties … They think that what makes predicates 
normative is that they ascribe normative properties, and that what makes 
judgements normative is that they apply normative predicates and thereby 
ascribe normative properties. So non-reductive realists think that normativity 
comes from properties, and extends to judgements via the predicates that 
ascribe these properties and express these judgements. (102) 
 
Reductive realists (or reductionists), on the other hand, think that normativity 
originates from normative concepts or judgements, and then extends to the 
properties via the predicates and claims that are used to express these concepts and 
judgements. 
Streumer also makes a distinction between normative properties and 
predicates and “descriptive” properties and predicates (1). As he defines normative 
and descriptive properties, a normative property is simply one that can be ascribed 
with a normative predicate, and a descriptive property is one that can be ascribed 
with a descriptive predicate (3). He doesn’t define what it is for a predicate to be 
normative or descriptive; he just observes that most philosophers “usually agree 
about which predicates are normative and which are descriptive.” Descriptive 
predicates are predicates such as, “is a desk,” “is white,” and “is made of wood and 
steel” as opposed to normative predicates like, “is right,” “is wrong,” “is good,” “is 
                                                            
165. A normative judgement is a mental item whereas a normative claim is a 
linguistic item. Normative claims express normative judgements and normative 
predicates express normative concepts and ascribe normative properties. 
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bad,” and “is a reason” (1).166 On these definitions, normative properties can also be 
descriptive properties, but normative predicates cannot be descriptive predicates: a 
predicate is either normative or it is descriptive.167 The reductionist or reductive 
realist holds that normative properties are identical with descriptive properties—
that normative properties can also be ascribed with descriptive, non-normative 
predicates; the non-reductionist or non-reductive realist holds that normative 
properties are not identical to descriptive properties—that normative properties can 
only be ascribed with normative predicates and never descriptive ones. 
This explains why the reductive realist cannot take the primary things that are 
normative to be properties. As Streumer says, “if reductive realism is true, the 
difference between normative and descriptive properties is a difference in language 
that is not matched by a difference in the nature of these properties” (103). If 
normative properties are identical to certain descriptive properties, there is of course 
no difference in the nature of these properties; normative properties would also be 
descriptive properties in this scenario. There would only be a difference in the 
predicates—normative and descriptive or non-normative—that can be used to 
ascribe these properties. All properties, normative or otherwise, would be 
descriptive in the sense that they can be ascribed using descriptive or non-normative 
predicates. But a subset of these properties would also be ascribable using normative 
                                                            
166. Streumer adds that “is a reason” is a normative predicate only if it is 
equivalent to “counts in favour.” 
 
167. Streumer doesn’t explicitly state this, but I think it is implied by the 
examples of descriptive predicates that he uses. 
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predicates, and this is what would make these properties normative: the fact that 
they can be ascribed using normative (as well as non-normative) predicates. 
Suppose, for instance, that the normative property of being what we ought to 
do is identical to the descriptive property of maximizing happiness. There would 
then be a single property that the predicates, “being what we ought to do” and 
“maximizing happiness” both ascribe, and this property would be both normative 
and descriptive, because it can be ascribed both by a normative predicate (“being 
what we ought to do”) and a descriptive predicate (“maximizing happiness”). Since 
this single property can be ascribed using both normative and non-normative 
predicates, this property’s normativity cannot originate from the property itself and 
extend to the predicates that ascribe it, because this would make the non-normative 
predicate (“maximizing happiness”) into a normative predicate as well. Instead, the 
normativity must extend from the normative predicate (“being what we ought to 
do”) to the property, through the fact that this property can be ascribed using this 
normative predicate. This predicate’s normativity probably comes not from the 
predicate itself, but from the normative concepts or judgements that it can be used to 
express, but if normative properties can also be ascribed with non-normative 
predicates, as the reductionist holds, it follows that the normativity of normative 
predicates is prior to the normativity of normative properties. Whereas for the non-
reductionist, of course, the normativity of normative properties is prior to the 
normativity of normative predicates. 
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In what follows, I will first outline the reductionist’s case for the conclusion 
that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties (Section 8.1), based 
as it is on the idea that normative and descriptive properties are necessarily co-
extensive and that this provides a strong reason to identify them (Jackson 2016, 202). 
I will then provide a critique of the reductionist’s position in Section 8.2 (a critique 
that applies to a version of reductionism which I believe avoids Streumer’s own 
objections). In Section 8.3, I will concede the reductionist’s claim that obviously 
normative predicates like “is right” do in fact ascribe the same properties as certain 
disjunctive predicates which are not obviously normative, such as the predicate 
Streumer refers to as predicate D*. But I will argue, contrary to the reductionist, that 
predicates like D* are actually normative and not descriptive predicates: predicate 
D* does not ascribe a descriptive property, but a pattern in descriptive properties 
which is not itself descriptive but is in fact normative, since it is identical to the 
normative property of being right. And finally, in Section 8.4, I will argue that the 
patterns in descriptive properties ascribed by predicates like D* are not only 
normative but irreducibly normative. 
 
8.1. The Reduction Argument 
Jackson and Streumer both defend a similar argument against non-reductive 
normative realism, an argument which Streumer calls “the Reduction Argument” 
(2017, 9). The Reduction Argument states that: 
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(1) Normative predicates are necessarily co-extensive with descriptive 
predicates.168 
(2) Two predicates ascribe the same property if and only if they are 
necessarily co-extensive.169 (11) 
(3) Therefore, normative properties (if they exist) are identical to descriptive 
properties.170 (40) 
 
It this argument is sound, it follows that normative properties can also be ascribed 
with descriptive, non-normative predicates, and thus that the normativity of 
predicates is prior to the normativity of properties, and that normative concepts or 
normative judgements are the things that are primarily normative, rather than the 
normative properties themselves. 
Since normative properties are grounded in descriptive properties—things 
have the normative properties that they have in virtue of also having certain 
descriptive properties—normative properties (and predicates) are necessarily co-
extensive with descriptive properties (and predicates), so long as normative 
properties also supervene on descriptive properties. Everything that has normative 
properties also has descriptive properties (9); there is obviously nothing which has 
only normative properties and no descriptive properties. And if it is also the case 
that there can be no difference in an object’s normative properties without a 
corresponding difference in its descriptive properties (Jackson 2016, 197), it follows 
                                                            
168. Or as Jackson puts it, “ethical [or normative] properties are necessarily 
co-extensive with non-ethical [or non-normative] properties” (2016, 197). 
 
169. This is the criterion of property identity which Streumer labels “(N)”. 
 
170. Normative properties of course don’t actually exist according to 
Streumer’s error theory. 
247 
that, whenever an object has certain normative properties, it must also have certain 
descriptive properties, which in turn implies that normative and descriptive 
properties (and predicates) are necessarily co-extensive. 
But why think that normative properties supervene on descriptive properties 
in the first place? Streumer takes it be a “central thought” about normative 
properties that “[f]or all possible worlds W and W*, if the instantiation of descriptive 
properties in W and W* is exactly the same, then the instantiation of normative 
properties in W and W* is also exactly the same” (2017, 6).171 Jackson simply calls 
Supervenience “plausible” (2016, 196) without providing any explicit defence of it. 
And Enoch (2013) admits that “he doesn’t know of any compelling arguments with 
this supervenience claims as its conclusion.” But Enoch also tells us that “the 
thought that a mere difference in modal location—in which possible world 
something is—can all alone, without a natural difference, make (or indicate) a 
normative difference seems utterly implausible to me, barely intelligible even” (141). 
Ernest Sosa (1980) likewise affirms that 
supervenience … characterizes normative and evaluative properties 
generally. Thus, if a car is a good car, then any physical replica of that car 
must be just as good. If it is a good car in virtue of such properties as being 
economical, little prone to break down, etc., then surely any exact replica 
would share all such properties and would thus be equally good. (15) 
 
I think we should accept that Supervenience is indeed a conceptual truth about the 
nature of normative properties. We saw in the previous chapter that fundamental 
normative knowledge can be acquired on the basis of empirical evidence alone 
                                                            
171. This thought is meant to reflect the nature of normative properties. 
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(without having to rely on a priori normative assumptions). And this would surely 
be impossible if normative properties didn’t supervene on descriptive properties. 
So normative properties certainly seem to be necessarily co-extensive with 
descriptive properties, and premise (1) of the Reduction Argument therefore seems 
to be true. But does this really mean that normative properties are identical to 
descriptive properties—that normative properties can also be ascribed with non-
normative predicates, and thus that properties are not the original source of 
normativity? Enoch denies that necessarily co-extensive properties are necessarily 
identical, arguing that whatever reason there is to think that such properties are 
identical basically comes down to considerations of parsimony—in particular, the 
thought that “multiplying distinct necessarily co-extensive properties does not add 
explanatory power” (2013, 139). Enoch’s response to this thought is that, although 
normative properties may not add explanatory power beyond that of the descriptive 
properties with which they are necessarily co-extensive, normative properties still 
“satisfy the parsimony requirement by being deliberatively indispensable” (140) and 
therefore don’t need to be identified with descriptive properties for the sake of 
preserving parsimony. 
We can agree that normative properties are deliberatively indispensable: as 
we saw in Chapter 3, the likes of Occam’s Razor and IBE cannot be used to refute the 
ontological commitments of normative deliberation. But this does not mean that 
there is no gain in parsimony involved in identifying normative properties with 
descriptive properties. Reductive realism is more ontologically parsimonious than 
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non-reductive realism (even naturalistic non-reductive realism) because it does not 
posit distinct necessarily co-extensive properties. All else being equal, therefore, 
reductive realism will come out ahead on plausibility points for this reason. 
Streumer points out that, even if normative properties are deliberatively 
indispensable, this does not mean that irreducibly normative properties are 
deliberatively indispensable (2017, 23). And we have already rejected Enoch’s and 
Parfit’s arguments (based as they are on the just-too-different-intuition) for the 
conclusion that normative facts and properties must be non-natural and 
metaphysically irreducible (Chapter 6). 
Unlike Enoch, however, we should also reject the thought that normative 
properties add no explanatory power of their own beyond that of non-normative 
properties.172 By the argument of the previous chapter, only normative properties 
could adequately explain our universal responses to certain of our phenomenal 
experiences, such as agony: an explanation that appeals entirely to facts and 
properties that are in no way normative (I have argued) would always fail to explain 
the link between the specific phenomenal character of the experience in question and 
the specific response to which it universally gives rise. But just because normative 
properties (such as the property of being a reason for aversion, or intrinsic ought-to-
be-avoidedness) are needed to explain these kinds of responses does not mean that 
these properties are not also descriptive. A descriptive property is not necessarily a 
                                                            
172. That is, properties that aren’t normative. 
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property that isn’t normative, and to assume that descriptive properties cannot be 
normative would already be to beg the question against reductive realism. 
Suppose that the normative property of being a reason for the kind of intense, 
instantaneous aversion that always follows the experience of agony is necessarily co-
extensive with the (apparently descriptive) property of being extremely unpleasant 
(since the phenomenal character of agony necessarily instantiates both of these 
properties).173 And suppose that premise (2) of the Reduction Argument is true and 
that necessarily co-extensive properties are necessarily identical. In that case, the 
descriptive property of being extremely unpleasant would also be a normative 
property, and what explains why we respond to agony (given that it has this 
property) with this kind of aversion would not be an irreducibly normative 
property, but the fact that a descriptive property (being extremely unpleasant) is also 
a normative property (being a reason for intense, instantaneous aversion). Is there 
any gain in explanatory power involved in positing an irreducibly normative 
property to explain our response to agony? If the phenomenal characters of 
experiences which have the property of being extremely unpleasant also have the 
irreducibly normative property of being a reason for intense, instantaneous aversion, 
this would indeed explain why we respond with such aversion to those experiences. 
But this would also seem to be explained equally well if the property of being 
extremely unpleasant is itself identical to the property of being a reason for this kind 
                                                            
173. I say “suppose” because, although anything that has the property of 
being extremely unpleasant (in the phenomenal sense) also has the property of being 
a reason for this kind of aversion, the reverse might not follow. 
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of aversion. Such an explanation would tell us that we respond in a certain way to a 
certain descriptive property because that property is also a normative property. And 
the reductive explanation, which simply says that a well-known descriptive property 
has the second-order property of being normative, is definitely more parsimonious 
than the non-reductive explanation, which says that this descriptive property is 
necessarily co-extensive with, but not identical to, an irreducibly normative 
property.174 
I think this illustrates that the burden on proof is on the non-reductionist to 
show that necessarily co-extensive properties are not identical, in light of the fact 
that it is more parsimonious to identify these properties than to regard them as 
distinct. The necessary co-extension of normative and descriptive properties does 
provide a strong (though not apodictic) reason to identify them (Jackson 2016, 202). 
The typical strategy for the non-reductionist is to attempt to offer various examples 
of necessarily co-extensive properties which are nonetheless distinct. But Streumer 
argues that if properties are what he calls ways objects can be—meaning that “what it 
is for an object to have a certain property is that this object itself is a certain way” 
(2017, 12)—it follows that (N), according to which necessarily co-extensive 
properties are identical, is the correct criterion of property identity. He considers 
                                                            
174. In other words, the reductive explanation says that we respond to agony 
in the way that we do because the (descriptive) property that agony has of being 
extremely unpleasant is itself a normative property, whereas the non-reductive 
explanation says that we respond to agony in this way because, in addition to 
having the property of being extremely unpleasant, it also has the (irreducibly 
normative) property of giving us a reason to respond in that way. It is clear that the 
former explanation is more parsimonious than the latter. 
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several purported counterexamples to (N), arguing that “if properties are ways 
objects can be, what (N) says about these examples is exactly right” (13). Probably 
the most plausible of these alleged counterexamples is the claim that, “[t]he 
predicate ‘is the only even prime number’ and ‘is the positive square root of four’ are 
necessarily co-extensive but ascribe different properties” (16). Parfit (2017), as a non-
reductive realist, claims that “it’s one thing to be the positive square root of 4, and 
quite a different thing to be the only even prime number” (69). And Streumer 
responds that, since the phrases, “the positive square root of four” and “the only 
even prime number” both refer to the number two (as Parfit admits), the predicates, 
“is the positive square root of four” and “is the only even prime number” must 
ascribe a single property: the property of being the number two (2017, 17). 
The predicates, “is the positive square root of four” and “is the only even 
prime number” no doubt express different concepts, and therefore ascribe different 
properties if properties are what Streumer calls shadows of concepts, which means that 
“what it is for an object to have a certain property is that this object falls under a 
certain concept” (12). Parfit tells us that he is using the word “property” in what he 
calls the pleonastic sense, the sense “in which any claim about something can be 
restated as a claim about this thing’s properties,” and thus in which the use of the 
word “property” adds nothing to the content of our claims.175 He also calls this sense 
the description-fitting sense, because in this sense, properties “fit the descriptive 
                                                            
175. For instance, as he puts it, “[i]nstead of saying that the Sun is bright, or 
that some argument is valid, we can say that the Sun has the property of being 
bright, or that this argument has the property of being valid” (66). 
253 
words or phrases with which we refer to them” (2017, 66) and he contrasts this with 
the necessarily co-extensional sense, in which (presumably) it is analytic that 
necessarily co-extensive properties are identical (or that necessarily co-extensive 
predicates ascribe the same property) (68). He then claims that “being the only even 
prime number and being the positive square root of 4 are the same property in the 
necessarily co-extensional sense,” but that “these properties are different in the 
description-fitting sense.” And why is this? Because “[t]he concept of being the only 
even prime number does not describe, and thereby refer to, the property of being the 
positive square root of 4” (69). 
The above seems to indicate that, as far as Parfit is concerned, the properties 
of being the only even prime number and being the positive square root of four are 
different only because the relevant concepts are different. Streumer would agree that 
these properties are different in the description-fitting sense (which seems to be the 
same thing as taking properties to be shadows of concepts). And they would both 
also agree that these properties are the same in the necessarily co-extensional sense 
(because this sense simply repeats the fact that these properties are necessarily co-
extensive). So this example doesn’t show that these necessarily co-extensive 
properties are nonetheless distinct if we take properties not to be shadows of 
descriptions or concepts but ways objects can be in-and-of-themselves. 
Parfit considers a further sense of “property” when he says that this word “is 
often used, not in this description-fitting sense [or the necessarily co-extensional 
sense], but in some narrower, ontologically weighty sense” (68). And as someone 
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who denies that normative truths have ontological implications, he doesn’t think 
that this sense applies to normative properties (indeed there are no normative 
properties, according to Parfit, in this ontological sense).176 But as we saw in Chapter 
4, normative properties do have ontological implications, and so this ontologically 
weighty sense of “property” applies to normative properties just as well as the 
description-fitting and necessarily co-extensional senses. It is basically incontestable 
that, if two concepts are different, the properties corresponding to these concepts are 
also different in the description-fitting sense (or the sense in which properties are 
shadows of concepts), and also that, if two properties are necessarily co-extensive, 
they are the same property in the necessarily co-extensional sense. And so it is this 
ontological sense that is the relevant sense when we are asking whether or not 
normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. Since (as we also saw in 
Chapter 4) what it is for a property to have ontological implications is for it to have 
some kind of causal standing or efficacy, we can say that properties are identical in 
this particular sense if and only if they necessarily have the exact same causal 
powers and effects.177 
                                                            
176. There are no ontologically weighty normative properties according to 
Streumer as well of course (because there are no normative properties). 
 
177. The ontological sense does not seem to be the relevant sense for 
properties like being the only even prime number or being the positive square root 
of four. There is no possible counterfactual scenario in which the only thing that 
actually has these properties (the number two) does not have these properties, 
meaning that these properties do not support counterfactuals and thus (under the 
counterfactual theory of causation at least) do not have any kind of causal standing, 
nor any ontological implications as a result. 
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Is it possible for properties to be necessarily co-extensive yet have different 
causal powers or effects? I think the answer must clearly be no. If properties A and B 
are necessarily co-extensive, there is no possible counterfactual scenario in which an 
object has property A without also having property B. This means that there is no 
possible counterfactual scenario in which an object with property A has different 
causal powers or effects than it actually has because it doesn’t have property B (and 
vice versa). We therefore cannot say truly that an object which has properties A and B 
would have different causal powers or effects than it actually has if it had property 
A but not property B (or vice versa). Neither property A nor property B, considered 
as distinct properties, makes a difference to the causal powers or effects of any object 
which has these properties. And if objects with property A necessarily have exactly 
the same causal powers and effects as objects with property B, it surely follows that 
property A itself has exactly the same causal powers and effects as property B, and 
thus that A and B are the same property, at least in the ontological sense. 
So (N) is the correct criterion of property identity for properties that are 
causally efficacious, ontologically weighty entities in their own right: if such 
properties are necessarily co-extensive, they are in fact the same property. 
Necessarily co-extensive concepts are not necessarily identical, but this is not 
something that is at issue between the reductionist and the non-reductionist. Robust 
normative properties are not merely shadows of concepts (or descriptions); they 
have the same ontological implications as the descriptive properties with which they 
are necessarily co-extensive. It follows from this that (N) is the correct criterion of 
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property identity for normative properties. This seems to give us premises (1) and 
(2) of the Reduction Argument, which together entail the conclusion that normative 
properties are identical with descriptive properties, and thus that normativity 
originates from concepts or judgements rather than the normative properties 
themselves. 
 
8.2. The problem with reductionism 
The Reduction Argument seems to establish that normative properties are 
identical to descriptive properties. If normative properties are identical to 
descriptive properties, normative predicates do not ascribe irreducibly normative 
properties, but rather descriptive properties. And as Streumer points out, “[i]f a 
certain normative predicate ascribes a certain descriptive property, this cannot be a 
brute fact. There must be something that makes it the case that this normative 
predicate ascribes this descriptive property” (2017, 43). If the normative predicate, “is 
right” ascribes the descriptive property of maximizing happiness, there must be 
some reason why this predicate ascribes the property of maximizing happiness, 
rather than, say, the property of maximizing suffering, and some reason why it is not 
some other, conflicting normative predicate (such as “is wrong”) that ascribes this 
property instead. The reductionist needs to be able to explain why normative 
predicates ascribe the particular descriptive properties that they ascribe. 
Predicates, of course, express concepts, so if a certain normative predicate 
ascribes a certain descriptive property, this must be in virtue of the concepts 
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expressed by both the normative and descriptive predicates that ascribe the same 
property. While the concepts expressed by the predicates, “is right” and “maximizes 
happiness” are different (one is normative, the other descriptive), if these predicates 
ascribe the same property, it must be in virtue of a necessary relation between these 
two concepts that these predicates ascribe the same property, and thus that the 
normative predicate ascribes the particular descriptive property that it ascribes. If 
something cannot fall under the concept expressed by the predicate, “is right” 
without also falling under the concept expressed by the predicate, “maximizes 
happiness,” because of the necessary relation standing between these two concepts, 
then this would explain why the normative predicate, “is right” ascribes the 
descriptive property of maximizing happiness. In other words, it is conceptual 
normative truths (such as, perhaps, the truth that what is right is maximizing 
happiness) which explain why certain normative predicates ascribe certain 
descriptive properties. 
However, if it is conceptual normative truths—and hence the necessary 
relations between normative and descriptive concepts—that explain why certain 
normative predicates ascribe certain descriptive properties, in virtue of what do 
these conceptual truths—and these conceptual relations—hold? Concepts (on the 
traditional view at least) “are abstract, sharable, mind-independent ways of thinking 
about objects and their properties” (Cuneo and Shafer-Landau 2014, 409), and “they 
are also referential devices or ways of getting things in mind that enable thinkers to refer 
to things such as objects and properties.” Concepts have essences in virtue of which 
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they apply only to certain things and not others: “[i]t belongs to the essence of ‘being 
wrong,’ for example, that it applies to exactly those things that are wrong” (410). If 
“is right” ascribes the property of maximizing happiness, then it must belong to the 
essence of the concept expressed by this normative predicate that it applies exactly to 
those things that have the descriptive property of maximizing happiness. And it 
must also belong to the essence of the concept expressed by the descriptive 
predicate, “maximizes happiness” that it applies exactly to those things that have the 
normative property of being right (thus generating the conceptual truth that what is 
right is maximizing happiness).178 
But can it just be a brute fact that it belongs to the essence of a certain 
normative concept that it applies to exactly those things that have a certain 
descriptive property? Take a non-normative conceptual truth such as the truth that 
nothing can be red and green all over. The essences of the concepts expressed by the 
predicates, “is red all over” and “is green all over” are such that nothing that 
satisfies the first can possibly satisfy the second. And this does not appear to be a 
brute fact: the essences of the concepts are necessarily related in the specific way that 
they are because the properties that these concepts represent—the properties of being 
red all over and of being green all over—are necessarily related in the same way. 
Nothing can have the property of being red all over at the same time as having the 
                                                            
178. As Cuneo and Shafer-Landau say, the “proposition that x is F is a 
conceptual truth if it belongs to the essence of ‘F’ that, necessarily, anything that 
satisfies ‘x’ also satisfies ‘F’” (410). And this is what would be the case for the 
proposition that what is right is maximizing happiness if the predicate, “is right” 
ascribes the property of maximizing happiness. 
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property of being green all over, and this is what explains why nothing can satisfy 
both of the equivalent concepts at the same time. Concepts being ways of thinking 
about objects and properties, if properties are ways objects can be, the essences of 
concepts and the relations between them are grounded in the essences of the 
underlying properties: it is impossible to think of something being both red and 
green all over at the same time because it is impossible for something to be both red 
and green all over at the same time. And the same should apply in the normative 
case. If the essences of the concepts expressed by the predicates, “is right” and 
“maximizes happiness” are such that nothing can satisfy the one without also 
satisfying the other, this must be explained by the fact that the essences of the 
equivalent properties are such that nothing can have one property without also 
having the other. 
If normative properties really are identical to descriptive properties, it must 
be the relations between normative and descriptive concepts that explain why 
certain normative predicates ascribe certain descriptive properties (and why certain 
descriptive predicates ascribe certain normative properties), in virtue of the fact that 
normative and descriptive predicates express these particular concepts.179 And since 
                                                            
179. Streumer says that, under reductive realism, what makes it the case that a 
certain normative predicate ascribes a certain descriptive property is either that, in 
certain descriptively specified conditions, users of this predicate would apply it to 
objects that have this property, or that, in certain normatively specified conditions, 
users of this predicate would apply it to these same objects (2017, 43). He then 
argues that, in the first case, reductive realism faces what he calls the false guarantee 
objection: it falsely implies that there are certain descriptively specified conditions in 
which people’s normative judgements are guaranteed to be correct (he takes it to be 
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concepts are ways of thinking about objects and properties, it must be the relations 
between objects and properties themselves that explain the relations between 
concepts: in other words, an object or a property can be thought about in a certain 
way only because the object or property can itself actually be that way. Under 
normative reductionism, the relations between normative predicates and descriptive 
properties (and descriptive predicates and normative properties) are explained by 
certain normative conceptual truths, and so it must be the properties represented by 
the concepts involved in these truths that explain the relations between normative 
and descriptive concepts, and hence why certain normative predicates ascribe 
certain descriptive properties. But if this is indeed the case, it must be the normative 
properties that are primarily normative, rather than the normative concepts: if the 
relations between normative and descriptive concepts are explained by the relations 
between normative and descriptive properties, the normativity of the normative 
properties must be prior to the normativity of normative predicates and concepts. 
And this is entirely contrary to the hypothesis that normative properties are identical 
to descriptive properties, and thus to the hypothesis of normative reductionism. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
a central thought about normative judgments that there are no descriptively 
specified conditions in which people’s normative judgements are guaranteed to be 
correct) (53). And in the second case, reductive realism faces what he calls the regress 
objection: it implies that a normative judgement, applying a certain normative 
predicate to an object with a certain descriptive property, would only be true if a 
further normative judgement, according to which the normatively specified 
conditions (in which this normative predicate ascribes that descriptive property) 
actually obtain, is also true, and so on ad infinitum, generating a vicious regress (57). I 
think the view that normative predicates ascribe the same properties as certain 
descriptive predicates because of the necessary relations between the concepts these 
predicates express avoids both of these objections. 
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So it appears that, pace the Reduction Argument, since normative properties 
are necessarily co-extensive with descriptive properties, they must be identical to 
descriptive properties, in the sense that normative predicates ascribe properties that 
can also be ascribed with descriptive predicates. But it also appears that, since 
normative and descriptive predicates ascribe the same properties in virtue of the 
relations between normative and descriptive concepts, and relations between 
concepts obtain in virtue of the relations between properties, it is the normative 
properties that are primarily normative rather than the concepts. And as we have 
seen, if normativity originally comes from properties, any predicate that ascribes a 
normative property will itself be a normative predicate in virtue of ascribing that 
property, meaning that no predicate that ascribes a normative property will be a 
descriptive predicate.180 Since descriptive predicates do not ascribe normative 
properties, therefore, normative properties are not actually identical to descriptive 
properties, and normative predicates do not actually ascribe descriptive properties, 
even though normative properties and predicates are necessarily co-extensive with 
descriptive properties and predicates. How can this be so?181 
 
                                                            
180. Remember, that while normative properties can also be descriptive 
properties (at least in so far as the definitions of “normative property” and 
“descriptive property” are concerned), normative predicates (by definition) cannot 
also be descriptive predicates. 
 
181. Streumer would of course answer that this is because there are in fact no 
normative properties. But quite aside from the fact that I have already defended 
metanormative realism (Chapters 2 and 3), I don’t think that we have to take this 
radical line (for reasons I am about to explain). 
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8.3. Predicate D* 
Jackson and Streumer both argue that the normative predicate, “is right” is 
necessarily co-extensive with a descriptive predicate which Jackson refers to as N 
(2016, 201) and Streumer refers to as D* (2017, 10).182 Predicate D* is a disjunctive 
predicate that consists of all the descriptive predicates that are satisfied by anything, 
in all possible worlds, that also satisfies the normative predicate, “is right” (9-10). In 
other words, D* is a disjunction of all the descriptive predicates that exist apart from 
those that are specifically excluded by the normative predicate, “is right”: every 
descriptive predicate that anything could possibly satisfy so long as it also satisfies 
the predicate, “is right.”183 And if something which satisfies the predicate, “is right” 
also satisfies any of the descriptive predicates in this disjunction (which it of course 
does), it also thereby satisfies predicate D*, from which it follows that “is right” is 
necessarily co-extensive with D*. Given the criterion of property identity (N) 
appealed to by the Reduction Argument (and which I have already defended), “is 
right” ascribes the same property as predicate D*. 
According to Jackson, “one thing we cannot say … is that ethical [or 
normative] properties match up with pattern-less infinite disjunctions of natural [or 
descriptive] properties” (2016, 201). Streumer points out that, “if properties are ways 
                                                            
182. I will refer it as D* to avoid confusion with (N). 
 
183. Satisfaction of the predicate, “is right” naturally excludes the satisfaction 
of predicates such as, “involves engaging in the recreational slaughter of others” and 
the like—any predicate the satisfaction of which by something prevents that thing 
from being right (and thus from satisfying the predicate, “is right”). 
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objects can be [they are not merely shadows of descriptions or concepts], properties 
are not themselves disjunctive or non-disjunctive”; they can only be ascribed with 
disjunctive or non-disjunctive predicates (2017, 26). So while the predicate, “is right” 
ascribes the same property as predicate D*, an infinitely disjunctive predicate 
consisting entirely of descriptive predicates, the property of being right cannot be 
equivalent to an infinite disjunction of the descriptive properties ascribed by the 
disjuncts of predicate D*. The property of being right must instead be equivalent, not 
to these descriptive properties themselves, but to a pattern in these descriptive 
properties. And it is this pattern that makes the property normative, not the fact that 
it can be ascribed by a normative predicate. What this means is that the property 
ascribed both by “is right” and predicate D* is not only normative but primarily 
normative. Normativity originally comes not from predicates, concepts or 
judgements, but from certain patterns in descriptive properties; and these patterns in 
descriptive properties are what normative properties are. Since the property ascribed 
by predicate D* is primarily normative, it therefore cannot be descriptive (because 
any predicate which ascribes this property will thereby be normative, not 
descriptive). And so it is false that the normative property of being right is identical 
to a descriptive property. 
This implies that premise (1) of the Reduction Argument is actually false: 
normative predicates and properties are not actually necessarily co-extensive with 
descriptive predicates and properties. Normative properties are necessarily co-
extensive with patterns in descriptive properties, and since these patterns in 
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descriptive properties are the things that are primarily normative, and these patterns 
are equivalent to normative properties like the property of being right, predicates 
like D* which ascribe these properties are not actually descriptive predicates 
(because they ascribe properties that are not only normative but primarily 
normative). As such, it is in fact not the case that normative properties can also be 
ascribed by descriptive predicates (or that normative predicates also ascribe 
descriptive properties). 
Streumer argues that predicate D* must be a descriptive predicate: in his 
words, “since a predicate that wholly consists of descriptive predicates is itself a 
descriptive predicate, predicate D* is a descriptive predicate” (10). But I think this 
assumption commits the fallacy of composition: we cannot assume that, just because 
the individual parts of predicate D* are descriptive, the whole predicate itself must 
be descriptive. If predicate D* ascribes a property that is also ascribed by the 
predicate, “is right,” then it ascribes a normative property. The property ascribed by 
both these predicates is a pattern in properties which consists entirely of descriptive 
parts. But this does not prevent this pattern as a whole from being a normative 
property. So the fact that predicate D* consists entirely of descriptive parts should 
not prevent it from being a normative predicate either.184 If normative predicates are 
                                                            
184. Especially when we remember that Streumer doesn’t tell us what 
normative and descriptive predicates actually are. If we start by defining normative 
and descriptive properties as those which can be ascribed with normative and 
descriptive predicates (respectively), and do not define what it is for a predicate to 
be normative or descriptive, we are quite likely to end up with the conclusion that 
the normativity of predicates is prior to the normativity of properties, because we 
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simply those that ascribe normative properties—since normativity extends from 
properties to the predicates that ascribe them—this will make predicate D* into a 
normative predicate. And I think we should conclude from the Reduction 
Argument, not only that the normative property of being right is identical to the 
(normative) property ascribed by predicate D*, but that predicate D* is itself 
normative because it ascribes the normative property of being right, and because this 
property is identical, not to any descriptive property, but to a normative pattern of 
descriptive properties and is therefore primarily normative. Since predicate D* is a 
normative predicate if it ascribes a property that is primarily normative, and the 
property of being right is, I submit, just such a property, predicate D* is in fact a 
normative predicate. Thus it is not in fact the case that the normative predicate, “is 
right” is necessarily co-extensive with a descriptive predicate. 
But how can premise (1) of the Reduction Argument be false if Grounding 
and Supervenience are both clearly true? Normative properties do supervene on 
descriptive properties, and things do have whatever normative properties they have 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
are defining the normativity of properties in terms of the normativity of predicates. 
In that case, it will be difficult to see how a predicate like D* could possibly be 
normative. But if instead we define a normative predicate as one which ascribes a 
normative property (while leaving it open exactly what a normative property is), we 
can easily see how D* could be a normative predicate even though it consists entirely 
of descriptive parts: the parts of this predicate only ascribe parts of the pattern which 
constitutes the property of being right, parts which are not themselves normative, 
whereas the whole predicate ascribes every part of the pattern—a pattern which 
(being equivalent to the property of being right) certainly is normative. The whole 
predicate is normative, even though its parts are not, because together its disjuncts 
ascribe every part of a pattern which is normative, even though the individual parts 
of the pattern are not. 
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in virtue of also having certain descriptive properties, so how can normative 
properties fail to be necessarily co-extensive with descriptive properties? I believe 
the answer is that, although any normative property is necessarily co-extensive with 
some descriptive property or other, no normative property is necessarily co-extensive 
with any descriptive property in particular. Normative properties are necessarily co-
extensive, not with any particular descriptive properties, but with patterns in 
descriptive properties that can be ascribed by predicates like D*, and this is why 
normative properties are equivalent to these patterns of descriptive properties, and 
thus why they can be ascribed by predicates like D* (which, I have argued, are in fact 
normative predicates). So premise (1) is not so much false as ambiguous: it could 
mean either that normative properties and predicates are necessarily co-extensive 
with particular descriptive properties and predicates, or that they are necessarily co-
extensive with some descriptive properties and predicates or other. In the first case, the 
conclusion—that normative properties are identical with descriptive properties, and 
that normative and descriptive predicates ascribe the same properties—will follow, 
but the premise is false. In the second, premise (1) is indeed true, but the conclusion 
will not follow: it is not obviously descriptive predicates (such as “maximizes 
happiness”) which ascribe the same properties as obviously normative predicates 
(such as “is right”), but predicates like D*, which may not be obviously normative, 
but which are not obviously descriptive either, and which must in fact be normative 
because they ascribe properties that are primarily normative. 
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The Reduction Argument, therefore, according to which normative properties 
(if they even exist at all) are identical to properties that can also be ascribed using 
descriptive, non-normative predicates, fails. We can construct a sound argument for 
the conclusion that normative properties are identical, not to descriptive or non-
normative properties, but to patterns in such descriptive or non-normative 
properties (patterns which are not identical to the descriptive or non-normative 
properties themselves): 
(1*) Normative properties are necessarily co-extensive with patterns in 
descriptive properties (like that ascribed by predicate D*). 
(2*) Properties are identical if and only if they are necessarily co-extensive 
(N). 
(3*) Therefore, normative properties are identical to patterns in descriptive 
properties. 
 
I think this argument establishes that properties are the things that are primarily 
normative, rather than normative predicates, concepts or judgements. The 
normativity of normative properties is prior to the normativity of normative 
predicates. Normative properties do not get their normativity from being ascribed 
by normative predicates; normative predicates get their normativity from ascribing 
normative properties. 
 
8.4. Is this reductionism? 
The non-reductionist is correct to hold that normative properties are the 
things that are primarily normative. But nonetheless, the above argument shows that 
there would be no normative properties whatsoever if not for certain non-normative 
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properties and the patterns these properties form185: normative properties, while 
perfectly real, are not fundamental features of the universe. Doesn’t this imply that 
there are no irreducibly normative properties, and thus that non-reductive 
metanormative realism is false? 
Jackson would no doubt maintain that to identify normative properties with 
patterns in non-normative properties is exactly to provide a reductive account of 
normativity. Drawing an analogy with the physical property of density (which is 
identical to mass divided by volume) he argues that “we identify density with a 
pattern of properties that aren’t density, namely, the ratio of mass to volume,” and 
“[i]t is in virtue of this fact that we can think of the identification of density as a 
reductive account” (2016, 199). But of course, to identify density with a pattern of 
properties that aren’t density (that is, the ratio of mass to volume) is not to identity 
density with the non-density properties (mass and volume) themselves. Density 
itself is something over-and-above the non-density properties on which it 
nonetheless ontologically depends. It is identical neither to mass or volume 
individually, nor just to the combination of mass and volume, but to a specific 
relationship between these two properties: mass divided by volume. An object which 
has mass, volume and density has three distinct properties, none of which is 
identical or reducible to any other. And the ratio of an object’s mass to its volume is 
neither identical nor reduces to a property that isn’t density—it is density. 
                                                            
185. Or perhaps, no normative property would be instantiated if not for 
certain non-normative properties being instantiated (if all properties exist 
necessarily). 
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Lee Smolin (2015) describes properties like density, which are always 
properties of a composite system “that would not make sense when applied to the 
parts [of the system],” and which “are not of the same kind as those of its component 
parts or processes,” as emergent properties. Emergent properties must be added to 
the list of properties in addition to the properties of the component parts of the 
system (378). In his illustration, “a litre of gasoline can have a mass, a momentum, a 
temperature, and a density. Its component molecules have mass and momentum, 
but it makes no sense to talk about the temperature or density of a molecule … So 
we say that temperature and density are emergent properties of the gas” (378-79). 
Smolin claims that “[t]his common circumstance does not represent a limit of the 
method of reductionism; instead it represents its intensification. For emergent 
properties can often be elucidated in terms of the properties of the parts” (379). But 
this is because he defines reductionism simply as “the good advice that if you want 
to understand a composite system, which means a system composed of parts, you 
will do well by explaining the properties of the composite system in terms of the 
properties of the parts” (378). As naturalists, we should be trying to explain the 
normative properties of things in terms of their non-normative properties, but this 
just means explaining how their non-normative properties give rise to their 
normative properties; it does not mean that normative properties are in any way 
identical to non-normative properties, any more than density is identical to the 
properties of mass or volume. If my arguments are correct, normative properties are 
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emergent properties which can be explained in terms of more basic non-normative 
properties, but this does not compromise their irreducible normativity. 
Returning to Blackburn’s definition of reductionism with which this chapter 
started (the facts or entities apparently needed to make true the statements of some 
area of discourse are dispensable in favour of some other facts or entities (2016, 311)), 
we can observe that statements about an object’s density are made true by facts 
about the object’s mass and volume, plus the fact that density is mass divided by 
volume. Given this fact about what density is, the fact that an object has a certain 
density is of course equivalent to the fact that it has a certain mass and volume. But 
neither of these facts is the same fact as the fact that density is mass divided by 
volume. And if not for this further fact, objects would not have density, and 
statements about the densities of objects would not be true. In the normative case, 
since being right is equivalent to D*, the fact that something is right is equivalent to 
the fact that it has the property ascribed by predicate D*. But these facts are not 
equivalent to the fact that being right is D*. And if not for this further fact, nothing 
would be right, and statements about which things are right would not be true. 
So what, then, is the status of the fact that being right is equivalent to D*? Is it 
an irreducibly normative fact? If it isn’t, I think it would follow that irreducibly 
normative facts are not needed to make normative statements true, and that we can 
therefore say that reductionism, as a general thesis, applies to the normative domain. 
The fact that something is right (or that it is D*) may be a normative fact, but it is not 
an irreducibly normative fact unless the fact that being right is D* is itself an 
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irreducibly normative fact. If something is right, what makes it the case that this fact 
obtains is simply that the thing has certain descriptive properties sufficient for it to 
satisfy predicate D*, combined with the fact that being right is D*. And since the fact 
that being right is D* involves a certain normative property being identical to a 
certain normative property (“being right” and “D*” of course ascribing the very 
same normative property), it might seem that it could not possibly be an irreducibly 
normative fact. But as we have seen, what this fact actually means is that when non-
normative properties come together in a certain way, a normative property is 
thereby formed. The fact that being right is D* tells us thus that, when something has 
certain non-normative properties (sufficient for it to be D*), it will also have a certain 
normative property (being right).186 This and other facts like it are indispensable to 
the truth of statements within the normative domain. I believe, therefore, that this 
fact is an irreducibly normative fact. And so is any fact according to which a certain 
pattern in non-normative properties equates to a certain normative property. 
 
8.5. Conclusion 
I conclude that the normative cannot be completely reduced to the non-
normative, and thus that normative reductionism is false. This is in spite of the fact 
that an argument close to the Reduction Argument actually succeeds. But as that 
argument shows, normative properties are not identical to straightforwardly 
                                                            
186. Just like the fact the density is mass divided by volume tells us that, if an 
object has the properties of mass and volume, it will also have the property of 
density. 
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descriptive properties (such as maximizing happiness), but to patterns in descriptive 
or non-normative properties, patterns which are not reducible to the non-normative 
properties themselves. Normativity originally comes from these patterns in non-
normative properties, not from the predicates that ascribe the properties to which 
these patterns are equivalent, nor the concepts or judgements which these predicates 
express. And since normative properties are equivalent to patterns in non-normative 
properties, rather than to the non-normative properties themselves, these properties, 
I believe, are irreducibly normative. 
The situation with normativity is analogous to the situation with 
consciousness or phenomenal experience. Consciousness, I think we can say, is a 
form of organized matter, and phenomenal properties are equivalent to patterns in 
physical properties: properties which are not themselves phenomenal, but which, 
when they come together in a certain way, form phenomenal properties. 
Phenomenal properties (quite plausibly) cannot be completely reduced to physical 
properties, but they are nonetheless completely metaphysically dependent on them: 
they are substantive, but not fundamental, features of the universe. In the case of 
consciousness and phenomenal experience, to simply deflate the phenomenal into 
the physical, or to take the phenomenal to be somehow metaphysically primitive, or 
indeed to deny its existence altogether, is to avoid the crucial task of actually 
understanding consciousness by explaining exactly how the conscious arises from the 
non-conscious. Likewise, to deflate normativity into a function of predicates and 
concepts (or the like), as the reductionist does, or to regard it as a fundamental 
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feature of the universe, like the non-naturalist, or to simply deny its existence, like 
the error theorist, is to avoid the task of explaining normativity, and therefore of 






I have argued that there are mind-independent, irreducibly normative truths, 
and that these truths can be known on the basis of observation and inference to the 
best explanation. The Agony Principle, according to which we always have a reason 
to want and to try to avoid all future agony, is a prime example of an irreducibly 
normative truth that can be known empirically by inference to the best explanation. 
Normative truths do not always need to be known in this way, however. Parfit’s 
Wager, according to which we have reasons to believe in (mind-independent) 
normative truths, and to engage in the form of deliberation which is committed to 
the existence of such truths (normative deliberation), is an example of a substantive 
normative truth which can be known a priori. But our ability to respond to normative 
reasons in a sensitive, counterfactually dependent manner suggests that normative 
facts and properties are genuinely causally efficacious (unless, that is, we interpret 
causality in an overly narrow sense, a sense that would actually rule out the 
possibility of facts and properties in general having any causal standing). And this in 
turn suggests that the normative domain is not autonomous from, but continuous 
with, the domain of the natural sciences, in the same way that other a priori 
accessible domains, such as logic and mathematics, are nonetheless perfectly 
continuous with science. 
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It is true that normative principles are not currently used in science in the way 
that logical and mathematical principles are. But since, returning to the definition of 
normativity with which we started, normativity is a force that applies specifically to 
the decisions and responses of conscious agents, and no one can justifiably claim that 
we fully understand these kinds of responses in a scientific way, I think there is still 
very much room for irreducibly normative principles to feature in a future “science 
of man,” which will not only explain why we respond to the world in the ways that 
we do, but which will also help us to understand which kinds of responses the 
world actually calls for. I believe the view I have advocated provides us with the 
most reliable basis for expanding our normative knowledge and for reaching greater 
convergence on our normative judgements. 
 
9.1. Robust Metanormative Naturalism and the Holy Grail of Metaethics 
I will end this dissertation by briefly considering the prospects for Robust 
Metanormative Naturalism to provide a basis not only for normative objectivity, but 
also for a stronger form of ethical objectivity, construed so as to cover specifically 
moral and altruistic reasons rather than just normative reasons in general. If the 
arguments I have made are correct, they show that we have normative reasons to be 
concerned with the contents of our own conscious experiences (such as agony) as 
individual conscious agents, but does this mean that we also have normative reasons 
to be concerned with the conscious experiences of others? Does the Agony Principle 
mean that Alan Gibbard’s ideally coherent Caligula, who “values the activity of 
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torturing others for fun, is perfectly logically and instrumentally consistent in 
holding this value, and is making no mistakes about the non-normative facts,” 
(Street 2016b, 164) nonetheless has sufficient normative reason not to torture others 
for fun (because of the intrinsic badness of the suffering this will cause, or for any 
other reason for that matter)? Many of us have a strong inchoate sense that such an 
agent is badly mistaken in thinking that the suffering of others has no bearing on 
how he ought to act. As Street explains, 
The Holy Grail in secular metaethics would be a vindication of this inchoate 
sense—a philosophical account that clearly explained, with no mysterious 
metaphysical or epistemological remainder, and in a way that rang deeply 
true with our pre-philosophical sense of things, exactly what such an agent’s 
mistake would consist in when he or she contemplated the suffering of others 
and saw it as counting for nothing. (165) 
 
Parfit’s Wager and the Normative Explanations argument, which together yield the 
Agony Principle, meaning that we always have a reason to (want to) avoid agony 
that comes not from our contingent desires, but from the intrinsic phenomenal 
character of agony itself, are, I think, both necessary steps on the road to discovering 
this Holy Grail. But the Agony Principle on its own does not tell us that we have 
reasons to be concerned with anyone else’s suffering. A further step is needed, 
therefore, to reach the conclusion that even an ideally coherent Caligula is mistaken 
when he contemplates the suffering of others and sees it as counting for nothing. 
The step that Street herself tries to take to reach this Holy Grail is to observe 
that all agents face what she calls the “problem of attachment and loss” (161), which is 
simply the fact that “[e]ach of us faces the inevitable loss of everyone and everything 
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we love,” and that “[m]ore generally, we face an ineliminable gap between how 
things are and how we would like them to be” (163). Street suggests that, for every 
one of us, the optimal solution to this problem involves adopting what she calls the 
“standpoint of pure awareness” in which one identifies with “a universal point of view 
on the world that transcends any particular, finite point of view … a point of view 
which is not itself vulnerable to loss” (186). She then goes on to suggest that “the 
standpoint of pure awareness is also an ethical standpoint,” because “[t]his point of 
view sees itself everywhere and is necessarily compassionate with the lived 
experience of every being. It recognizes that there is no real difference between ‘self’ 
and ‘other’—that instead ‘I’ am everywhere, in ‘you’ as much as ‘me’” (186-87). In 
other words, if we all have normative reasons to be concerned with our own 
conscious experiences, and consequently to (want to) avoid extremely negative 
experiences like agony and loss, we all have normative reasons to adopt the 
standpoint of pure awareness: adopting this standpoint is the only way we can avoid 
being vulnerable to loss. And if we all have reasons to adopt the standpoint of pure 
awareness, we all have reasons to have the same kind of concern with the conscious 
experiences of every other being as we do with our own conscious experiences 
(because this is what the standpoint of pure awareness necessarily involves). Even 
Caligula, therefore, actually has most reason to be compassionate towards others 
rather than torturing them for his own amusement. 
Thus outlined, this particular map to the Holy Grail does not strike me as 
totally coherent. If one identifies with a standpoint that takes one from being 
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primarily concerned with one’s own lived experience (or with the experience of a 
small minority of people) to being far more substantially concerned with the lived 
experience of all conscious beings, then surely one’s vulnerability to loss has thereby 
only increased, rather than being somehow removed or reduced. If being concerned 
with my own experience makes me vulnerable to loss in the first place, becoming 
equally concerned with the experience of all conscious beings will surely make my 
vulnerability to loss equivalent, not to the absence of any such vulnerability, but 
rather to the combined vulnerability of all conscious beings. I will therefore be far 
less vulnerable to loss, not if I am equally compassionate towards the suffering of all 
conscious beings, but in fact if I am strictly concerned only with my own suffering 
and well-being. I have far less to lose as just one conscious being than as the sum of 
all conscious beings and their combined capacity for suffering. Parfit (2011b) 
interprets Nietzsche as claiming that “[t]o live cheerfully and with a good conscience 
… each of us needs to have some horizon around ourselves … If we were fully aware 
of the sufferings of others, we would be ‘overwhelmed by compassion,’ and not 
want to live” (574). For the same reason, I don’t think it is viable to maintain that we 
have reasons to be compassionate towards all conscious beings that ultimate stem 
from our self-interest in solving a problem that applies to us as individuals.187 
                                                            
187. Moreover, because Street also argues that the problem of attachment and 
loss is a consequence of any evaluative point of view whatsoever, no matter the 
particulars (such as whether or not it values compassionate concern for all conscious 
beings) (2016b, 175), and it certainly seems that it must be such a consequence, since 
to have any evaluative point of view on the world is to encounter the fact that the 
world will never fully live up to one’s values, it is difficult to see how the standpoint 
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But I think there is still something in the idea that there is no real difference 
between “self” and “other” (that instead “I” am everywhere, in “you” as much as in 
“me”), and that this, combined with the idea that there are normative reasons which 
ultimately stem, not from our desires, but from the intrinsic phenomenal characters 
of our experiences, is what can finally lead us to that elusive Holy Grail. Robust 
Metanormative Naturalism tells us that some conscious experiences are inherently 
reason-giving (they have ought-to-be-avoidedness or ought-to-be-pursuedness built into 
them). If we combine this metanormative view with the right view of personal 
identity and the self—a view on which personhood and the self are, on the one hand, 
“thick” enough for there to be reasons for persons to respond in certain ways in the 
first place, and yet at the same time also “thin” enough to block the relativization of 
the normative reasons that experiences like agony generate to the persons who stand 
to have the particular experiences in question—this should entail that we have 
normative reasons to be concerned not only with our own conscious experiences, but 
also with the conscious experiences of others. If this view of personhood is correct, 
Caligula would have reasons to cease his practice of torturing others for fun, reasons 
which come directly from the nature of the suffering he is causing, because the 
separateness of his own personhood and that of his victims would not be robust 
enough to prevent the reason-giving force of their suffering from transmitting to 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
of pure awareness could possibly be an ethical (and thus evaluative) standpoint at 
all if it is also supposed to be a point of view which is itself not vulnerable to loss. 
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him. His mistake would then consist precisely in thinking and acting as if the 
difference or boundary between himself and others is more real than it really is. 
This idea is to some extent a familiar one. If one has a reason to (want to) 
avoid all future agony, one has a reason to prevent one’s future self from being in 
agony. If one has a reason to be concerned with the conscious experiences of one’s 
future self, one thereby has a reason to be concerned with the experiences of a self 
that is distinct from one’s present self. Prudential reasons are therefore reasons to be 
concerned with the suffering and well-being of a self which is in an important sense 
“other” than the present self which actually has these reasons. And altruistic reasons 
are essentially reasons of this same kind: reasons to be co concerned with the 
suffering and well-being of selves other than the self which has actually these 
reasons. If there is no robust difference between one’s future self and another self 
which exists outside one’s own body, then if one has reasons to prevent one’s future 
self from suffering, it arguably follows that one also has reasons to prevent the 
suffering of other selves which are distinct both from one’s present self and one’s 
future self. Christine Korsgaard (2009) argues that, in light of the choice-dependent 
nature of personal identity—in her words, “what counts as me, my incentives, my 
reasons, my identity, depends on, rather than proceeds, the kinds of choices that I 
make” (199)—interacting with others is rationally and normatively equivalent to 
interacting with yourself: “the requirements for unifying your agency internally are 
the same as the requirements for unifying your agency with that of others” (202). For 
Korsgaard, you cannot act for reasons at all unless you actively constitute yourself as 
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a person and unify your agency internally (204), which means that the reasons that 
apply to your future self must also have normative force for your present self, and if 
you meet the requirements for doing this, you also meet the requirements for 
unifying your agency with that of others, which means that the reasons that apply to 
them must also have normative force for you. 
I would argue that the above argument fails within Korsgaard’s own 
constructivist framework188: if there are no categorical reasons, I don’t think even the 
reasons of our own present selves are normative for us, let alone the reasons of our 
future selves or the reasons of other selves that exist outside our own bodies. In this 
scenario, we may have hypothetical reasons to take the reasons of these other selves 
into account, but on my understanding at least, these would not be truly normative 
reasons. Yet if we are Robust Metanormative Naturalists, we can reject metaethical 
constructivism while still retaining its crucial insights about the nature of 
personhood and its significance for personal and interpersonal interaction. If 
Korsgaard is right that what counts as me depends on, rather than precedes, the 
kinds of choices that I make, then my personhood will be real enough for me to have 
normative reasons for action in the first place, but not real enough for it to be 
legitimate to relativize the Agony Principle to mean that I only have reasons to (want 
to) avoid my own future agony: the inherently reason-giving nature of agony will 
always precede the construction of my personhood that is based inescapably on the 
                                                            
188. I take it that metaethical constructivist is committed to the doctrine of 
Internalism (or subjectivism) about reasons, which I do not believe to be a coherent 
position. 
282 
choices that I make. It will thus provide a normative basis for me to constitute my 
identity in one way rather than other, and thus in a way that involves my having a 
concern for the suffering and well-being of others, rather than just my own.189 
Parfit believed that our continued existence and identity as persons is not a 
deep further fact, distinct from our physical and psychological continuity, nor a fact 
that must be all-or-nothing, in the sense that each of us always either is or is not one 
particular person at any given time, but is instead simply certain direct connections 
between past, present and future experiences, such as those involved in experience-
memory, or in the carrying out of an earlier intention. In a famous passage (1984), he 
describes what happened to him when he came to accept this “Reductionist View” of 
the self and personal identity: 
When I believed that my existence was a such a further fact, I seemed 
imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was 
moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I 
changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the 
open air. There is still a difference between my life and the lives of other 
people. But the difference is less. Other people are closer. I am less concerned 
about the rest of my own life, and more concerned about the lives of others. 
(281) 
 
If there is no glass wall between oneself and others, and one’s conscious experiences 
give one normative reasons to be concerned about one’s own life, then these same 
                                                            
189. This may also serve to vindicate the oft-maligned move that Mill (1998) 
tried to make from the premise “that each person’s happiness is a good to that 
person” to the conclusion that “the general happiness, therefore, [is] a good to the 
aggregate of all persons” (81). If personal identity is ultimately choice-dependent, 
the reason we have to pursue happiness as such would already exist prior to the 
reasons we have to pursue our own happiness (which would come into existence 
only after we construct our separate individual identities). We could not then easily 
appeal to the “separateness of persons” in order to bock Mill’s conclusion. 
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experiences should also give others normative reasons to be concerned about one’s 
life, and the experiences of others should give one normative reasons to be 
concerned about their lives as well. If what we essentially are is just experiences that 
are related to each other in certain (direct) ways, and thus we are not really 
imprisoned inside glass tunnels that robustly separate us from each other, the 
normative reasons these experiences generate are likewise not imprisoned within the 
walls of glass tunnels, unable to transmit their normative force from one person to 
the other. The best explanation for why Parfit became more concerned with the lives 
of others upon accepting the Reductionist View could be that he became more 
sensitive to the normative reasons generated by the experiences of others 
(experiences that just happen not to be related in certain ways to certain other 
experiences), because he was longer imprisoned in the illusory glass tunnel of the 
self that kept him from responding appropriately to these normative reasons. And it 
may be the fact that agents like Caligula are so deeply imprisoned within this false 
tunnel—which in their case seems darker than glass—preventing them from 
responding to the reasons given to them by the sufferings of others, which 
ultimately explains their malignant behaviour. I will not defend this view of 
personal identity here; I will simply remark that, if something similar to this view 
turns out to be true, then given the resources provided by Robust Metanormative 
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